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ABSTRACT		Effective	emotion	regulation	is	essential	for	our	social	and	emotional	well-being.	Yet,	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 as	 it	 is	 conventionally	 regarded	 in	 the	field,	does	not	 take	 important	aspects	of	emotions	and	emotion	regulation	 into	account.	The	overarching	aim	of	the	current	thesis	was	to	include	such	missing	aspects	 and	 thereby	 expand	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	 regulation.	 The	 expansion	occurred	 in	 two	directions:	 firstly,	 the	definition	of	 emotion	within	 the	 field	of	emotion	regulation	was	widened	to	include	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions	in	terms	of	value-based	prediction	errors	and	their	neural	implementation;	and	secondly,	 an	 underestimated	 type	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 –	 the	 social	 emotion	regulation	–	and	its	neural	underpinnings	were	investigated.		Projects	 1	 and	 2	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	 expand	 the	 emotion	 part	 of	 emotion	regulation.	 Project	 1	 investigated	whether	 emotion	 regulation	 affects	 not	 only	emotional	response-related	brain	activity	but	also	influences	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity,	i.e.,	the	motivation-related	brain	signal.	We	found	that	self-initiated	 reappraisal,	 a	 type	 of	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation,	 indeed	 affected	prediction	 error-related	 activity,	 such	 that	 this	 activity	 was	 enhanced	 in	 the	ventral	tegmental	area,	ventral	striatum,	insula	and	hippocampus,	possibly	via	a	prefrontal-tegmental	 pathway.	 Project	 2	 further	 examined	 the	 way	 emotion	regulation	 affects	 emotions	 and	 prediction	 errors,	 by	 testing	 whether	 self-initiated	reappraisal	directly	targets	the	brain	network	for	motivated	behaviour	previously	 outlined	 by	 animal	 studies.	We	 found	 that	 superior	 (in	 contrast	 to	inferior)	 regulators	 affected	 the	 balance	 of	 competing	 influences	 of	 ventral	striatal	afferents	on	striatal	aversive	prediction	error	signals;	 they	reduced	 the	impact	of	subcortical	striatal	afferents	(i.e.,	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	ventral	tegmental	area),	while	keeping	the	influence	of	the	prefrontal	cortex	on	ventral	striatal	prediction	errors	constant.	Inferior	regulators,	on	the	other	hand,	failed	to	 supress	 subcortical	 inputs	 into	 the	 ventral	 striatum	 and	 instead	counterproductively	 reduced	 the	 prefrontal	 influence	 on	 ventral	 striatal	prediction	error	signals.		
			ii	
Projects	3	and	4	of	 the	 thesis	extend	the	regulation	part	of	emotion	regulation.	Project	3	explored	 the	neural	 correlates	of	 social	 cognitive	emotion	 regulation,	specifically	reappraisal,	and	directly	compared	them	with	those	of	self-initiated	reappraisal.	We	 found	 that	 regions	of	 the	anterior,	 the	medial	parietal,	 and	 the	lateral	 temporo-parietal	 default	 mode	 network	 were	 specifically	 involved	 in	social	 emotion	 regulation,	 and	 that	 social	 regulation	 success	 and	 the	 default	mode	 network	 involvement	 during	 regulation	 were	 related	 to	 participants’	attachment	 security	 scores.	 Project	 4	 investigated	 social	 emotion	 modulation	and	 its	 impact	 on	 two	 distinct	 types	 of	 emotional	 brain	 activity	 –	 emotional	response-	 and	 aversive	 prediction	 error-related	 activity.	 We	 found	 –	 for	 the	simple	 contrast	 of	 being	 with	 somebody	 versus	 being	 alone	 –	 a	 three-fold	dissociation	between	signal	types	and	insula	subregions,	including	left	and	right	anterior	and	posterior	insula	parts.	Social	emotion	modulation	reduced	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	in	the	posterior	insula,	while	simultaneously	increasing	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	anterior	insula.	Furthermore,	the	social	 effect	 on	prediction	 error-related	 activity	was	positively	 associated	with	aversive	learning	in	the	right,	but	negatively	in	the	left	anterior	insula.			Altogether,	 by	 expanding	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 projects	 of	 the	current	 thesis	 provide	 new	 insights	 into	 both	 the	 effects	 and	 the	 neural	underpinnings	 of	 three	 distinct	 emotion	 regulation	 types.	 Considering	 that	problems	 in	 both	 intrapersonal	 emotion	 regulation	 and	 social	 interaction	 are	linked	 to	 affective	 disorders,	 our	 findings	 might	 contribute	 to	 a	 better	understanding	of	these	disorders	and	the	disorder-specific	emotional	and	social	impairments.		 	
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General	Introduction:	Emotion	
Regulation	in	an	Extended	Context	
	Our	emotions	are	subject	to	change	at	any	moment.	We	can	feel	content	and	happy,	but	become	highly	distressed	if	we	unexpectedly	receive	news	that	a	loved	one	has	been	in	a	car	accident.	While	emotions	are	an	essential	part	of	life,	it	is	of	paramount	importance	 to	 our	 mental	 health	 that	 we	 are	 able	 to	 control	 or	 regulate	 our	emotional	 responses	 (Eftekhari,	 Zoellner,	 &	 Vigil,	 2009;	 Gross	 &	 Jazaieri,	 2014;	Gross	 &	 Muñoz,	 1995;	 Ochsner,	 Silvers,	 &	 Buhle,	 2012;	 Sheppes,	 Suri,	 &	 Gross,	2015).	But	emotions	are	much	more	than	simple	responses	to	our	environment.	By	giving	objects	and	events	value,	emotions	motivate	our	actions,	so	that	we	strive	to	approach	positive	 and	avoid	negative	 experiences	 (Lang	&	Bradley,	 2010;	 Lang	&	Davis,	 2006);	 emotion	 regulation	 might	 therefore	 additionally	 involve	 regulating	parameters	associated	with	motivated	behaviour.	On	the	other	hand,	our	emotions	are	not	only	regulated	by	us,	but	can	also	be	 influenced	by	others;	 social	emotion	regulation	 is	 therefore	 an	 important,	 but	 often	 neglected,	 type	 of	 emotion	regulation.	 In	 brief,	 projects	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	 aimed	 to	 incorporate	 1)	 the	motivational	 aspect	 of	 emotions	 into	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 thereby	extending	the	notion	of	emotion	regulation	to	additionally	include	the	regulation	of	emotional-motivational	 responses;	 and	 2)	 social	 emotion	 regulation	 as	 an	important	 but	 largely	 underestimated	 type	 of	 emotion	 regulation.	 General	Introduction	is	divided	into	four	parts.	The	first	part	introduces	emotion	regulation	as	it	is	typically	viewed,	especially	focusing	on	reappraisal,	its	neural	underpinnings	and	 individual	 differences	 in	 reappraisal	 ability.	 The	 second	 part	 focuses	 on	 the	motivational	 aspect	 of	 emotions,	 introduces	 prediction	 errors,	 their	 neural	correlates,	 and	 the	 neural	 network	 of	 motivated	 behaviour.	 The	 third	 part	introduces	social	emotion	modulation	and	regulation	and	the	current	knowledge	on	their	neural	basis.	Finally,	the	fourth	part	outlines	the	aims	of	this	thesis.	 	
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1.1	Emotion	Regulation	Seen	 conventionally,	 emotion	 regulation	 denotes	 the	 process	 of	 controlling	 your	emotional	 responses	 (for	 reviews,	 see	 Gross,	 2015;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Phillips,	Ladouceur,	&	Drevets,	2008).	In	order	to	present	the	conventional	view	of	emotion	regulation,	the	current	section	portrays:	a)	different	types	of	emotion	regulation;	b)	reappraisal	 as	 a	 highly	 effective	 emotion	 regulation	 strategy;	 c)	 neural	 systems	involved	in	the	generation	and	regulation	of	emotion;	and	d)	individual	differences	in	reappraisal	ability.		
1.1.1	Emotion	Generation	and	Types	of	Emotion	Regulation	Conventional	 theories	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 clearly	 separate	 the	 concepts	 of	emotion	 generation	 and	 emotion	 regulation.	 Because	 various	 types	 of	 emotion	regulation	occur	at	different	stages	of	emotion	generation,	 it	 is	worthwhile	to	first	briefly	 outline	 the	 process	 of	 emotion	 generation	 (Gross,	 2015;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	2012).	 The	 generation	 of	 emotion	 starts	 with	 the	 perception	 of	 a	 stimulus	 in	 a	specific	 context	 (Barrett,	Mesquita,	Ochsner,	&	Gross,	 2006;	Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012).	The	stimulus	can	be	internal	(e.g.	feeling	of	loneliness	or	contentment)	or	external	(e.g.	 a	 snake	 or	 a	 smiling	 face).	 The	 context	 is	 important,	 since	 it	 can	 change	 the	value	of	the	stimulus	and	the	associated	emotion(s).	For	instance,	noticing	a	snake	in	 your	 son’s	 playroom	 (therefore	 probably	 a	 snake	 toy)	 or	 on	 a	 forest	 footpath	(therefore	 probably	 a	 dangerous	 animal)	 can	 drastically	 change	 the	 process	 of	emotion	 generation.	 The	 second	 step	 of	 emotion	 generation	 involves	 the	deployment	 of	 attention	 to	 certain	 stimuli	 or	 parts	 of	 stimuli,	 determining	which	stimuli	will	be	focused	on	and	therefore	processed	further	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2012).	In	the	 following	 step,	 the	 relevant	 stimulus	 or	 stimuli	 are	 appraised	 based	 on	 one’s	current	 needs,	 wishes,	 and	 goals,	 to	 determine	 their	 significance	 (i.e.,	 are	 they	positive	 or	 negative	 and	 to	 what	 extent).	 The	 fourth	 and	 final	 step	 of	 emotion	generation	embodies	the	emotional	response,	in	terms	of	experience,	behaviour	and	autonomic	bodily	changes	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2012).		Different	 types	of	emotion	regulation	can	be	categorised	along	a	voluntary	versus	automatic	 dimension,	 as	well	 as	 depending	 on	which	 step	 of	 emotion	 generation	
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they	 are	 targeting,	 such	 as	 attentional	 control,	 cognitive	 change,	 or	 response	modulation	(Gross,	2015;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2012;	Ochsner	&	Gross,	2005;	Phillips	et	al.,	2008).	Automatic	attentional	control	could	be	the	modulation	of	spatial	attention	by	emotional	 stimuli	 in	 a	 fear-conditioning	 paradigm	 (Armony,	 2002),	 automatic	cognitive	 change	 might	 involve	 covert	 learning	 that	 leads	 to	 an	 automatic	adjustment	 of	 behaviour	 (e.g.	 in	 choosing	 risky	 or	 safe	 decisions	 in	 an	 Iowa	gambling	 task)	 (Fukui,	Murai,	 Fukuyama,	 Hayashi,	 &	 Hanakawa,	 2005;	 Lawrence,	Jollant,	O'Daly,	Zelaya,	&	Phillips,	2009),	while	automatic	behavioural	 control	may	be	 represented	 by	 fear	 extinction	 (Gottfried	 &	 Dolan,	 2004;	 Phelps,	 Delgado,	Nearing,	&	LeDoux,	2004).	On	 the	other	hand,	voluntary	attentional	control	might	involve	 selective	 attention	 in	 a	 go/no	 go	 task	 (Goldstein	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 voluntary	cognitive	 change	usually	 represents	 a	 reappraisal	 or	 cognitive	 re-evaluation	of	 an	emotional	 event	 (Goldin,	 McRae,	 Ramel,	 &	 Gross,	 2008;	 Kanske,	 Heissler,	Schönfelder,	Bongers,	&	Wessa,	2011;	McRae	et	al.,	2010;	McRae,	Ochsner,	Mauss,	Gabrieli,	 &	 Gross,	 2008;	 Ochsner,	 Bunge,	 Gross,	 &	 Gabrieli,	 2002;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	2004;	 Phan	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Walter	 et	 al.,	 2009),	 while	 behavioural	 control	 might	involve	suppressing	one’s	emotional	expression	while	watching	negatively	charged	film	clips	(Goldin	et	al.,	2008;	Lévesque	et	al.,	2003).		
1.1.2	Reappraisal	Most	 research	up	 to	 date	 has	 focused	 on	deliberate	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation,	specifically	 reappraisal	 (for	 reviews	 and	 meta-analyses,	 see	 Buhle	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Kalisch,	 2009;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Reappraisal	 is	 a	 complex	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 strategy;	 it	makes	 use	 of	 higher	 cognitive	 processes,	 such	 as	 language,	memory	and	attention,	in	order	to	change	one’s	appraisal	of	the	stimulus,	including	the	connection	of	the	stimulus	to	oneself,	with	the	goal	of	changing	one’s	emotional	response	 to	 that	 stimulus	 (Buhle	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Gross,	 2002;	 Kalisch,	 2009).	 As	 an	example,	 imagine	 that	 you	 are	 unexpectedly	 evicted	 from	 your	 apartment,	which	makes	 you	 anxious	 and	 angry.	 One	 way	 to	 make	 yourself	 feel	 better	 is	 by	 re-interpreting	 the	 situation.	For	 instance,	 you	could	 remind	yourself	how	small	 and	expensive	 the	 apartment	 really	was,	 and	 how	 the	 loud	 neighbour	 above	 you	was	reducing	your	valuable	hours	of	 sleep	–	perhaps	 the	eviction	 is	 an	opportunity	 to	find	a	better	place	to	live.	
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One	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 reappraisal	 is	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 emotion	 regulation	strategies	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 an	 incredibly	 effective	 strategy	 of	modulating	 both	subjective	emotional	feelings	and	physiological	emotional	reactions	(Dillon	&	Labar,	2005;	Gross,	2002;	Gross	&	John,	2003;	Kalisch	et	al.,	2005;	Webb,	Miles,	&	Sheeran,	2012).	 The	 effects	 of	 reappraisal	 are	 also	 longer	 lasting	 than	 those	 of	 attentional	control	 strategies	 (Kross	 &	 Ayduk,	 2008;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Ochsner	 &	 Gross,	2005).	 Furthermore,	 people	 that	 normally	 use	 reappraisal	 more	 often	 than	suppression	 (i.e.,	 a	 behavioural	 control	 regulation	 strategy)	 show	 advantages	 in	mental	 health	 and	 social	 functioning	 (Eftekhari	 et	 al.,	 2009;	Gross,	 2002;	Gross	&	John,	 2003).	 Finally,	 reappraisal	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 various	 forms	 of	psychotherapy,	 such	 as	 cognitive	 behavioural	 therapy	 (Beck,	 2005),	 further	increasing	the	importance	of	this	emotion	regulation	strategy.		
1.1.3	The	Neural	Underpinnings	of	Emotion	Regulation	and	Reappraisal	An	 extensive	 body	 of	 work	 has	 explored	 the	 neural	 systems	 underlying	 emotion	regulation,	 especially	 reappraisal	 (for	 reviews,	 see	 Kalisch,	 2009;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	2012;	 Phillips	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Since	 emotion	 regulation,	 in	 the	 conventional	 view,	 is	seen	 as	 the	 process	 of	 controlling	 emotional	 responses,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 first	consider	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	 emotional	 responses,	 or	 more	 broadly,	 the	correlates	 of	 emotion	 generation.	 The	 generation	 and	 experience	 of	 emotion	 is	subserved	by	a	range	of	brain	regions,	including	amygdala,	ventral	striatum,	insula,	periaqueductal	gray	and	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(PFC)	(Kober	et	al.,	2008;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2012;	Phillips,	Drevets,	Rauch,	&	Lane,	2003).	Employing	a	network	approach,	a	meta-analysis	of	neuroimaging	studies	on	emotion	showed	that	regions	involved	 in	 emotional	 processing	 could	 be	 grouped	 into	 six	 functional	 units:	 the	core	 limbic	 group	 (areas	 traditionally	 viewed	 as	 ‘emotion	 regions’,	 including	amygdala,	ventral	striatum,	thalamus,	hypothalamus,	and	periaqueductal	gray),	the	lateral	paralimbic	group	(including	further	parts	of	the	ventral	striatum	and	insula),	the	 medial	 PFC	 group,	 the	 cognitive/motor	 group,	 the	 medial	 posterior	 group	(including	 V1	 and	 posterior	 cingulate),	 and	 the	 lateral	 occipital	 group,	demonstrating	 both	 the	 high	 extent	 of	 the	 brain	 involved	 and	 the	 complexity	 of	emotion	generation	(Kober	et	al.,	2008).	It	is	worth	noting	that	there	is	an	emerging	view	that	there	are	in	fact	no	areas	or	networks	in	the	brain	that	are	specialized	for	
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different	 emotion	 categories	 or	 even	 emotion	 in	 general.	 Instead,	 domain-general	large-scale	 brain	 networks,	 involved	 in	 basic	 emotional	 and	 non-emotional	operations,	 are	 thought	 to	 interact	 to	 enable	 emotion	 perception	 and	 experience	(Barrett	&	 Satpute,	 2013;	K.	 A.	 Lindquist	&	Barrett,	 2012;	K.	 A.	 Lindquist,	Wager,	Kober,	Bliss-Moreau,	&	Barrett,	2012).		The	 regulation	 of	 emotion	 is	 likewise	 subserved	by	 an	 extensive	network,	mainly	comprising	frontal	and	parietal	regions	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2012;	Phillips	et	al.,	2008).	A	distinction	between	automatic	and	voluntary	emotion	regulation	has	been	proposed	in	the	PFC:	a	lateral	PFC	system,	including	dorsolateral	PFC	and	ventrolateral	PFC,	may	 be	 involved	 in	 voluntary	 emotion	 regulation	 processes,	 while	 a	 medial	 PFC	system,	 including	 medial	 orbitofrontal	 cortex,	 anterior	 cingulate	 and	 the	dorsomedial	 PFC,	 might	 be	 involved	 in	 automatic	 emotion	 regulation	 processes	(Phillips	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Reappraisal,	 the	 regulation	 type	 of	 choice	 for	 the	 first	 and	second	 projects	 of	 this	 thesis,	 has	 been	 investigated	 most	 extensively.	 Regions	involved	 in	 the	 process	 of	 reappraisal	 include	 the	 dorsolateral	 PFC,	 ventrolateral	PFC,	dorsomedial	PFC	and	inferior	parietal	areas	(Buhle	et	al.,	2014;	Kalisch,	2009;	Kohn	et	al.,	2013;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2012;	Phillips	et	al.,	2008).	The	dorsolateral	PFC	and	the	inferior	parietal	cortex	are	typically	associated	with	working	memory	and	selective	attention,	and	therefore	provide	the	means	to	hold	reappraisal	strategies	in	mind	 and	 to	 attend	 to	 relevant	 features	 of	 the	 stimuli	 (Wager	 &	 Smith,	 2003;	Wager,	 Jonides,	&	Reading,	 2004).	Ventrolateral	 PFC	 is	 involved	 in	 selecting	 goal-relevant	 information	 from	memory,	 and	 can	 therefore	help	 select	 the	appropriate	reappraisal	strategy	(Badre	&	Wagner,	2007).	Finally,	dorsomedial	PFC,	associated	with	 accrediting	mental	 states,	might	 help	with	 keeping	 track	 of	 one’s	 emotional	state	 (Olsson	 &	 Ochsner,	 2008).	 In	 contrast,	 regions	 whose	 activity	 is	 typically	suppressed	during	 reappraisal,	 in	 principle	 span	 the	 emotion	 generation	network	described	in	the	previous	paragraph,	but	most	commonly	include	amygdala,	ventral	striatum	and	insula	(for	a	review,	see	Ochsner	et	al.,	2012).		When	investigating	the	neural	underpinnings	of	emotion	regulation,	it	 is	crucial	to	consider	not	only	activation	and	de-activation	brain	patterns,	but	 to	also	examine	functional	 connections	 between	 the	 relevant	 brain	 regions	 and	 how	 these	
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connectivity	 patterns	 might	 be	 changed	 during	 emotion	 regulation.	 A	 growing	number	of	studies	have	focused	on	connectivity	rather	then	activity	changes	during	emotion	regulation,	again	typically	utilizing	reappraisal	as	the	regulation	of	choice.	For	 instance,	 a	 recent	 study,	 using	 dynamic	 causal	 modelling,	 focused	 on	 the	connectivity	among	PFC	regions	involved	in	emotion	regulation,	and	demonstrated	an	increase	of	excitatory	changes	from	dorsolateral	PFC	to	ventrolateral	PFC,	and	an	increase	of	inhibitory	changes	from	ventrolateral	PFC	to	dorsolateral	PFC,	possibly	representing	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 reappraisal	 strategy	 (Morawetz,	 Bode,	 Baudewig,	Kirilina,	 &	 Heekeren,	 2015).	 Since	 amygdala	 is	 the	 most	 common	 region	 whose	activity	 is	 suppressed	 during	 reappraisal	 (Buhle	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 some	 studies	 have	examined	 whether	 the	 connectivity	 between	 amygdala	 and	 regulatory	 regions	might	be	increased	during	regulation	(Banks,	Eddy,	Angstadt,	Nathan,	&	Phan,	2007;	Erk	et	al.,	2010).	Indeed,	amygdala	increased	its	connectivity	with	dorsolateral	PFC,	dorsomedial	PFC,	orbitofrontal	cortex	and	anterior	cingulate	in	one	study	(Banks	et	al.,	2007),	and	with	dorsolateral	PFC,	ventromedial	PFC,	inferior	parietal	cortex	and	posterior	cingulate	in	another	study	(Erk	et	al.,	2010),	demonstrating	that	emotion	regulation	 and	 emotion	 generation	 regions	 indeed	 increase	 their	 synchronicity	during	 the	 process	 of	 reappraisal.	 A	 recent	 meta-analysis	 confirmed	 this	 on	 a	broader	 scale,	 putting	 forward	 a	 model	 in	 which	 ventrolateral	 PFC	 gives	information	 to	 the	 dorsolateral	 PFC	 about	 the	 need	 to	 regulate,	 after	 which	dorsolateral	PFC	carries	out	the	regulation	and	relays	the	signals	to	the	parietal	and	motor	areas,	as	well	as	 to	 the	amygdala	and	 the	basal	ganglia	 (Kohn	et	al.,	2013).	Focusing	 on	 connectivity	 changes	 within	 and	 between	 networks,	 another	 study	similarly	 identified	 significant	 changes	 in	 connectivity	 among	 the	 visual,	 dorsal	attention,	 frontoparietal	 and	 default	 mode	 networks	 during	 emotion	 regulation	(Sripada	et	al.,	2014).		
1.1.4	Individual	Differences	in	Reappraisal	Even	 though	reappraisal	 is	 successfully	used	by	many	of	us	 in	our	everyday	 lives,	highly	relevant	individual	differences	have	been	noted	in	reappraisal	ability	across	the	population	(McRae,	Jacobs,	Ray,	John,	&	Gross,	2012;	Troy,	Shallcross,	Davis,	&	Mauss,	 2013;	 Troy,	 Wilhelm,	 Shallcross,	 &	 Mauss,	 2010).	 A	 recent	 study	systematically	 investigated	 the	 relationship	 between	 reappraisal	 ability,	 the	
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frequency	 of	 reappraisal	 use	 in	 everyday	 life,	 well-being,	 and	 several	 cognitive	control	 processes	 (McRae	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 They	 reported	 a	 significant	 positive	association	 between	 reappraisal	 ability,	 reappraisal	 frequency,	 the	 person’s	 well-being,	as	well	as	the	cognitive	abilities	of	working	memory	capacity	and	set-shifting	costs	 (McRae	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Another	 study	 looking	 at	 individual	 differences	 in	reappraisal	ability	showed	that	at	high	 levels	of	stress,	a	better	reappraisal	ability	might	 protect	 the	 person	 against	 depressive	 symptoms	 (Troy	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 By	demonstrating	the	relevance	of	reappraisal	ability	for	one’s	general	well-being	and	resistance	against	psychopathology,	the	two	studies	demonstrate	the	importance	of	incorporating	 individual	 differences	 in	 reappraisal	 ability	 in	 the	 study	 of	 emotion	regulation.		A	number	of	neuroimaging	studies	have	already	examined	the	relationship	between	either	 neural	 activity	 or	 connectivity	 change	 during	 regulation	 and	 reappraisal	ability.	 A	 few	 studies	 reported	 a	 positive	 association	 between	 the	 rate	 of	 activity	increase	in	the	PFC	with	emotion	regulation	and	reappraisal	ability	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2002;	 2004;	 Phan	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Wager,	 Davidson,	 Hughes,	 Lindquist,	 &	 Ochsner,	2008).	 Another	 study	 showed	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 amygdala	 activity	decrease	during	reappraisal	and	reappraisal	ability	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2004).	A	further	study	demonstrated	a	positive	correlation	between	self-reported	negative	 feelings	and	functional	connectivity	increase	between	amygdala	and	orbitofrontal	cortex,	as	well	 as	 amygdala	 and	 dorsomedial	 PFC	 (Banks	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Lastly,	 two	 studies	examined	the	pathway	supporting	emotion	regulation	using	mediation	analysis,	to	assess	whether	the	change	in	negative	feelings,	reflected	in	the	reappraisal	ability,	was	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 prefrontal	 control	 systems	 on	 subcortical	emotion	generation	systems	(Kober	et	al.,	2010;	Wager	et	al.,	2008).	The	first	study	found	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 ventrolateral	 PFC	 activity	 on	 reappraisal	 success	 was	indeed	 mediated	 by	 amygdalar	 and	 ventral	 striatal	 brain	 activity	 (Wager	 et	 al.,	2008).	 The	 second	 study	 found	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 dorsolateral	 PFC	 activity	 on	reappraisal	 success	 was	 mediated	 by	 the	 ventral	 striatal	 activity	 (Kober	 et	 al.,	2010).	 	
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1.2	Emotion,	Motivation	and	Prediction	Errors	Emotions	are	not	simply	reactions	to	our	internal	and	external	environments.	They	motivate	 our	 actions	 in	 a	 way	 that	 we	 strive	 to	 experience	 positive	 and	 avoid	negative	 experiences	 (Izard,	 2009;	 Lang	 &	 Bradley,	 2010;	 LeDoux,	 2012).	 The	current	section:	a)	introduces	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions;	b)	presents	the	neural	network	 thought	 to	 support	motivated	behaviour;	 c)	 introduces	prediction	errors;	d)	describes	 the	neural	 correlates	of	prediction	errors;	and	e)	 reviews	 the	few	studies	touching	on	the	regulation	of	prediction	errors.		
1.2.1	The	Motivational	Aspect	of	Emotions	Emotion	 is	a	complex	and	multifaceted	concept,	so	much	so	that	researchers	have	yet	 to	agree	on	 its	definition	 (Izard,	2010;	LeDoux,	2012).	 In	 the	 traditional	view,	including	that	of	emotion	regulation,	emotions	are	primarily	viewed	as	responses	or	reactions	to	events	in	our	internal	and	external	environments	(Ochsner	et	al.,	2012).	However,	 most	 researchers	 nowadays	 would	 agree	 that	 emotions	 are	more	 than	reactions	 to	 stimuli	 (Izard,	 2010).	 One	 critical	 aspect	 of	 emotions,	 greatly	emphasized	 in	 certain	 theoretical	 views,	 is	 their	 motivational	 significance	 (Izard,	2009;	Lang	&	Bradley,	2010).	Since	emotional	responses	help	determine	the	nature	of	 a	 certain	 event	 or	 stimulus,	 in	 the	 simplest	 terms	 whether	 it	 is	 positive	 or	negative,	 they	are	able	 to	motivate	our	actions,	 in	order	 to	approach	positive	and	avoid	negative	experiences	(Lang	&	Bradley,	2010).	Emotional	events	indeed	attract	our	 attention	 and	 are	 typically	 better	 remembered	 than	 non-emotional	 ones	(Dolcos,	 Iordan,	 &	 Dolcos,	 2011).	 Enhanced	 memory	 for	 emotionally	 significant	events	enables	us	to	be	better	able	to	predict	such	events	in	the	future	were	they	to	re-occur,	which	is	the	basis	of	associative	learning	(Dolan,	2002).	The	simplest	type	of	 associative	 learning	 is	 Pavlovian	 or	 classical	 conditioning,	 where	 a	 neutral	stimulus	 acquires	 emotional	 significance	 (thereby	 becoming	 the	 conditioned	stimulus)	when	paired	with	an	emotionally	relevant	stimulus	(called	unconditioned	stimulus)	on	a	few	occasions	(Dolan,	2002;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000;	Seymour	&	Dolan,	2008).	Pavlovian	conditioning	thus	embodies	the	motivational	significance	of	emotions	and	provides	a	structured	framework	in	which	one	can	study	emotions	as	more	than	simply	reactions	to	significant	events	in	our	environment	(LeDoux,	2012;	Seymour	&	Dolan,	2008).	
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1.2.2	The	Neural	Network	supporting	Motivated	Behaviour	Models	outlining	motivated	behaviour	are	largely	founded	on	animal	research,	and	are	 often	 constructed	 with	 associative	 learning	models	 in	 mind	 (Grace,	 Floresco,	Goto,	 &	 Lodge,	 2007;	 Pennartz	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Pennartz,	 Ito,	 Verschure,	 Battaglia,	 &	Robbins,	2011;	Sesack	&	Grace,	2010).	With	regard	to	the	neural	network	involved	in	motivated	 behaviour,	 the	models	 emphasize	 ventral	 striatum	 as	 an	 integration	centre	that	links	motivational	drives	represented	by	limbic	regions	on	the	one	hand,	and	motor	 control	 circuits	 that	 enable	 goal-directed	behaviour	on	 the	other	hand	(Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Pennartz	et	al.,	2009;	Sesack	&	Grace,	2010).	Ventral	striatum	is	known	 to	 receive	 signals	 from	 several	 regions,	 including	 the	 PFC,	 hippocampus,	amygdala	 and	 ventral	 striatum.	 Hippocampus	 provides	 spatial	 and	 contextual	information,	 amygdala	 relays	 emotional	 drive	 and	 conditioned	 associations,	 and	PFC	provides	executive	control	by,	for	example,	enabling	the	inhibition	of	responses	and	 task	 switching	 (Grace	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Sesack	 &	 Grace,	 2010).	 Ventral	 tegmental	area,	 via	 dopaminergic	 input,	 is	 able	 to	modulate	 both	 the	 activity	 in	 the	 ventral	striatum,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 balance	 and	 integration	 of	 other	 inputs	 into	 ventral	striatum,	 and	 thus	has	 a	direct	 influence	on	 goal-directed	behaviour	 (Grace	 et	 al.,	2007;	 Sesack	 &	 Grace,	 2010).	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 associative	 learning	 models,	dopaminergic	 signals	 in	 the	 ventral	 tegmental	 area	 represent	 prediction	 errors,	parameters	that	drive	the	process	of	learning	(Pennartz	et	al.,	2009).		
1.2.3	Prediction	Errors	In	 basic	 terms,	 learning	 involves	 making	 predictions	 of	 what	 might	 happen,	experiencing	 the	 outcome,	 and	 adjusting	 predictions	 for	 the	 future,	 based	 on	 the	errors	of	previous	predictions	(Ouden,	Kok,	&	de	Lange,	2012;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000).	For	instance,	imagine	you	see	a	lightning	and	a	moment	later,	rain	starts	to	fall.	 The	 next	 time	 you	 see	 a	 lightning,	 you	 might	 immediately	 take	 out	 your	umbrella	 and	 open	 it,	 predicting	 the	 rain.	 If	 the	 rain	 indeed	 starts	 to	 fall,	 your	prediction	 was	 correct,	 strengthening	 the	 association	 between	 lighting	 and	 rain.	However,	 if	 the	 raining	 does	 not	 start,	 you	 made	 a	 prediction	 error	 (i.e.,	 you	predicted	 the	 falling	of	 rain	but	no	 rain	 came),	 and	you	will	probably	adjust	 your	prediction	of	rain	following	lightning	in	the	future.	This	type	of	associative	learning,	driven	by	prediction	errors,	is	called	Pavlovian	or	classical	conditioning	and	one	of	
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the	most	 basic	 and	 fundamental	 models	 accounting	 for	 Pavlovian	 learning	 is	 the	Rescorla	Wagner	model	(Pearce	&	Bouton,	2001;	Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972;	Schultz	&	 Dickinson,	 2000).	 The	 model	 accounts	 for	 three	 parameters	 of	 learning:	prediction	 P,	 prediction	 error	 PE	 and	 learning	 rate	 λ	 (Rescorla	 &	Wagner,	 1972;	Schultz	 &	 Dickinson,	 2000).	 In	 an	 experimental	 setting,	 where	 the	 experiment	consists	of	several	trials,	a	prediction	error	is	calculated	as	the	difference	between	the	prediction	of	 the	current	 trial	P(t)	and	 the	actual	outcome	of	 the	current	 trial	R(t):	
	
PE(t)	=	R(t)	–	P(t)		Prediction	 for	 the	next	 trial	P(t+1),	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	 calculated	by	adding	 the	prediction	of	the	current	trial	P(t)	and	the	prediction	error	of	the	current	trial	PE(t),	the	latter	weighted	by	the	learning	rate	λ	(λ	<	1):		
P(t+1)	=	P(t)	+	λPE(t)	
	Since	predictions	are	re-evaluated	based	on	prediction	errors,	prediction	errors	are	seen	as	the	driving	force	of	learning	(Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000).	 Learning	 rate,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 reflects	 the	 speed	 of	 learning,	 such	 that	when	 the	 learning	 rate	 is	 high	 (for	 instance,	 λ	 =	 0.9),	 a	 prediction	 error	 has	 a	stronger	effect	on	the	next	prediction.	In	the	example	above,	this	would	mean	that	the	absence	of	rain	following	lighting	on	one	occasion	would	remove	the	prediction	of	rain	on	the	next	occasion.	On	the	other	hand,	when	the	learning	rate	is	low	(for	instance,	λ	=	0.1),	learning	is	slower,	and	so	prediction	for	the	next	occurrence	takes	several	previous	experiences	into	account.	In	the	example	above,	the	absence	of	rain	on	one	occasion	would	only	 slightly	 reduce	 the	expectation	of	 rain	 for	 the	 future,	but	 would	 not	 reverse	 it,	 especially	 if	 we	 have	 previously	 encountered	 the	association	between	lighting	and	rain	on	several	occasions.		
1.2.4	The	Neural	Underpinnings	of	Prediction	Errors	A	number	of	studies	have	investigated	the	neural	correlates	of	associative	learning-related	prediction	errors	in	the	human	brain	(for	reviews,	see	Delgado,	Li,	Schiller,	
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&	 Phelps,	 2008;	 Garrison,	 Erdeniz,	 &	 Done,	 2013;	 Ouden	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	 the	framework	of	motivational	or	associative	learning,	there	are	two	different	kinds	of	prediction	errors;	reward	prediction	errors	are	those	pertaining	to	positive	events,	while	 aversive	 prediction	 errors	 are	 errors	 related	 to	 aversive	 outcomes.	 Both	reward	 and	 aversive	 prediction	 errors	 can	 be	 positive	 (i.e.,	 no	 expectation	 of	outcome,	but	the	reward	or	punishment	is	presented)	or	negative	(i.e.,	expectation	of	 outcome,	 but	 the	 reward	 or	 punishment	 is	 absent)	 (Delgado	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 In	human	 neuroimaging	 studies,	 reward	 prediction	 errors	 have	 repeatedly	 been	shown	in	the	striatum,	especially	ventral	striatum	(Delgado	et	al.,	2008;	Garrison	et	al.,	 2013;	Ouden	et	al.,	 2012).	Aversive	prediction	errors,	on	 the	other	hand,	have	been	observed	in	the	ventral	striatum,	ventral	tegmental	area,	insula	and	amygdala	(Garrison	et	al.,	2013;	M.	Menon	et	al.,	2007;	Metereau	&	Dreher,	2013;	Robinson,	Frank,	 Sahakian,	 &	 Cools,	 2010;	 Schiller,	 Levy,	 Niv,	 LeDoux,	 &	 Phelps,	 2008;	Seymour,	Daw,	Dayan,	Singer,	&	Dolan,	2007;	Seymour	et	al.,	2004;	Spoormaker	et	al.,	2011).		
1.2.5	The	Regulation	of	Prediction	Errors	Firstly,	associative	learning	embodies	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions	(LeDoux,	2012;	 Seymour	 &	 Dolan,	 2008);	 secondly,	 prediction	 errors	 are	 thought	 to	 drive	associative	 learning,	 including	 Pavlovian	 conditioning	 (Rescorla	 &	Wagner,	 1972;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000).	Therefore,	a	good	way	to	incorporate	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions	into	the	concept	of	emotion	regulation	would	be	to	test	whether	emotion	 regulation	 can	 extend	 beyond	 the	modulation	 of	 emotional	 responses	 to	additionally	affect	prediction	error-related	brain	signals.	A	few	existing	studies	have	given	 clues	 as	 to	whether	 and	how	prediction	errors	might	be	modulated.	On	 the	one	 hand,	 recent	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 emotions	 themselves	 can	 modulate	prediction	error-related	brain	activity	and	thus	directly	influence	learning	(Katahira	et	al.,	2015;	Watanabe,	Sakagami,	&	Haruno,	2013).	If	emotions	can	modulate	neural	prediction	 error-related	 activity	 and	 emotion	 regulation	 can	 affect	 emotions,	emotion	 regulation	 is	very	 likely	 to	also	modulate	prediction	errors.	On	 the	other	hand,	two	recent	studies	found	that	a	change	in	an	emotional	state	was	able	to	affect	prediction	error	signals	 in	 the	ventral	striatum.	The	 first	study	demonstrated	 that	self-initiated	reappraisal	was	able	 to	modulate	an	aspect	of	 the	reward	prediction	
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error	coding	in	the	right	ventral	striatum	(Staudinger,	Erk,	Abler,	&	Walter,	2009).	The	second	study	showed	that	an	 increase	 in	stress	 levels	enhanced	aversive	(but	not	 reward)	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 right	 ventral	 striatum	(Robinson,	Overstreet,	Charney,	Vytal,	&	Grillon,	2013).	It	should	be	noted	that	both	studies	specifically	analysed	changes	in	the	ventral	striatum	and	overlooked	other	brain	areas	whose	prediction	error-related	activity	might	also	have	been	affected.		
1.3	Social	or	Interpersonal	Emotion	Regulation	It	is	often	underemphasized	that	our	emotions	are	not	only	regulated	by	us,	but	can	also	be	 influenced	by	others	 around	us.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	mere	presence	of	 a	supporting	 other	 can	 ameliorate	 our	 negative	 state;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 another’s	words	can	be	even	more	effective	at	comforting	us	when	we	are	feeling	down	(for	reviews	 on	 social/interpersonal	 emotion	 regulation,	 see	 Reeck,	 Ames,	 &	Ochsner,	2015;	 Zaki	 &	 Williams,	 2013).	 This	 section	 introduces	 a)	 the	 modulation	 of	emotions	by	the	presence	of	others	and	neural	systems	supporting	this	effect;	and	b)	the	social	or	interpersonal	emotion	regulation	and	its	neural	underpinnings.		
1.3.1	The	Social	Modulation	of	Emotion	Social	 relationships	 are	 highly	 beneficial	 to	 our	 health,	 such	 that	 poor	 social	relationships	represent	a	mortality	risk	similar	 to	 that	of	smoking	and	other	well-known	risk	factors	of	mortality	(Holt-Lunstad,	Smith,	&	Layton,	2010).	One	possible	process	through	which	social	relationships	may	influence	our	health	is	by	‘buffering’	the	negative	effects	of	stressors	(Cohen,	Gottlieb,	&	Underwood,	2001).	In	line	with	this,	 Social	 Baseline	 Theory	 proposes	 that	 social	 relationships	 represent	bioenergetic	 resources,	 such	 that	 social	 proximity	 of	 trusting	 others	 reduces	 risk	and	decreases	effort	levels	for	achieving	various	goals	(Beckes	&	Coan,	2011;	Coan,	2011;	 Coan	&	 Sbarra,	 2015).	 According	 to	 this	 framework,	 the	 social	 presence	 of	trusting	others	represents	 the	 ‘baseline	state’	of	 the	brain,	 in	which	the	 individual	naturally	 feels	 safer	 and	 calmer	 and	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 vigilant	 for	 potential	threats	(Beckes	&	Coan,	2011;	Coan,	2011;	Coan	&	Sbarra,	2015).	Empirical	studies	have	indeed	demonstrated	that	the	mere	presence	of	another	person	in	the	face	of	adverse	stimuli	can	modulate	emotional	responses,	such	that	the	negative	affect	 is	
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down-regulated	(Coan,	Schaefer,	&	Davidson,	2006;	Eisenberger,	2013;	Eisenberger	et	al.,	2011;	Younger,	Aron,	Parke,	Chatterjee,	&	Mackey,	2010).		Studies	 exploring	 the	neural	 basis	 of	 social	 emotion	modulation	or	 social	 support	are	 slowly	 accumulating.	 One	 study,	 for	 example,	 tested	 the	 effect	 of	 spouse	 or	stranger	handholding	versus	no	handholding	on	the	neural	responses	to	the	threat	of	 shock	 (Coan	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Holding	 the	 hand	 of	 either	 a	 stranger	 or	 your	 own	spouse	 reduced	 threat-related	activity	 in	 the	 anterior	 and	posterior	 cingulate,	 the	left	 supramarginal	 gyrus	 and	 the	 right	 postcentral	 gyrus.	 Spousal	 handholding	additionally	 decreased	 threat-related	 activity	 in	 the	 dorsolateral	 PFC,	 the	 caudate	and	the	superior	colliculus	(Coan	et	al.,	2006).	Two	further	studies	tested	whether	perceived	 social	 support	 of	 a	 loved	 one	 (induced	 by	 seeing	 their	 photograph	 in	contrast	 to	 seeing	 a	 photo	 of	 a	 familiar	 acquaintance	 or	 stranger)	 would	 affect	neural	activations	related	to	painful	stimulation	(Eisenberger	et	al.,	2011;	Younger	et	 al.,	 2010).	 The	 two	 studies	 found	 that	 being	 reminded	 of	 a	 loved	 one,	 who	typically	provides	social	support,	reduced	pain-related	activity	in	a	number	of	areas,	including	 anterior	 and	 posterior	 insula	 and	 dorsal	 anterior	 cingulate,	 along	 with	reducing	 the	 feeling	 of	 pain.	 Furthermore,	 viewing	 a	 loved	 one,	 in	 contrast	 to	 an	acquaintance	 or	 stranger,	 increased	 activity	 in	 the	 ventromedial	 PFC	 and	 the	posterior	 cingulate,	 regions	 that	 typically	 signal	 safety	 (Eisenberger	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Younger	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Using	 a	 different	 design,	 another	 study	 similarly	demonstrated	that	social	support	in	response	to	social	pain	due	to	social	exclusion	was	related	 to	a	decrease	of	 insula	activity	and	an	 increase	 in	medial	PFC	activity	(Onoda	et	al.,	2009).		
1.3.2	The	Social	Regulation	of	Emotion	In	 contrast	 to	 the	 passive	modulation	 of	 emotion	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 another	person,	social	or	interpersonal	emotion	regulation	refers	to	a	goal-driven	process	in	which	one	person	regulates	another	person’s	emotions	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015;	Zaki	&	Williams,	 2013).	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 social	 emotion	 regulation,	 the	 conventional	type	of	emotion	regulation,	in	which	one	attempts	to	regulate	one’s	own	emotions,	has	been	termed	 intrapersonal	emotion	regulation	(Zaki	&	Williams,	2013).	Social	emotion	 regulation	 typically	 involves	 the	 regulator	 (i.e.,	 the	 person	 causing	
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emotional	 changes	 in	 the	 other	 person)	 and	 the	 target	 (i.e.,	 the	 person	 whose	emotions	 are	 being	 influenced	 by	 the	 other	 person)	 (Reeck	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Zaki	 &	Williams,	2013).	Furthermore,	 the	social	regulation	of	emotion	can	be	 initiated	by	either	 the	 regulator	 (called	 ‘extrinsic’	 social	 emotion	 regulation)	 or	 the	 target	(termed	‘intrinsic’	social	emotion	regulation)	(Zaki	&	Williams,	2013).	In	parallel	to	intrapersonal	emotion	regulation,	the	regulator	in	social	emotion	regulation	can	use	various	regulatory	strategies	depending	on	the	emotion	generation	stage	the	target	is	in,	such	as	modifying	the	situation,	deploying	attention,	using	cognitive	strategies	or	modulating	 behavioural	 responses	 (Reeck	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 For	 instance,	 since	 the	presence	 of	 trusting	 others	 can	modulate	 negative	 feelings	 (see	 section	1.3.1	The	
Social	Modulation	of	Emotion),	 the	 target	 can	modify	 the	 situation	 by	 seeking	 the	presence	and/or	contact	of	a	loved	one.	Alternatively,	the	regulator	might	similarly	use	the	situation	modification	strategy	and	ensure	that	the	target	is	close	to	a	loved	one	 if	 they	 think	 that	 the	 target	 is	 distressed.	 This	 nicely	 demonstrates	 the	interdependence	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 and	 regulation;	 despite	 being	 a	passive	 strategy	 on	 its	 own,	 social	 emotion	modulation	 is	 often	 part	 of	 the	 social	emotion	 regulation	 process	 (Reeck	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Zaki	 &	Williams,	 2013).	 Another	strategy	that	a	regulator	can	use	to	regulate	 the	target’s	emotions,	highly	relevant	for	 both	 every	day	 life	 and	 for	 psychotherapy,	 is	 reappraisal,	 a	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 strategy.	 Here,	 the	 regulator	 tries	 to	 change	 the	 target’s	 emotions	 by	suggesting	alternative	interpretations	for	the	negative	emotion-triggering	stimulus	or	situation.	Besides	being	the	most	effective	and	healthy	strategy	of	intrapersonal	emotion	 regulation,	 it	 is	 also	 uniquely	 relevant	 for	 situations	where	 the	 aversive	stimulus	cannot	be	avoided	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).		Little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 neural	 underpinnings	 of	 social	 emotion	 regulation.	Nevertheless,	studies	from	various	disciplines	provide	the	basis	for	a	well-informed	model,	which	has	recently	been	provided	in	a	review	on	social	emotion	regulation	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).	 In	contrast	to	 intrapersonal	emotion	regulation,	the	networks	involved	in	social	emotion	regulation	are	expected	to	differ	between	the	regulator	and	the	target.	The	regulator	likely	recruits	the	cognitive	control	network	involving	parietal	 and	 PFC	 areas,	 which	 is	 also	 used	 for	 intrapersonal	 emotion	 regulation	(Buhle	et	al.,	2014;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2012).	Additionally,	the	regulator	is	expected	to	
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recruit	 three	 further	 networks:	 a)	 the	 mentalizing	 or	 social	 cognitive	 network,	including	the	medial	PFC,	the	precuneus	and	the	temporo-parietal	junction	(TPJ),	in	order	 to	 understand	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 target	 (Frith	&	 Frith,	 2011;	 Lieberman,	2006;	 Schilbach	 et	 al.,	 2012);	 b)	 the	 action	 identification	 system,	 involving	 the	premotor	cortex	and	the	inferior	parietal	module,	to	evaluate	the	goals	and	beliefs	of	 the	 target	 (Van	 Overwalle	 &	 Baetens,	 2009);	 and	 c)	 the	 system	 for	 empathy,	including	the	mid-cingulate	and	the	insula,	which	helps	the	regulator	to	vicariously	understand	 the	 target’s	 emotions	 (Lamm,	 Decety,	 &	 Singer,	 2011).	 The	 neural	systems	supporting	social	emotion	regulation	in	the	target,	on	the	other	hand,	likely	involve	 both	 the	 social	 cognitive	 network	 (i.e.,	 medial	 PFC,	 precuneus	 and	 TPJ)	(Frith	 &	 Frith,	 2011;	 Lieberman,	 2006;	 Schilbach	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 and	 the	 cognitive	control	network	(i.e.,	dorsolateral,	ventrolateral	and	dorsomedial	PFC	and	superior	parietal	 areas)	 (Buhle	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Furthermore,	 the	 target	should	 additionally	 engage	 brain	 regions	 linked	 with	 emotion	 generation	 (e.g.,	amygdala,	 insula,	striatum	and	periaqueductal	gray),	whose	activity	 is	expected	to	decrease	during	social	emotion	regulation	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).		
1.4	Aims	of	the	Thesis	The	 overarching	 goal	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	was	 to	 extend	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	regulation.	The	main	method	employed	during	the	projects	was	functional	magnetic	resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI).	 We	 combined	 a	 typical	 event-related	 analysis,	 which	highlights	locations	of	task-related	activations,	with	a	model-based	analysis,	which	additionally	 provides	 insight	 into	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 related	 to	 specific	activations.	We	 aimed	 to	 extend	 emotion	 regulation	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	emotion	and	 the	 emotion	 regulation	 part	 of	 the	 concept.	 With	 regard	 to	 emotion,	 it	 is	becoming	increasingly	clear	that	emotions	entail	a	lot	more	than	simple	reactions	to	stimuli;	 emotions	 can	 be	 motivating	 and	 therefore	 promote	 associative	 learning	(Izard,	 2009;	 Lang	 &	 Bradley,	 2010;	 LeDoux,	 2012).	 However,	 neuroscience	research	 has	 not	 yet	 appropriately	 incorporated	 this	 relevant	 aspect	 of	 emotions	into	 theories	 of	 emotion	 regulation.	 Projects	 1	 and	 2	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	incorporated	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions	into	emotion	regulation	in	terms	of	 value-based	prediction	 errors	 and	 their	 neural	 implementation.	With	 regard	 to	
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emotion	regulation,	 it	 is	important	to	note	that	emotions	are	not	only	regulated	by	us,	but	are	often	influenced	and	controlled	by	others	around	us	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).	However,	 cognitive	 and	 affective	 neuroscience	 has	 largely	 ignored	 the	 social	regulation	 and	 modulation	 of	 emotion.	 Projects	 3	 and	 4	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	investigated	 the	 effects	 and	 the	 neural	 underpinnings	 of	 these	 underestimated	social	regulation	types.		To	provide	a	more	comprehensive	view	of	emotion	regulation	and	bridge	the	gaps	in	 literature	 noted	 above,	 the	 current	 thesis	 focused	 on	 the	 following	 research	questions:	1) Besides	 being	 able	 to	 supress	 aversive	 response-related	 activity,	 can	cognitive	emotion	regulation	also	impact	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	brain?	The	first	project	 ’s	aim	was	to	 investigate	whether	 intrapersonal	cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 could	 affect	 the	 brain	 signal	 for	 motivated	behaviour	–	 the	prediction	error	signal	–	 in	 the	ventral	striatum,	 the	 insula	and	the	ventral	tegmental	area.		2) What	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 on	 the	 network	 of	 motivated	behaviour	 centred	 on	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 and	 what	 role	 do	 individual	differences	 in	 reappraisal	 have	 in	 this	 effect?	 The	 second	 project	 of	 this	thesis	examined	the	influence	of	intrapersonal	cognitive	emotion	regulation	on	prediction	error-related	connectivity	of	 the	ventral	striatum,	 taking	 into	account	participants’	reappraisal	ability.		 3) What	 are	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	 social	 emotion	 regulation,	 particularly	social	 reappraisal?	The	 third	project	 investigated	 the	neural	underpinnings	of	social	reappraisal	in	the	target,	their	specificity	in	relation	to	the	network	supporting	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 social	regulation	success	and	participants’	attachment	security	levels.		 4) Does	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 affect	 distinct	 types	 of	 neural	 activity	 in	different	subregions	of	the	human	insula?	The	fourth	and	last	project	of	the	current	thesis	focused	on	the	effect	of	supportive	social	presence,	a	form	of	
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social	emotion	modulation,	on	two	distinct	types	of	emotional	brain	activity	–	emotional	response-	and	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	–	in	the	left	and	right	anterior	and	posterior	insula	parts,	and	the	association	of	this	effect	with	aversive	learning.		The	 first	 two	 projects	 relate	 to	 the	 extension	 of	 emotion,	 while	 the	 second	 two	extend	 the	 emotion	 regulation	 part	 of	what	 is	 conventionally	 considered	 emotion	regulation.	Overall,	the	current	thesis	aimed	to	provide	a	revised	and	extended	view	of	 emotion	 regulation,	 and	by	 taking	 this	 view	 into	 account,	 to	 offer	new	 insights	into	 the	 effects	 and	 the	 neural	 underpinnings	 of	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal,	 social	reappraisal	and	social	emotion	modulation.			 	
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2	
Project	1:	Cognitive	Emotion	Regulation	
Enhances	Aversive	Prediction	Error	
Activity	While	Reducing	Emotional	
Responses	
The	 current	 chapter	 includes	 a	 research	 article	 entitled	 “Cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 enhances	 aversive	 prediction	 error	 activity	 while	 reducing	 emotional	responses”.	The	article	showed,	for	the	first	time,	that	cognitive	emotion	regulation,	besides	 reducing	emotional	 responses	and	aversive	 response-related	activity,	 also	affects	 aversive	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 ventral	tegmental	 area,	 insula	 and	 hippocampus,	 possibly	 via	 tegmental	 dopaminergic	pathways.	The	manuscript	was	published	in	NeuroImage	in	2015.		
Contributions:	Authors:	 Satja	 Mulej	 Bratec,	 Xiyao	 Xie,	 Gabriele	 Schmid,	 Anselm	 Doll,	 Leonhard	
Schilbach,	Claus	Zimmer,	Afra	Wohlschläger,	Valentin	Riedl,	Christian	Sorg	The	author	of	this	thesis	is	the	first	author	of	the	manuscript.	S.M.B.	and	C.S.,	with	the	 help	 of	 G.S.	 and	 C.Z.,	 conceived	 the	 experiment.	 S.M.B.	 recruited	 and	 trained	participants,	 and	 S.M.B.	 and	 X.X.	 together	 conducted	 behavioural	 and	 fMRI	 data	acquisition.	S.M.B.	analysed	behavioural	and	imaging	data,	with	some	help	from	X.X.	and	 A.D.,	 and	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 A.W.	 and	 V.R.	 S.M.B.,	 supervised	 by	 C.S.,	wrote	the	manuscript,	which	was	commented	on	and	revised	by	L.S.		 	
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Cognitive emotion regulation is a powerful way of modulating emotional responses. However, despite the vital
role of emotions in learning, it is unknown whether the effect of cognitive emotion regulation also extends to
the modulation of learning. Computational models indicate prediction error activity, typically observed in the
striatum and ventral tegmental area, as a critical neural mechanism involved in associative learning. We used
model-based fMRI during aversive conditioning with and without cognitive emotion regulation to test the
hypothesis that emotion regulation would affect prediction error-related neural activity in the striatum and
ventral tegmental area, reﬂecting an emotion regulation-related modulation of learning. Our results show that
cognitive emotion regulation reduced emotion-related brain activity, but increased prediction error-related
activity in a network involving ventral tegmental area, hippocampus, insula and ventral striatum. While the re-
duction of response activity was related to behavioral measures of emotion regulation success, the enhancement
of prediction error-related neural activity was related to learning performance. Furthermore, functional connec-
tivity between the ventral tegmental area and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, an area involved in regulation, was
speciﬁcally increased during emotion regulation and likewise related to learning performance. Our data,
therefore, provide ﬁrst-time evidence that beyond reducing emotional responses, cognitive emotion regulation
affects learning by enhancing prediction error-related activity, potentially via tegmental dopaminergic pathways.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Cognitive emotion regulation is a powerful way of modulating
emotional responses (Gross, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2012). For example,
lifting up a picnic blanket and surprisingly noticing a snake will induce
fear, including increased heart rate, fearful feeling, and aﬂight tendency.
However, cognitively reappraising the situation, for instance realizing
that the snake is a blindworm and therefore not dangerous, will cool
your fear down immediately. During cognitive emotion regulation, brain
activity in areas critical for experiencing emotions such as amygdala, insula
and striatum is reduced (in the case of down-regulation) by emotion reg-
ulation signals from anetwork of dorsolateral, dorsomedial, and ventrolat-
eral prefrontal regions (Buhle et al., 2014; Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner et al.,
2012; Phillips et al., 2008). Emotions, however, do not only provide the
organism with fast, consistent responses and attitudes to stimuli in
the environment. Due to their motivational signiﬁcance, emotions are able
to adapt our behavior by changing the subjective value of stimuli and en-
couraging association formations (Izard, 2009; Lang and Bradley, 2010;
Lang and Davis, 2006; Nesse and Ellsworth, 2009). But if so, the question
ariseswhether cognitiveemotion regulationmightnotonlyaffect emotional
responsesbutalso related learningprocesses. In termsof theaboveexample,
noticing that the snake is a blindworm (i.e., regulatory reappraisal)may
interfere with fear-associated adaptions (i.e., learning).
According to computational models in associative learning theory,
learning is driven by reinforcement prediction errors (e.g., surprisingly
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noticing the snake) (Pearce and Bouton, 2001; Rescorla and Wagner,
1972; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). Neural correlates of both reward
and aversive prediction errors have been repeatedly observed in the
striatum, ventral tegmental area, and other brain areas (Delgado et al.,
2008a; Garrison et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2010; Spoormaker et al.,
2011). Recent studies have shown that emotions can directly inﬂuence
learning by modulating such prediction error activity (Katahira et al.,
2015; Watanabe et al., 2013). Given that emotions can directly modu-
late neural prediction error activity, emotion regulation is very likely
to alsomodulate aversive prediction errors. We therefore hypothesized
that cognitive emotion regulation might not only affect aversive
response-related brain activity, but also affect brain activity related to
aversive prediction errors. More speciﬁcally, along the idea that
cognitive emotion regulation increases control of aversive emotions,
we hypothesized that cognitive emotion regulation also increases
control of aversive learning. A potential mechanism for the increased
control of learning might be an increase of prediction error-related
brain activity. In a related example, moderate levels of stress, typically
beneﬁcial in aversive situations and therefore representing a form of
emotion regulation, increased aversive prediction error-related signals
in the striatum for emotional stimuli in a simple cognitive task
(Robinson et al., 2013). We therefore hypothesized that cognitive
emotion regulation would decrease brain responses related to aversive
emotions, and increase aversive prediction error-related brain activity.
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to analyze
the effect of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive response- and
aversive prediction error-related brain activity. A model-based fMRI
analysis combined with an aversive classical conditioning paradigm
allowed insight into both aversive response- and aversive prediction
error-related blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activity,
observed concurrently in a speciﬁc trial. With regard to emotional re-
sponses, we expected cognitive emotion regulation to decrease aversive
response-related activity in emotional brain areas such as insula, amyg-
dala, and ventral striatum, replicating previous studies (Ochsner et al.,
2012; Phillips et al., 2008). With respect to prediction errors, we hy-
pothesized that cognitive emotion regulation would increase aversive
prediction error-related neural activity in regions previously associated
with aversive prediction errors, such as striatum, insula and ventral
tegmental area (Delgado et al., 2008a; Garrison et al., 2013).
Materials and methods
Participants
24 healthy young participants were assessed by the experiment (all
females), with a mean age of 24.8 years (SD= 2.3). Data from 4 partic-
ipants had to be excluded from analysis, due to excessive head move-
ment (translation N 2 mm, rotation N 2°; N = 2) and poor behavioral
performance (N = 2, see Behavioral measures section). Only females
were tested to avoid previously reported differences in the processing
and regulation of emotions between genders (McRae et al., 2008;
Whittle et al., 2011).Written consentwas obtained fromall participants
and the study was approved by the local ethics committee (Technische
Universität München). All participants were right-handed native
German speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history
of neurological or psychiatric disorders, and reported no intake of
psychotropic medication. They received a ﬁnancial compensation for
their participation after completing the experiment.
Paradigm
To investigate the effect of cognitive emotion regulation on emotion-
al responses and learning, we conducted a model-based fMRI study in
which the visual presentation of aversive stimuli was combined with
classical conditioning and varying conditioned–unconditioned stimulus
(CS–US) contingencies. The conditioning paradigmwas adapted from a
previous study (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005), with the critical difference
of exchanging painful stimulation for aversive pictures. Thiswas done to
facilitate comparison with previous emotion regulation studies, the
majority of which investigated the regulation of emotional responses
elicited by pictures from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS) (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). A previous study on
emotion–cognition interaction similarly used IAPS pictures as aversive
outcomes in a reinforcement-learning paradigm, to examine prediction
error-related brain activity (Katahira et al., 2015). On each trial, one of
two symbols (CS; blue square or yellow pentagon) was presented,
after which an aversive IAPS picture (US) followed on a proportion of
trials (Paired trials; otherwise a blank screen was presented: non-
Paired trials). Participant's task was to predict the occurrence of a US
after a particular CS (Fig. 1/A). The CS–US contingency systematically
ﬂuctuated throughout the experiment, forcing participants to constant-
ly adapt their predictions (Fig. 1/B) (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005). Impor-
tantly, a reappraisal strategy of self-distancing (Kalisch et al., 2005;
Ochsner et al., 2004; Walter et al., 2009) was employed in the experi-
ment, with participants trying to regulate stimulus-evoked emotional
reactions in the Distance condition, or passively observe the stimuli in
the Attend condition. Conditioning was modeled by the prediction
error-based Rescorla–Wagner rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972),
resulting in the learning parameter of interest, aversive prediction
error (Fig. 1/C). For a trial t, aversive prediction error aPEwas calculated
as a difference between the actual outcome R(t) and the predicted out-
come aP(t) [aPE(t) = R(T) − aP(t)], while predicted outcome for the
next trial aP(t + 1) was updated by adding aversive prediction error
of the current trial aPE(t) to aP(t), weighted by a learning rate λ
[aP(t+ 1) = aP(t) + λaPE(t)].
Each trial started with a 1 s showing of a ﬁxation cross, after which
the Regulation Strategy (‘Distance’ or ‘Attend’) was presented for 2 s.
This was followed by a CS (blue square or yellow pentagon), presented
for 6 s (Fig. 1/A). Participants were asked to indicate (predict) via a but-
ton press in the ﬁrst 3 s of CS presentationwhether a negative picture or
no picturewould follow the CS. The US, presented for 6 s,was a negative
picture from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al.,
1997), shown on 50%of the trials (Paired trials). The picture setwas bal-
anced for arousal and valence across Distance and Attend conditions
(for details on the set of pictures used in the experiment, see Supple-
mentary methods in the Supplementary material). Next, participants
had 3 s to evaluate the intensity of emotion via a button press on a
scale from−3 to 3 (increments of 1; set to 0 on each trial). The inter-
trial interval lasted for 4 ± 2 s. Each participant completed both
Distance (i.e., self-distancing) and Attend (i.e., attentively observing)
run, with the run order counterbalanced across participants.
Contingency variation
The CS–US contingency varied throughout the experiment following
a low-frequency sinewave function, with 1.75 and 1.5 cycles per exper-
imental run for CS1 and CS2, respectively (Fig. 1/B) (Gläscher and
Büchel, 2005). Two CSswere used, because overlapping two contingen-
cy variation patterns (as opposed to using a single one) helped ensure
that participants could not easily recognize the overall contingency pat-
tern and therefore kept on learning throughout the experiment
(Gläscher and Büchel, 2005). To guarantee that each CS predicted US
occurrence with a different probability at each time point, the phase
between the two CS-related sine functions was shifted by 96°.
Reinforcement probability was kept constant at 50% for the ﬁrst 4% or
19% of the run, for CS1 and CS2, respectively, to reduce cognitive search
for contingency structure (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005). Participants
were told that the two symbols (whose assignment to a particular
CS–US contingency was counterbalanced across participants) predicted
US occurrence with different probabilities, and that they should keep in
mind that these probabilities could change throughout the run.
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The experiment consisted of two runs (Distance and Attend) of 80
trials each, with an equal proportion (40 trials) of CS1 and CS2 trials
in each run. A preudorandom CS event train was used, with the re-
striction that the same CS could not be presented on more than
two consecutive trials (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005). An average
reinforcement probability of 50% resulted in 40 Paired and 40 non-
Paired trials in each run. Furthermore, to maximize similarity of CS1
and CS2, the two were followed by an equal number of Paired trials
(i.e., 20 Paired and 20 non-Paired trials per CS in each run). To
construct the trial sequence (stick function in Fig. 1/B), the two sine
waves were used as threshold functions. A trial was Paired or non-
Paired when a random number drawn from the amplitude range
was below or above the threshold function, respectively (Gläscher
and Büchel, 2005).
Emotion regulation instructions
In the Distance condition, participants were instructed to actively
down-regulate emotions elicited by the negative pictures by means of
cognitive self-distancing (Kalisch et al., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2004;
Paret et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2009). They were given the option to
use ‘self-focused distancing’ (e.g. ‘The content of the images has nothing
to do with me or my situation. I am not affected and none of my loved
ones is affected.’), and/or ‘reality-focused distancing’ (‘The pictures are
not real, they are staged and have nothing to do with reality.’). In the
Attend condition, participantswere instructed to let the images passive-
ly sink in and to not alter the evoked emotions. They were told to
attentively look at the presented picture, be aware of its meaning and
to not change the triggered emotions.
Fig. 1. Experimental design and aversive prediction error model for fMRI analysis. (A) Example of a trial. Trial types differed based on regulation strategy (‘Distance’ or ‘Attend’) and US
presentation (Paired and non-Paired trials). A button press was required to predict whether a picture will follow or not, and at the end of the trial to indicate emotional feeling.
(B) Contingency curve (based on a sine function, in cyan) and event train (stick function, in white) for one CS and one run are shown. (C) Model of aversive prediction error derived
from the RescorlaWagner rulewas used as a parametricmodulation of theUS-onset regressor in the general linearmodel analysis. For a trial t, aversive prediction error aPEwas calculated
as a difference between the actual outcome R(t) and the predicted outcome aP(t) [aPE(t) = R(T)− aP(t)], while predicted outcome for the next trial aP(t+ 1) was updated by adding
aversive prediction error of the current trial aPE(t) to aP(t), weighted by a learning rate λ [aP(t+ 1) = aP(t) + λaPE(t)]. CS — conditioned stimulus, US— unconditioned stimulus.
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Experimental procedure
Participants were instructed that they would participate in a
functional imaging experiment investigating emotions and that they
would learn a technique useful for modulating the impact of negative
images on one's current emotional state.
After signing the consent form, they participated in a 20min training
session outside the scanner. Short 12-trial runs, analogous to the exper-
iment but using unique IAPS pictures, were repeated until each partici-
pant was successful at both the learning and emotion regulation tasks.
Prediction performance was measured by successful prediction of US
occurrence as indicated via button press at the CS presentation. Regula-
tion success, in turn,was veriﬁed via emotional intensity rating scores at
the end of each trial and verbal reports of the exact emotion regulation
strategy participants had used. All subjects were successfully trained at
both emotion regulation and prediction tasks before continuing with
the experiment.
Next, they completed the fMRI session, consisting of 2 runs lasting
35min each, with a structural scan of 5 min between the runs, allowing
participants to rest. To conﬁrm the use of regulation strategies, partici-
pants were asked to verbally repeat the types of sentences they had
used for both Distance and Attend conditions in the experiment. All
participants complied with the experimental instructions.
Behavioral measures
For a behavioralmeasure of regulation success during scanning, par-
ticipants rated their emotional feeling at the endof each run via a button
press (on a scale of−3 to 3 in increments of 1; set to 0 on each trial). A
2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on intensity rating scores with
factors Regulation Strategy (Distance, Attend) and Trial Type (Paired,
non-Paired) revealed a signiﬁcant Regulation Strategy & Trial Type in-
teraction (F = 63.95, p b 0.001), with a non-signiﬁcant non-Paired-
Distance versus non-Paired-Attend planned t-test (t = 1.15, p N 0.26).
This conﬁrmed the assumption that participants used the strategy of
distancing chieﬂy when presented with negative pictures. Only Paired
trials were therefore considered for the analysis of emotional intensity
scores. Correspondingly, aversive prediction error-related fMRI analysis
likewise focused on Paired trials only. Regulation successwas calculated
as a difference in intensity rating scores between Distance and Attend
conditions for each participant.
To account for behavioral learning, participants also predicted US oc-
currence via button press (binary yes/no task) during the ﬁrst 3 s of CS
presentation in the scanner. For a measure of prediction performance,
behavioral predictions were correlated with the actual US presentation
sequence for each participant resulting in Pearson's r values, z-
transformed for comparison across participants. Baseline performance
(if one was to respond randomly) equaled 0. Only participants whose
performance was signiﬁcantly different from 0 in both Distance and
Attend conditions were included in the analysis (2 participants were
excluded due to poor performance). A second measure of learning
was reaction times related to the prediction task. Participants were
not given speciﬁc instructions regarding response speed, with the ex-
ception that they had to respond within the ﬁrst 3 s of the CS being
presented.
For analysis of behavioral data the three measures of prediction
performance, reaction times and intensity rating scores were subjected
to paired t-tests, comparing Distance and Attend conditions.
Functional MRI acquisition and preprocessing
All measurements were performed on a 3 Tesla Siemens scanner at
the Klinikum rechts der Isar, Technische Universitaet Muenchen. Visual
stimuli, presented with the Presentation software (Neurobehavioral
Systems), were rear-projected on a screen at the head of the scanner
and could be seen by participants through an adjustable mirror,
mounted to a standard head coil. Presentation software also received
trigger pulses signaling the beginning of each volume acquisition from
the scanner.
Anatomical images were acquiredwith themagnetization-prepared
rapid acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) T1-weighted sequence
(1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution), and functional scans with the contrast-
gradient echo-planar T2*-weighted sequence with a repetition time of
2 s, echo time of 30 ms, ﬂip angle of 90°, acquisition matrix of 64 × 64,
35 slices, each 3 mm thick, with a gap of 0.6 mm, and an in-plane
resolution of 3 × 3 mm.
Preprocessing and analysis of imaging data were carried out with
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK).
The T2*-weighted functional images were slice-timed, then realigned
to the ﬁrst image of the ﬁrst run (after discarding the ﬁrst two volumes)
and unwarped. T1-weighted structural images were coregistered to the
functional images, segmented and then normalized to a standard T1
template in the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space with a
1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution. Normalization parameters from the latter
were used to normalize the functional images, which were then
resampled to 3 × 3 × 3 mm, smoothed with an 8 mm full-width-at-
half-maximum Gaussian ﬁlter, and temporally high-pass ﬁltered with
a cut-off of 128 s.
Aversive PE model
Aversive predictions and aversive prediction errors were computed
based on the Rescorla Wagner rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). For a
trial t, aversive prediction error aPE was calculated as a difference
between the actual outcome R(t) and the predicted outcome aP(t):
aPE tð Þ ¼ R tð Þ–aP tð Þ $ U tð Þ:
In turn, predicted outcome for the next trial aP(t+ 1) was updated
by adding aversive prediction error of the current trial aPE(t) to aP(t),
weighted by a learning rate λ:
aP t þ 1ð Þ ¼ aP tð Þ þ λaPE tð Þ $ U t þ 1ð Þ:
Parameter R was set to 1 when the aversive picture was delivered,
and to 0 when no picture was shown. In turn, parameter U was used
to disentangle CS1 and CS2 trials. Speciﬁcally, to calculate aP and aPE
values related to CS1, Uwas set to 1 on CS1 trials, and to 0 on CS2 trials,
and vice versa for the calculation of aPs and aPEs related to CS2
(Gläscher and Büchel, 2005).
We used an optimized subject- and run-speciﬁc learning rate λ, de-
rived from behavioral prediction scores. In detail, for each subject, sep-
arately for each CS and each run, subject's prediction responses were
compared with themodeled aP values from the above RescorlaWagner
equation. Root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) was calculated for a
range of learning rates from 0.001 to 1, in increments of 0.001. Best-ﬁt
learning rate for a speciﬁc CS, run and subjectwas determined by the as-
sociated global RMSD minimum. The mean best-ﬁt learning rate across
participants and conditionswas 0.054 (SD=0.031), which is consistent
with previous studies (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005; den Ouden et al.,
2009). A 2 × 2 ANOVA with factors Regulation Strategy (Distance, At-
tend) and CS (CS1, CS2) conﬁrmed thatmean learning rate did not differ
across conditions (non-signiﬁcantmain effects and interaction, F b 0.48,
p N 0.49).
fMRI data analysis
General linear model-based statistical analysis with the following re-
gressors was carried out: a) hemodynamic response function-convolved
onsets of CS1, CS2, US-Paired, US-non-Paired, Regulation Instruction,
and Emotional Intensity Scale; b) aP and aPE values derived from the
Rescorla Wagner rule as parametric modulations of the onset regressors:
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aversive prediction1 andaversive prediction2 asparametricmodulations
of CS1 and CS2 onsets, respectively, plus aversive prediction error-Paired
and aversive prediction error-non-Paired as parametric modulations of
US-Paired and US-non-Paired onsets, respectively; and c) 6 movement
regressors derived from realignment as regressors of no interest.
Activation analysis
To check for the main effects of two factors Regulation Strategy
(Distance, Attend) and Trial Type (Paired, non-Paired) on aversive
response-related activity without the impact of parametric modulation
regressors, we ﬁrst carried out a ﬁrst-level analysis with no parametric
modulation regressors, followed by a second-level 2× 2 ﬂexible factori-
al analysis with factors Subject, Regulation Strategy and Trial Type.
Based on the assumption that distancing was chieﬂy utilized during
US presentation (see also Behavioral measures section), and to be able
to directly compare the effects of cognitive emotion regulation on aver-
sive response and aversive prediction error activity, all further analyses
focused on Paired trials only (Fig. 1/A). At the group-level, two paired
t-test analyses were carried out, with parameter estimates related to ei-
ther US-Paired (i.e., Response-Paired) or Prediction Error-Paired regres-
sors used as dependent variables, comparing Distance and Attend
conditions. Statistical threshold for all activation analyses was set to
p b 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (family wise error [FWE])
at the cluster level, based on a height threshold of p b 0.005, using
whole-brain as the volume of interest.
Psychophysiological interaction analysis
An additional psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis was
carried out, based on the activation results. Speciﬁcally, a generalized
form of PPI (McLaren et al., 2012) was used, with three prefrontal
clusters from Response: Distance N Attend (i.e., regions involved in reg-
ulation) as seeds and amidbrain-masked overlap of Response: Attend N
Distance and Prediction Error: Distance N Attend as the region of inter-
est (ROI). All regressors of the localization model (i.e., the activation
analysis reported above) were also entered into the PPI and the PPI
regressors were orthogonalized to them, only capturing effects over
and above the localized activations. The midbrain mask was taken
from previous studies (Aron et al., 2004; Murray et al., 2008).
Results
Behavioral results
With regard to regulation success, cognitive emotion regulation sig-
niﬁcantly reduced emotional intensity ratings, validating the current
emotion regulation paradigm (t=10.779, p b 0.001; Table S1).With re-
spect to prediction reaction times, participantswere signiﬁcantly slower
inmaking predictions onUS occurrencewhile regulating their emotions
compared to the non-regulating condition, potentially suggesting
higher cognitive load during the regulation condition (t = 2.005, p =
0.0295; Table S1). With regard to prediction performance, prediction
performance mean (based on z-transformed Pearson's r-values)
remained unchanged with regulation (t = 0.01, p = 0.496; Table S1),
in line with previous results where heightened stress-levels failed to
affect behavioral learning accuracy (Robinson et al., 2013).
Main effects fMRI analysis
The main effects fMRI analysis without parametric modulation re-
gressors revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of Trial Type for the contrast
Paired N non-Paired (Fig. S1/A), and a signiﬁcant main effect of Regula-
tion Strategy for the contrast Attend N Distance (Fig. S1/B). Crucially,
both interactions yielded signiﬁcant and meaningful activations, indi-
cating a differential inﬂuence of cognitive emotion regulation on aver-
sive response-related activity on Paired and non-Paired trials (Figs. S1/
C, D), further corroborating the behavioral result that cognitive emotion
regulation was chieﬂy utilized during Paired trials (see Behavioral
measures section). All further analyses therefore focused on Paired trials
only.
The effect of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive response activity
We veriﬁed that the presented emotional pictures evoked a typical
emotion-related activation pattern (Fig. S2/A), in line with previous
studies (Lindquist et al., 2012). To assess whether cognitive emotion
regulationwas able to reduce the emotional brain activity, we inspected
the contrast Response: Attend N Distance. Aversive response-related ac-
tivity decreased during emotion regulation in a wide network of areas
including the insula, ventral tegmental area, periaqueductal gray area,
thalamus, striatum, parietal, visual and somatomotor cortices (Fig. 2/
A1; Table S2), consistent with previous studies (Buhle et al., 2014;
Ochsner et al., 2012). When correlating behavioral regulation success
scores with the degree of activity reduction due to cognitive emotion
regulation in the peak cluster from Response: Attend N Distance
(encompassing visual cortex, ventral tegmental area, periaqueductal
gray area, left insula and striatum and left somatomotor cortex), we
found that higher regulation success was related to higher emotion
regulation-related activity reduction in this cluster, r =−0.394, p =
0.043 (Fig. 2/A2).We controlled the last ﬁnding for the effects of poten-
tial outliers. Using a cut-off of 3 standard deviations for the regulation
success scores, we could ﬁnd no outliers and therefore proceeded with
the analysis, including all data points. With a stricter cut-off of 2 stan-
dard deviations, one data point would have been outside the range
(mean regulation success = 0.99, SD = 0.41, mean− 2 × SD = 0.17,
regulation success of participant 12 = 0.03.). Nevertheless, excluding
this participant would have resulted in a trend for a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between the behavioral regulation success scores and the degree of
activity reduction due to cognitive emotion regulation in the peak clus-
ter from aR: Attend NDistance (p=0.077). Taken together, results indi-
cate that cognitive emotion regulation indeed reduced emotional
responses, as expected from previous studies (Ochsner et al., 2012;
Phillips et al., 2008).
The effect of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive prediction error
activity
Aversive prediction error-related activity pattern during the Attend
session involved bilateral striatum (Fig. S2/B), as shown previously
(Delgado et al., 2008a; Garrison et al., 2013). Most relevant to the
focus of our study, to test whether cognitive emotion regulation indeed
enhanced aversive prediction error-related brain activity, we examined
the contrast Prediction Error: Distance N Attend. It revealed that cogni-
tive emotion regulation increased aversive prediction error-related
brain activity in the right ventral tegmental area, hippocampus, insula,
and ventral striatum (Fig. 2/B1; Table S2). The opposite contrast Predic-
tion Error: Attend N Distance, testing which brain regions decreased
aversive prediction error-related activity during cognitive emotion reg-
ulation, revealed no signiﬁcant activations, even at a liberal threshold
(Table S2). We then examined whether the effects of cognitive emotion
regulation on aversive prediction error activity were related to subject-
speciﬁc prediction performance scores. Aversive prediction error-
related activity increase during regulation was correlated with the
prediction performance difference (between Distance and Attend
conditions) for the entire cluster in the contrast Prediction Error:
Distance N Attend, encompassing right ventral tegmental area, ventral
striatum, hippocampus and insula (r =−0.545, p= 0.006, Fig. 2/B2),
as well as for each of the sub-regions separately (Supplementary analy-
sis and Table S3). The correlation pattern suggests, ﬁrstly, that aversive
prediction error enhancement was related to prediction performance,
and secondly, that those participantswhohadmore difﬁculty predicting
US occurrence during regulation showed a higher emotion regulation-
related increase of aversive prediction error activity. Together, results
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demonstrate that cognitive emotion regulation enhanced aversive pre-
diction error-related signals in regions typical for aversive reinforce-
ment learning (Delgado et al., 2008a; Goosens, 2011; Spoormaker
et al., 2011), conﬁrming the hypothesis that cognitive emotion
regulation can indeed affect not only response-related but also
learning-related brain activity.
Fig. 2. The effect of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive response- and aversive prediction error-related activity. (A1) Cognitive emotion regulation reduced aversive response-related
activity in the insula, ventral tegmental area, periaqueductal gray, thalamus, striatum, visual and somatomotor cortices. (A2) The higher the regulation success, the stronger the reduction
in the peak Response: Attend NDistance cluster (encompassing visual cortex, ventral tegmental area and periaqueductal gray, left insula and striatumand left somatomotor cortex) across
subjects. (B1) Cognitive emotion regulation increased aversive prediction error-related activity in the right ventral tegmental area, ventral striatum, hippocampus, thalamus and insula.
(B2) Theworse the prediction performance across subjects, the stronger the aversive prediction error-related increase of activity with emotion regulation in these areas. (C1) The overlap
of aversive response and aversive prediction error networks regulated by cognitive emotion regulation. Contrast Response: Attend N Distance is shown in yellow and contrast Prediction
Error: Distance N Attend is depicted in red. The two contrasts overlapped in themidbrain (including ventral tegmental area), hippocampus and insula. (C2) The effect of cognitive emotion
regulation on aversive response- and aversive prediction error-related activity showed a trend for a negative correlation, such that the stronger the effect of emotion regulation on aversive
response activity, the less aversive prediction error activitywas affected, and vice versa (*a trend for signiﬁcance). All contrasts were thresholded at p b 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected (with a
height threshold of p b 0.005 and an extent threshold of 138 or 155 voxels for Response and Prediction Error analysis, respectively). a.u. — arbitrary units, r— Pearson's r, VTA— ventral
tegmental area, Thal — thalamus, VST — ventral striatum, Hipp — hippocampus.
143S. Mulej Bratec et al. / NeuroImage 123 (2015) 138–148
Relationship between the regulation of aversive responses and aversive
prediction errors
Considering our assumption that the regulation of emotional
responses and learning is intimately connected, we tested whether
the effects of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive response- and
aversive prediction error-related activity were related to each other.
We ﬁrst examined regional overlap by overlaying the contrasts
Response: Attend N Distance and Prediction Error: Distance N Attend.
Indeed, the regulated aversive response and aversive prediction error
networks overlapped in the midbrain (including ventral tegmental
area), hippocampus and insula (Fig. 2/C1). Next, we looked for a quan-
titative relationship between the two effects across subjects.We found a
trend for a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the extracted beta-
values, such that the stronger the effect of cognitive emotion regulation
on aversive response activity, the less aversive prediction error activity
was affected by emotion regulation, and vice versa (Fig. 2/C2; mean
β-values of all signiﬁcantly activated voxels in both contrasts were
used). Together, results suggest that the effects of cognitive emotion
regulation on emotional responses and learning are speciﬁcally interre-
lated in the ventral tegmental area, hippocampus, and insula.
Mechanism underlying the effect of cognitive emotion regulation
Finally, we sought to shed light on the neural mechanism by which
emotion regulation might have inﬂuenced aversive prediction error-
related brain activity. Firstly, the overlap of contrasts Response:
Attend N Distance and Prediction Error: Distance N Attend (Fig. 2/C1),
together with a trend towards a negative relationship between the ef-
fects of cognitive emotion regulation on aversive response and aversive
prediction error activity (Fig. 2/C2), suggests that the effects of regula-
tion might be linked with a common prefrontal system, whose activa-
tions are typically associated with regulatory activity (Buhle et al.,
2014; Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2012). Secondly, previous studies in-
dicate that aversive prediction errors are coded by the salience-related
midbrain dopaminergic neurons (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). Together with our ﬁndings, where
ventral tegmental area was a part of the aversive prediction error-
related neural network affected by regulation (see Fig. 2/B1), and
given the evidence that the prefrontal cortex is able to directlymodulate
dopamine activity in the ventral tegmental area (Ballard et al., 2011;
Gao et al., 2007; Gariano and Groves, 1988; Svensson and Tung, 1989),
this implies that emotion regulation might be effective by directly
targeting the source of the aversive prediction error signal in the ventral
tegmental area.
To conﬁrm this, we ﬁrst identiﬁed regions involved in the regulation
of emotions by examining the contrast Response: Distance N Attend.
Replicating previous studies, a fronto-parietal networkwas revealed, in-
cluding bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3/A; Table S2) (Buhle et al., 2014; Kalisch, 2009;
Ochsner et al., 2012). We then performed three PPI analyses, using the
three prefrontal clusters involved in emotion regulation as seeds. As
mentioned above, cognitive emotion regulation was expected to en-
hance functional connectivity between a prefrontal regulatory cluster
and the regulated midbrain ROI. The PPI analysis with a seed in the
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex revealed a signiﬁcant connectivity-
related activation in the ventral tegmental area for the contrast
Response: Distance N Attend (MNI x, y, z: 3,−7,−11; p b 0.05, FWE
small-volume corrected), suggesting an increased functional connectiv-
ity during cognitive emotion regulation between the left ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex and ventral tegmental area (Fig. 3/B). The result was
further corroborated by a signiﬁcant correlation between the increase
of functional connectivity between the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
and ventral tegmental area with cognitive emotion regulation and the
prediction performance difference (r = 0.386, p = 0.046, Fig. 3/C). In
line with the ﬁnding that an increase of ventral tegmental area activity
during cognitive emotion regulation is negatively correlated with pre-
diction performance (Fig. 2/B2),we found that theworse the participant
was in predicting US occurrence during regulation, the more the
connectivity between the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and ventral
tegmental area was enhanced during regulation. Together, results
imply a relationship between the regulation of emotional responses
and learning, pointing to a possible common source of regulatory
activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and a common target of
regulation in the ventral tegmental area.
Discussion
Cognitive emotion regulation has proven highly effective in modu-
lating emotional responses (Delgado et al., 2008b; Kalisch et al., 2005;
Ochsner et al., 2012). Results of the current study, however, show that
cognitive emotion regulation is able to go beyond emotional responses
and can also affect the mechanisms of emotional learning. Speciﬁcally,
data demonstrate, for the ﬁrst time, that while cognitive emotion regu-
lation reduced aversive response-related activity in a wide network
of areas, it increased aversive prediction error-related activity in an
overlapping sub-network involving ventral tegmental area, ventral
Fig. 3. The effect of cognitive emotion regulation on the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex–ventral tegmental area connectivity. (A) Cognitive emotion regulation-related activations included
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. The contrastwas thresholded at p b 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected (with a height threshold of p b 0.005 and an
extent threshold of 138 voxels). (B) PPI analysis revealed increased connectivity of the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex cluster (taken from Response: Distance N Attend) with ventral
tegmental area in themidbrain ROI, p b 0.05 FWE, small volume-corrected. (C) During emotion regulation, theworse the prediction performance across subjects, the higher the functional
connectivity between the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and ventral tegmental area. PPI—psychophysiological interaction analysis, a.u.— arbitrary units, r— Pearson's r, VTA— ventral
tegmental area, VLPFC — ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
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striatum, hippocampus and insula (Figs. 2/A1, B1). In addition, whereas
the reduction of response activity was related to emotion regulation
success, the enhancement of aversive prediction error-related activity
was related to prediction performance (Figs. 2/A2, B2). Finally, a selec-
tive increase of functional connectivity during cognitive emotion regu-
lation between ventral tegmental area and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex, a regulatory area, was likewise related to prediction perfor-
mance (Fig. 3). Together, data suggest that cognitive emotion regulation
may exert control over both emotional response- and learning-related
brain activity.
Enhancement of aversive prediction error activity during cognitive emotion
regulation
Emotional stimuli not only elicit emotional responses, but also
prompt association formations to the surrounding neutral stimuli and
thereby promote learning; speciﬁcally, emotions have been shown to
modulate the learning parameter of prediction error (Izard, 2009;
Katahira et al., 2011; Lang and Bradley, 2010; Nesse and Ellsworth,
2009; Watanabe et al., 2013). Cognitive emotion regulation, on the
other hand, inﬂuences emotions; in particular, cognitive emotion regu-
lation reduces aversive emotional responses and related brain activity
(Fig. 2/A) (Buhle et al., 2014; Kalisch, 2009;Ochsner et al., 2012). Results
of the current study demonstrate that cognitive emotion regulation can
affect not only aversive emotional responses, but also the actual process
of learning (Fig. 2/B). More speciﬁcally, we found that the regulatory
technique of self-distancing increased aversive prediction error-
related neural activity in the ventral striatum, hippocampus, and ventral
tegmental area (Fig. 2/B1). Due to the overwhelming evidence from
computational and empirical neuroscience for the essential role of pre-
diction errors in associative learning (Delgado et al., 2008b; Garrison
et al., 2013; Pearce and Bouton, 2001; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Schultz and Dickinson, 2000), our results indicate that cognitive
emotion regulation inﬂuences learning-related neural processes in the
context of emotions. Furthermore, we found that the aversive predic-
tion error-related activity increase during regulation was related to
the prediction performance difference (Fig. 2/B2), indicating that cogni-
tive emotion regulation in fact affected the relationship between predic-
tion performance change and aversive prediction error-related activity
increase. In detail, during emotion regulation, the more a participant's
prediction accuracy was lowered, the more aversive prediction error-
related activity was enhanced, and opposite, the better the participant
was in predicting during regulation, the less aversive prediction error-
related BOLD activity was increased. A potential mechanism linking
lower prediction performance with increased aversive prediction error
activity during cognitive emotion regulation might be the learning
rate parameter. In a recent study, using a reinforcement learning
paradigm and an extended computational model of learning, a task-
independent showing of a fearful face resulted in both an increased
reward prediction error-related brain activity and a higher learning
rate (Watanabe et al., 2013). Assuming that classical conditioning and
reinforcement learning rely on similar mechanisms, participants with
a lower learning performance might have increased their prediction
error-related activity during emotion regulation by increasing the learn-
ing rate— the higher the learning rate, thehigher the effect of prediction
errors (Watanabe et al., 2013). Future studies, examiningdifferent types
of learning combined with variable learning models could help further
illuminate this effect.
In addition, given the role of prediction errors in attention allocation
(Corlett et al., 2007; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Pearce and Hall, 1980), current
results suggest that cognitive emotion regulation might enable us to
enhance our attention to the relevant stimuli while decreasing aversive
responses. Considering the importance of attention for memory (Chun
and Turk-Browne, 2007), as well as the known link between cognitive
emotion regulation and enhanced memory (Dillon et al., 2007; Hayes
et al., 2010; Richards and Gross, 2000), emotion regulation-induced
enhancement of the aversive prediction error activity may additionally
result in an enhanced memory of the reappraised stimuli, especially
those that are unexpected (i.e., for which the prediction error is high).
Future studies might test this idea to see whether pictures associated
with the highest prediction error values are indeed remembered better
than those whose occurrence is expected.
Lastly, it is worth noting that a recent study showed an aversive
prediction error-related signal increase in the ventral striatum with
elevated stress levels induced by preparatory cues (Robinson et al.,
2013), a seemingly incompatible ﬁnding. However, given that people
tend to automatically down-regulate negative emotions in response to
stress-related cues (Mauss et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2008), the stressful
condition in the study by Robinson and colleagues could have partially
resembled the Distance condition in our study. Future work might
help to disentangle the effect of stress and emotion regulation on aver-
sive prediction errors.
Prediction error enhancement during cognitive emotion regulation in the
ventral tegmental area
The network of areas whose aversive prediction error-related
activity was enhanced during emotion regulation included the
ventral tegmental area, a region previously associatedwith aversive pre-
diction error coding in neuroimaging studies (Delgado et al., 2008a;
Spoormaker et al., 2011). In terms of a neuromodulatory basis of
aversive prediction errors, salience-coding dopaminergic neurons in
the ventral tegmental area have been shown to activate in response to
unexpected aversive events (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Matsumoto
and Hikosaka, 2009). Furthermore, acute intake of amphetamine, an in-
direct dopamine agonist, was shown to increase BOLD-related aversive
prediction error signal in the ventral tegmental area and striatum in a
previous study (Menon et al., 2007). Considering that emotion regula-
tion in the current study targeted aversive prediction error-related
activity in the ventral tegmental area, and given that prefrontal cortex
has been shown to modulate dopaminergic ventral tegmental area
activity (Ballard et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2007; Gariano and Groves,
1988; Svensson and Tung, 1989), cognitive emotion regulation might
be affecting aversive prediction error-related activity by targeting
the midbrain dopaminergic system. Indeed, an additional analysis
conﬁrmed that functional connectivity between one of the relevant
regulatory regions – left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex – and ventral
tegmental area increased with emotion regulation (Fig. 3/B), and
that this connectivity increase was related to behavioral prediction
performance (Fig. 3/C). Speciﬁcally, the worse the participant was in
predicting US occurrence during cognitive emotion regulation, the
more the connectivity between ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and
ventral tegmental areawas enhanced during regulation,mirroring the re-
lationship between prediction performance and aversive prediction
error-related activity change with cognitive emotion regulation (Fig. 2/
B2). In detail, during emotion regulation, the more a participant's predic-
tion accuracywas lowered, themore the connectivity between ventrolat-
eral prefrontal cortex and ventral tegmental area was enhanced, perhaps
to enable theparticipant topaymore attention toher errors, andopposite,
the better the participant was in predicting during emotion regulation,
the less the connectivity between ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and ven-
tral tegmental area was increased, possibly because there was no need to
pay that much extra attention to the errors. Together, our ﬁndings there-
fore suggest that cognitive emotion regulation-related effects on aversive
prediction error activity might be moderated by dopaminergic ventral
tegmental area pathways.
Prediction error enhancement during cognitive emotion regulation in the
hippocampus, striatum and insula
Results further demonstrate that aversive prediction error-related
activity was enhanced in the hippocampus, insula and ventral striatum
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(Fig. 2/B1). The involvement of both striatum and insula is consistent
with previous studies, where they have repeatedly been implicated as
the neural correlates of aversive prediction errors (Delgado et al.,
2008a; Metereau and Dreher, 2013; Robinson et al., 2010; Schiller
et al., 2008; Seymour et al., 2004, 2007; Spoormaker et al., 2011). The
strongest enhancement of aversive prediction error-related activity,
however, was found in the right hippocampus (Fig. 2/B1; Table 2).
Hippocampus has likewise been implicated in aversive learning and
aversive prediction error coding (Goosens, 2011; Huh et al., 2009;
Ploghaus et al., 2000). Furthermore, given the involvement of hippo-
campus in emotion regulation-related memory enhancement (Hayes
et al., 2010), this result might further corroborate the link between
cognitive emotion regulation-induced increase of aversive prediction
error-related activity and memory enhancement.
Overlapping effects of cognitive emotion regulation on emotional response-
and prediction error-related activity
The regulatory impact of cognitive emotion regulation on response-
and learning-related activity overlapped in the ventral tegmental area,
insula and hippocampus (Fig. 2/C1), suggesting that emotion regulation
modulated regionally overlapping but partly distinct processes. Firstly,
emotion regulation affected the two types of activity in opposite ways,
such that aversive response-related activity was reduced (Fig. 2/A1),
while the aversive prediction error-related activity was enhanced by
regulation (Fig. 2/B1). Secondly, the two effects correlated with differ-
ent behavioral measures, such that the reduction of response-related
activity was related to regulation success (Fig. 2/A2), while the en-
hancement of aversive prediction error activity was related to predic-
tion performance (Fig. 2/B2). Finally, the two effects showed a trend
towards a negative correlation, such that an augmentation of one was
related to a reduction in the other (Fig. 2/C2), suggesting that the effects
of cognitive emotion regulation on emotional responses and learning
might share cognitive resources. The results are in line with a number
of previous studies demonstrating either emotional response- or
aversive prediction error-related activity in the above-mentioned
areas (Delgado et al., 2008b; Goosens, 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012;
Spoormaker et al., 2011). Our data show that these processes are largely
simultaneously and distinctivelymodulated by cognitive emotion regu-
lation. Unfortunately, beyond a regional speciﬁcation and direction of
the effect, BOLD fMRI does not allow for further characterization of ac-
tivitymodulation. For example, due to a limited spatio-temporal resolu-
tion and an indirect measure of blood oxygenation changes, we cannot
determine whether inhibitory GABA-ergic or neuromodulatory dopa-
minergic cell groups in the ventral tegmental area are modulated by
cognitive emotion regulation. Future studies, for instance modulating
dopamine levels, could be helpful for a further characterization of
activity modulation by cognitive emotion regulation.
Other issues: limitations, amygdala, and clinical implications
The current study has some limitations. First, we did not ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant effect of cognitive emotion regulation on behavioral learning
(i.e., prediction performance). The missing effect of emotion regulation
on learning at the behavioral level is in linewith a previous study,where
increased levels of stress failed to inﬂuence behavioral learning, while
signiﬁcantly affecting aversive prediction error-related neural activity
(Robinson et al., 2013). The lack of cognitive emotion regulation-
related inﬂuence on behavioral learning might be due to several
reasons: a) the current study's model-based design focused on aversive
prediction errors at a macroscopic brain level and not on learning at the
behavioral level. As a consequence of this computational approach, the
lack of a behavioral learning effect might be due to the lower
sensitivity of behavioral prediction scores, for which the mean of all
trials was used, based on a binary ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer. The compu-
tational model applied to the neural data, on the other hand, accounted
for variations in the BOLD amplitude, based on themodel's assumptions.
b) The lack of performance differencemight lie in the potentially higher
cognitive load in the Distance condition, which is also reﬂected by a re-
action time difference in prediction scores, such that participants took
longer to respond during cognitive emotion regulation (Table S1).
Nevertheless, this reaction time difference did not confound the effect of
emotion regulation on either aversive response- or aversive prediction
error-related activity, as was conﬁrmed by an additional analysis, in
which reaction time scores were included as a covariate. c) While no
average-based effect of cognitive emotion regulation on prediction
performance was found across subjects, we observed that the emotion
regulation's effect on aversive prediction error-related activity was linked
to subject-speciﬁc prediction performance scores (Fig. 2/B2). This brain-
behavior relationship across subjects suggests an inﬂuence of further
unknown factors that may confound the emotion regulation-related
effects on learning, such as emotional response styles. Future studies
may help illuminate these potential additional factors.
As a second limitation of the current study, the analysis did not focus
on the effects of cognitive emotion regulation on prediction-related
neural activity at the time of CS presentation. Such analysis was beyond
the study's aim, which focused on directly comparing the effects of
cognitive emotion regulation on emotional responses and learning.
Due to our whole-brain approach, we did not observe a modulating
effect of cognitive emotion regulation on amygdala with regard to emo-
tional responses, despite it being commonly affected by regulation in
other studies (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). An additional
ROI-based analysis focused on amygdala for both aversive response-
and aversive prediction error-related effects can be found in the Supple-
mentary material (Supplementary analysis).
Our ﬁndings may have relevant clinical implications, particularly for
affective disorders, which are characterized by impaired emotion regu-
lation (Campbell-Sills and Barlow, 2007; Erk et al., 2010; Etkin and
Wager, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2007). For example in major depression,
both an inability of patients to reduce emotional responses to aversive
stimuli (Campbell-Sills and Barlow, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2007) and a
negative bias in attention, thinking and memory (Beck, 2008; Disner
et al., 2011) are well-known; however, as yet, a possible interaction be-
tween impaired emotion regulation and negative bias is poorly under-
stood. If aberrant response regulation were accompanied by failures in
enhancing emotional learning for aversive stimuli, patients would be
unable to boost their attention to errors, resulting in an unchanged
pronounced negative bias typically seen in depressed patients. Future
studies on patients with affective disorders could help test whether
aberrant effects of cognitive emotion regulation on emotional learning
are present in affective disorders.
Conclusion
In summary, we show that cognitive emotion regulation is able to
reach beyond the reduction of emotional responses to directly affect
the process of emotional learning by increasing aversive prediction
error-related activity in the ventral tegmental area, striatum, hippocam-
pus and insula, potentially via tegmental dopaminergic pathways. The
result highlights a neglected dimension of emotion regulation, namely
its impact on emotional learning.
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Supplementary Methods 
Emotional Stimuli 
To elicit aversive emotions, 80 negative pictures were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS), and divided into two groups of 40 pictures, for use (in a 
counterbalanced way) in the two emotion regulation conditions (Distance and Attend), based 
on normative ratings of valence and arousal. Valence means for the two sets of IAPS pictures 
were 2.25 (SD = 0.48) and 2.15 (SD = 0.40), while arousal means equaled 6.05 (SD = 0.60) 
and 6.10 (SD = 0.61). T-tests confirmed that there was no significant difference between the 
two sets of pictures for either arousal (p > 0.32) or valence (p > 0.68). The picture 
presentation order was random and differed for each participant.  Set 1 contained the 
following IAPS pictures: 3160, 9400, 9415, 9911, 9007, 3010, 3170, 9322, 3051, 9421, 9900, 
6838, 3550, 6021, 6571, 3301, 2683, 9181, 3212, 8485, 6550, 6563, 3100, 9635.1, 2730, 
2352.2, 3185, 6212, 9183, 3071, 2717, 3016, 9800, 9075, 3005.1, 1930, 3102, 2095, 6821, 
9902, while set 2 contained the following pictures: 9420, 2799, 3064, 9908, 3266, 2053, 
3061, 3500, 2691, 3080, 9250, 6830, 9571, 6315, 9940, 9433, 9428, 9903, 9941, 9006, 3030, 
3350, 3261, 6300, 9326, 3000, 6560, 2703, 3168, 9252, 9405, 9332, 9043, 9300, 9560, 7380, 
3017, 9570, 9254, 6230. 
 
Supplementary Analysis 
Aversive Prediction Error-Related Region of Interest-Based Correlation Analysis 
The cluster resulting from the contrast Prediction Error: Distance > Attend spanned more than 
one anatomical region. In order to show which region(s) were driving the correlation effect 
(Figure 2/B2), we followed an anatomical region of interest (ROI)-based approach and 
divided the cluster into anatomical sub-regions hippocampus, striatum, insula and midbrain 
(based on ‘wfupickatlas’ from SPM8). After obtaining a difference score for each participant, 
indicating the strength of enhancement with cognitive emotion regulation (Distance – 
Attend), we performed correlations between BOLD difference scores in the sub-regions and 
prediction performance difference scores (Distance – Attend). All of the sub-regions exhibited 
a significant negative correlation with prediction scores, indicating that the result was highly 
consistent and uniform across the whole original cluster (Table S3). 
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The Effect of Cognitive Emotion Regulation on Aversive Response-Related Activity in the 
Amygdala 
In line with previous studies, the presentation of negative pictures elicited amygdala-related 
activation (Figure S2/A) (Lindquist et al., 2012). However, based on a whole-brain analysis, 
cognitive emotion regulation failed to significantly affect this response-related activity in the 
amygdala. We therefore performed a ROI-based analysis focused on the anatomical amygdala 
ROIs, to determine whether cognitive emotion regulation suppressed responses in the 
amygdala, as suggested by previous studies (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). We 
extracted average ß-values related to the Response regressor from the left and right 
anatomical amygdala ROIs and performed a t-test comparing Attend and Distance conditions. 
Results showed a trend for significance in the left amygdala (t = 1.575, p = 0.066), but no 
suppression of response-related activity in the right amygdala (t = 0.406, p = 0.345).  
 
The Effect of Cognitive Emotion Regulation on Aversive Prediction Error-Related Activity in 
the Amygdala 
Since amygdala has also been shown to code for aversive prediction errors (Boll et al., 2013; 
McHugh et al., 2014; Metereau and Dreher, 2013), we expected that cognitive emotion 
regulation might modulate this activity. However, we failed to observe prediction error-
related amygdala activations in a whole-brain approach, and therefore performed an 
additional ROI-based analysis, based on anatomical amygdala ROIs, to test whether amygdala 
activations in our study were modulated by emotion regulation. We extracted average ß-
values related to the Prediction Error regressor from the left and right anatomical amygdala 
ROIs and performed a t-test comparing Attend and Distance conditions. Results showed a 
trend for significance in the left amygdala (t = 1.482, p = 0.078), but no suppression of 
prediction error-related activity in the right amygdala (t = 1.018, p = 0.161). Together with 
response-related findings for amygdala above, results indicate that cognitive emotion 
regulation shows a trend towards suppressing aversive responses and aversive prediction 
errors in the amygdala. However, further studies are necessary to support this result. 
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Supplementary Tables 
Table S1. Behavioral measures. 
Behavioral Measure 
Emotional Intensity 
Rating (SEM) 
Reaction Time 
(SEM) 
Prediction Performance 
(SEM) 
Attend - 1.56 (0.09) 1.14 (0.04) 0.35 (0.03) 
Distance - 0.85 (0.1) 1.21 (0.05) 0.36 (0.03) 
T-test: 
Attend vs. Distance 
p < 0.001 p < 0.05 n.s. 
A t-test on emotional intensity ratings showed that distancing significantly reduced negative feelings, 
a t-test on reaction time scores revealed a significant slowing during distancing, and a t-test on 
prediction performance scores showed no significant effects of cognitive emotion regulation. N.s. – 
non-significant, SEM – standard error of mean. 
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Table S2. Significant activations for the regulation of aversive response- and aversive 
prediction error-related activity. 
Region activated Hemisphere Coordinates Z value Cluster size 
x y z 
Response: Distance > Attend 
Middle frontal gyrus R 42 17 52 5.01 803 
Middle frontal gyrus L -45 23 34 4.82  
Superior medial frontal gyrus L -3 38 37 3.89  
Inferior frontal gyrus L -51 17 22 3.59  
Superior frontal gyrus L -12 23 64 3.22  
Superior medial frontal gyrus R 6 44 46 3.17  
Superior frontal gyrus R 21 26 55 3.12  
Inferior parietal gyrus L -42 -52 40 4.46 430 
Supramarginal gyrus L -60 -49 28 3.42  
Angular gyrus R 57 -52 31 4.46 399 
Middle frontal gyrus L -27 59 4 4.74 180 
 
Response: Attend > Distance 
Supramarginal gyrus L -57 -28 34 5.40 5892 
Middle occipital gyrus L -51 -70 1 4.80  
Fusiform gyrus L -24 -55 -14 4.64  
Middle temporal gyrus L -51 -67 10 4.58  
Middle temporal gyrus R 51 -61 4 4.56  
Fusiform gyrus R 30 -52 -17 4.46  
Insula L -39 -22 1 4.19  
Cerebellar vermis R 0 -58 -29 4.15  
Postcentral gyrus L -42 -19 49 4.13  
Precuneus R 24 -61 25 4.12  
Cuneus R 21 -82 43 4.11  
Cerebellum L -6 -67 -11 4.10  
Middle occipital gyrus R 39 -85 25 3.94  
Rolandic operculum L -36 5 13 3.93  
Caudate L -12 -7 16 3.91  
Periaqueductal gray L -3 -31 -17 3.90  
Precentral gyrus L -33 -13 49 3.84  
Putamen L -24 8 -8 3.67  
Cerebellum R 24 -37 -23 3.66  
Lingual gyrus L -15 -79 -2 3.64  
Precuneus L -12 -55 13 3.52  
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Hippocampus R 30 -31 -8 3.45  
Lingual gyrus R 15 -67 -8 3.44  
Superior temporal gyrus L -48 -10 4 3.39  
Cuneus L -9 -76 19 3.24  
Hypothalamus R 3 -4 -14 3.22  
Calcarine fissure R 15 -52 7 3.10  
Superior occipital gyrus L -18 -73 22 2.91  
Superior occipital gyrus R 27 -73 43 2.77  
Parahippocampal gyrus R 33 -28 -17 2.73  
Supramarginal gyrus R 66 -19 31 4.70 1072 
Insula R 39 -16 -2 4.47  
Postcentral gyrus R 51 -25 22 4.25  
Rolandic operculum R 45 -1 10 3.85  
Superior parietal gyrus R 18 -58 58 4.27 284 
Midcingulate gyrus R 15 -31 40 4.00  
Inferior parietal gyrus R 33 -46 55 3.92  
Midcingulate gyrus R 0 2 40 4.02 165 
 
Prediction Error: Distance > Attend 
Hippocampus R 24 -22 -11 4.11 432 
Thalamus R 9 -22 4 3.59  
Insula R 42 -4 -17 3.44  
Midbrain (VTA/SN) R 9 -10 -14 3.40  
Superior temporal gyrus R 45 8 -20 3.27  
Fusiform R 36 -37 -20 3.20  
Hypothalamus R -1 2 -14 3.19  
Putamen R 30 -4 -8 3.04  
Cerebellum R 30 -43 -26 2.92  
Thalamus L -9 -28 7 2.77  
Parahippocampal gyrus R 21 -40 -8 2.76  
Periaqueductal gray R 9 -25 -17 2.70  
 
Prediction Error: Attend > Distance 
No significant activations. 
 
Results are based on differential t-contrasts, thresholded at p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected, and a 
height threshold of p < 0.005. Some clusters cover more than one brain region; peak coordinates 
reflect local maxima. Coordinates conform to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. 
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Table S3. Aversive prediction error-related region of interest-based correlation analysis. 
Region Whole cluster Hippocampus Striatum Insula Midbrain 
Pearson’s r -0.545 -0.464 -0.389 -0.638 -0.520 
Alpha 0.006** 0.020** 0.045** 0.001** 0.009** !
Table shows correlation analyses between BOLD difference scores (Distance – Attend) in the 
indicated regions and prediction performance difference scores (Distance – Attend). As can be seen 
above, all of the sub-regions exhibited a significant negative correlation with prediction scores. ** - 
Significant at p < 0.05. 
! 9!
Supplementary Figures 
 
Figure S1. Main-effects fMRI analysis. (A) Activation pattern related to the main effect of Trial Type 
for the contrast Paired > non-Paired. (B) Activation pattern related to the main effect of Regulation 
Strategy for the contrast Attend > Distance. (C) Activation pattern related to the interaction effect 
between Trial Type and Regulation Strategy, for the contrast (Distance > Attend)Paired > (Distance > 
Attend)non-Paired. (D) Activation pattern related to the interaction effect between Trial Type and 
Regulation Strategy, for the contrast (Attend > Distance)Paired > (Attend > Distance)non-Paired. All 
contrasts were thresholded at p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected (with a height threshold of p < 0.005 
and an extent threshold of 169 voxels). 
! 10!
 
Figure S2. Aversive response- and aversive prediction error-related activation patterns. (A) Activation 
pattern related to the presentation of IAPS pictures (Response regressor). The contrast was thresholded 
at p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected (with a height threshold of p < 0.005). (B) Activation pattern 
related to the aversive prediction error (Prediction Error regressor). The contrast was thresholded at a 
height threshold of p < 0.005 and an extent threshold of 50 voxel. 
 
			42	
		 	
			 43	
3	
Project	2:	Cognitive	Emotion	Regulation	
Modulates	the	Balance	of	Competing	
Influences	on	Ventral	Striatal	Aversive	
Prediction	Error	Signals	
The	 current	 chapter	 includes	 a	 research	 manuscript	 entitled	 “Cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 modulates	 the	 balance	 of	 competing	 influences	 on	 ventral	 striatal	aversive	prediction	error	signals”.	It	demonstrates,	for	the	first	time,	that	cognitive	emotion	 regulation,	when	 implemented	by	 a	 person	with	high	 reappraisal	 ability,	can	affect	the	balance	among	competing	striatal	inputs	to	reduce	the	inputs	coming	from	 subcortical	 afferents,	while	maintaining	 the	 ones	 coming	 from	 the	 PFC.	 The	manuscript	is	currently	unpublished.		
Contributions:	Authors:	 Satja	 Mulej	 Bratec,	 Xiyao	 Xie,	 Yijun	 Wang,	 Leonhard	 Schilbach,	 Gabriele	
Schmid,	Claus	Zimmer,	Afra	Wohlschläger,	Valentin	Riedl,	Christian	Sorg	The	author	of	this	thesis	is	the	first	author	of	the	manuscript.	S.M.B.	and	C.S.,	with	the	help	of	X.X.,	G.S.	and	C.Z.,	conceived	the	experiment.	S.M.B.	recruited	and	trained	participants,	 and	 S.M.B.	 and	 X.X.	 together	 conducted	 behavioural	 and	 fMRI	 data	acquisition.	 S.M.B.	 analysed	 behavioural	 and	 imaging	 data,	 with	 some	 help	 from	X.X.,	 Y.W.	 and	 A.W.,	 and	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 V.R.	 and	 C.S.	 S.M.B.	 wrote	 the	manuscript,	supervised	by	C.S.,	and	the	manuscript	was	commented	on	and	revised	by	L.S.		 	
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Abstract	Cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 (CER)	 is	 a	 critical	 human	 ability	 to	 face	 aversive	emotional	stimuli	in	a	flexible	way,	via	recruitment	of	specific	frontal	brain	circuits.	Animal	research	reveals	a	central	role	of	ventral	striatum	in	emotional	behaviour,	for	both	aversive	conditioning,	with	 striatum	signalling	aversive	prediction	errors	(aPE),	 and	 for	 integrating	 competing	 influences	 of	 distinct	 striatal	 inputs	 from	regions	 such	 as	 the	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (PFC),	 amygdala,	 hippocampus	 and	 ventral	tegmental	 area	 (VTA).	 Translating	 these	 ventral	 striatal	 findings	 from	 animal	research	 to	 human	 CER,	 we	 hypothesized	 that	 successful	 CER	 would	 affect	 the	balance	of	competing	influences	of	striatal	afferents	on	striatal	aPE	signals,	in	a	way	favouring	 PFC	 as	 opposed	 to	 subcortical	 striatal	 inputs.	 Using	 aversive	 classical	conditioning	with	and	without	CER	during	fMRI,	we	found	that	during	CER,	superior	regulators	 indeed	 reduced	 the	modulatory	 impact	 of	 subcortical	 striatal	 afferents	(hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA)	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals,	while	keeping	the	PFC	impact	intact.	In	contrast,	inferior	regulators	showed	an	opposite	pattern.	Our	results	 demonstrate	 that	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals	 and	 associated	 competing	modulatory	 inputs	 are	 critical	 mechanisms	 underlying	 successful	 cognitive	regulation	of	aversive	emotions	in	humans.	 	
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Introduction	Cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 (CER)	 is	 a	 vital	 human	 ability	 to	 face	 aversive	emotional	stimuli	in	a	flexible	way	(Buhle	et	al.,	2014;	Gross,	2002;	Kalisch,	2009).	Based	 on	 animal	 research,	 ventral	 striatum	 is	 critical	 for	 emotional	 behaviour,	particularly	 for	aversive	conditioning,	with	striatum	signalling	aversive	prediction	errors	 (aPE),	 and	 for	 integrating	 competing	 modulatory	 influences	 from	 several	regions	 such	 as	 the	 prefrontal	 cortex	 or	 medial	 temporal	 lobes	 (Grace,	 Floresco,	Goto,	 &	 Lodge,	 2007;	 Pennartz,	 Ito,	 Verschure,	 Battaglia,	 &	 Robbins,	 2011).	 In	humans,	 however,	 it	 is	 unknown	 whether	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals	 and	 their	modulation	are	associated	with	successful	CER.		Ventral	striatum	is	widely	known	for	its	role	in	associative	learning,	particularly	in	Pavlovian	conditioning	(Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Liljeholm	&	O’Doherty,	2012;	O'Doherty	et	 al.,	 2004;	 Pennartz	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 It	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 implicated	 in	 aversive	Pavlovian	conditioning	in	a	variety	of	human	studies	(Delgado,	Jou,	&	Phelps,	2011;	Jensen	et	al.,	2003;	Klucken	et	al.,	2012;	Robinson,	Frank,	Sahakian,	&	Cools,	2010).	Based	 on	 computational	 models	 of	 associative	 learning	 theory,	 Pavlovian	conditioning	is	driven	by	PEs	(Liljeholm	&	O’Doherty,	2012;	Pearce	&	Bouton,	2001;	Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000),	and	a	number	of	studies	have	demonstrated	the	encoding	of	aPEs	(i.e.,	PEs	related	to	aversive	situations)	by	the	ventral	striatum	during	aversive	Pavlovian	conditioning	(Garrison,	Erdeniz,	&	Done,	2013;	 Menon	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Robinson,	 Overstreet,	 Charney,	 Vytal,	 &	 Grillon,	 2013;	Seymour,	Daw,	Dayan,	Singer,	&	Dolan,	2007;	Seymour	et	al.,	2004).		Emotions	 play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	modulating	 or	 controlling	 behaviour	 (Cardinal,	Parkinson,	 Hall,	 &	 Everitt,	 2002;	 Lang	 &	 Bradley,	 2010).	 Animal	 models	 of	controlled	motivated	behaviour	highlight	the	critical	role	of	ventral	striatal	activity	and	 its	 control	 by	diverse	 competing	 afferent	 inputs	 (Floresco,	 2015;	Grace	 et	 al.,	2007;	 Pennartz	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 2009;	 Sesack	 &	 Grace,	 2010).	 Specifically,	 ventral	striatum	is	seen	as	an	integration	area,	controlled	by	a	number	of	afferent	regions,	including	 the	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (PFC),	 hippocampus,	 amygdala,	 and	 ventral	tegmental	area	(VTA)	(Fig.	1).	PFC	input	into	ventral	striatum	is	thought	to	enable	behavioural	 flexibility,	 hippocampal	 input	 to	 provide	 contextual	 and	 spatial	
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information,	 amygdala	 to	 support	 emotional	 behaviour,	 particularly	 cue	conditioning,	and	dopaminergic	input	from	VTA	is	suggested	to	modulate	influences	of	 the	other	afferents	on	ventral	striatum,	possibly	via	PE	signals	 (Floresco,	2015;	Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Pennartz	et	al.,	2011).	While	VTA	is	also	an	output	region	of	the	ventral	 striatum,	PFC,	hippocampus	and	amygdala	 are	 its	unidirectional	 afferents,	providing	input	through	direct	anatomical	connections	(Floresco,	2015;	Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Haber	&	Knutson,	2010;	Sesack	&	Grace,	2010).		
	
Figure	1.	The	model	of	motivated	behaviour,	adapted,	with	permission,	from	(Grace	et	al.,	2007).	In	this	 model,	 ventral	 striatum	 (VST)	 is	 an	 integration	 centre,	 influenced	 by	 a	 number	 of	 afferent	regions:	 PFC	 input	 into	 ventral	 striatum	 is	 thought	 to	 enable	 behavioural	 flexibility,	 hippocampal	(Hipp)	 input	 to	provide	 contextual	 and	 spatial	 information,	 amygdala	 (Amy)	 to	 support	 emotional	behaviour,	particularly	cue	conditioning,	and	dopaminergic	input	from	VTA	to	modulate	connections	between	other	afferents	and	the	ventral	striatum,	possibly	via	PE	signals.		In	the	case	of	human	emotional	behaviour,	characterized	by	both	emotion	adaption	and	emotion	regulation,	a	similar	neural	network	might	be	relevant.	Particularly	in	the	case	of	CER	or	reappraisal,	the	balance	among	ventral	striatal	inputs	may	shift	in	favour	 of	 PFC	 input,	 to	 realize	 behavioural	 flexibility	 in	 response	 to	 emotional	stimulation.	Indeed,	previous	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	studies	in	 humans	 have	 characterized	 PFC	 as	 a	 principal	 region	 exerting	 control	 over	ventral	striatum	during	CER,	with	the	effect	being	related	to	individual	differences	in	 reappraisal	 ability	 (Kober	 et	 al.,	 2010;	Wager,	 Davidson,	 Hughes,	 Lindquist,	 &	
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Ochsner,	2008).	Furthermore,	based	on	previous	studies,	aPE-related	activity	in	the	ventral	striatum	was	enhanced	during	specific	emotional	states	such	as	CER	(Mulej	Bratec	et	 al.,	 2015)	or	 stress	 (Robinson	et	al.,	 2013).	CER	also	affects	 interactions	among	 brain	 regions,	 such	 that	 during	 CER,	 synchronicity	 of	 activity	 between	prefrontal	 regions,	 involved	 in	 regulation,	 and	 subcortical	 regions,	 typically	suppressed	during	CER,	 is	 increased,	with	 the	effect	being	 related	 to	participants’	reported	negative	feelings	(Banks,	Eddy,	Angstadt,	Nathan,	&	Phan,	2007;	Erk	et	al.,	2010;	Kohn	et	al.,	2013).	Critically,	strong	PFC	activation,	akin	to	that	typically	seen	during	CER	implementation,	was	shown	to	reduce	hippocampal	and	thalamic	inputs	into	the	ventral	striatum	in	adult	male	rats,	thus	biasing	the	ventral	striatal	inputs	in	favour	of	cortical	and	against	subcortical	inputs	(Calhoon	&	O'Donnell,	2013).		In	 light	 of	 the	 above-described	 background,	 the	 current	 study	 focused	 on	 the	question	of	whether	CER	might	affect	the	balance	among	competing	ventral	striatal	afferents,	and	to	what	extent	individual	differences	in	reappraisal	ability	might	play	a	role	in	this	effect.	We	therefore	measured	the	influence	of	remote	brain	regions	on	ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 activity,	 by	 way	 of	 combining	 model-based	 fMRI	 and	psychophysiological	 interaction	 analysis	 (PPI)	 during	 aversive	 classical	conditioning	 with	 and	 without	 CER.	 We	 hypothesized	 that	 a	 successful	 CER	implementation	 by	 superior	 regulators	would	 shift	 the	 balance	 of	 ventral	 striatal	inputs	 in	 favour	 of	 PFC	 as	 opposed	 to	 subcortical	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents,	while	opposite	might	be	true	for	inferior	regulators.		
Results		
CER	affects	the	influence	of	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	Motivated	by	the	hypothesis	that	CER	would	impact	the	interaction	between	ventral	striatal	afferents	and	ventral	striatum,	we	carried	out	four	ANOVAs,	based	on	four	generalized	 PPI	 analyses,	 one	 for	 each	 ventral	 striatal	 afferent	 (i.e.,	 PFC,	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA)	(Fig.	2A).	PPI	analysis	measures	how	strongly	an	(afferent)	region’s	activity	contribution	(physiological	factor)	to	the	ventral	striatal	aPE	activity	depends	on	CER	(psychological	 factor	Regulation	Strategy	with	 levels	CER	 and	 NoCER)	 (Friston	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 We	 first	 examined	 the	 main	 effect	 of	Regulation	Strategy	for	the	four	ANOVAs:	there	was	a	significant	influence	decrease	
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during	CER	compared	to	NoCER	for	the	PFC	(F	=	13.199,	p	=	0.002),	amygdala	(F	=	7.825,	p	=	0.012)	and	VTA	(F	=	8.97,	p	=	0.008)	on	aPE-related	activity	in	the	ventral	striatum,	and	a	trend	towards	a	significant	decrease	of	hippocampus	influence	(F	=	3.094,	 p	 =	 0.096)	 (Fig.	 2B,	 first	 row).	 Results	 demonstrate	 that	 in	 humans,	 the	influence	of	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	is	modulated	by	CER,	in	line	with	suggestions	from	animal	models	of	emotional	behaviour	outlined	in	Fig.	1.		
Reappraisal	 Ability	 Impacts	 the	Way	 CER	 Affects	 the	 Competing	 Influences	 of	
Ventral	Striatal	afferents	on	aPE	signals	We	next	examined	whether	CER	success	 (i.e.,	 reappraisal	ability)	was	relevant	 for	the	way	CER	affected	the	competing	influence	of	ventral	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	 aPE	 signals.	 To	 create	 the	 factor	 Reappraisal	 Ability,	 participants	 were	divided	 into	 two	 equal	 groups,	 based	 on	 their	 reappraisal	 ability	 score	 (i.e.,	difference	 in	the	emotional	 intensity	ratings	between	CER	and	NoCER	conditions).	Average	reappraisal	ability	equalled	0.99	(SD	=	0.41);	superior	regulators	(N	=	10)	had	 a	 mean	 reappraisal	 ability	 score	 of	 1.31	 (SD	 =	 0.24,	 N	 =	 10)	 and	 inferior	regulators	(N	=	10)	a	mean	reappraisal	ability	score	of	0.67	(SD	=	0.26,	N	=	10).	
	To	see	whether	differences	in	reappraisal	ability	influenced	the	way	ventral	striatal	afferents	 affected	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 activity	 during	 CER,	 we	 examined	 the	interaction	 between	 Regulation	 Strategy	 and	 Reappraisal	 Ability	 for	 the	 four	ANOVAs	(Fig.	2B,	second	row).	A	significant	interaction	was	revealed	by	the	ANOVA	focusing	on	the	PFC	 influence	(F	=	8.264,	p	=	0.01),	with	planned	t-tests	revealing	that	Superior	regulators	showed	no	change	in	the	PFC	contribution	to	striatal	aPE	activity	between	CER	and	NoCER	conditions	(t	=	 -0.591,	p	=	0.285),	while	 Inferior	regulators	 showed	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 PFC	 impact	 on	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals	during	CER	compared	to	NoCER	conditions	(t	=	-4.24,	p	=	0.001).	ANOVAs	focusing	on	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA	 influences	on	ventral	 striatum	did	not	reveal	significant	 interaction	 effects	 (hippocampus:	 F	 =	 1.551,	 p	 =	 0.229;	 amygdala:	 F	 =	1.219,	p	=	0.284;	VTA:	F	=	1.575,	p	=	0.226).	
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Figure	2.	CER	modulates	the	 influence	of	ventral	striatal	(VST)	afferents	on	striatal	aPE	signals.	A,	Overview	of	the	PPI	Analyses,	including	the	four	PPI	seeds	(PFC,	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA),	and	 the	 target	 ventral	 striatum	ROI.	B,	 First	 row	 shows	 the	main	 effect	 of	Regulation	 Strategy	 for	each	 of	 the	 four	 PPI	 analyses;	 CER	 reduced	 the	 influence	 of	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 on	 ventral	striatal	aPE	signals.	Second	row	shows	the	Regulation	Strategy	×	Reappraisal	Ability	interaction	for	each	 of	 the	 four	 connectivity	 combinations;	 the	 effect	 of	 CER	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 striatal	 afferents	depended	 on	 individuals’	 reappraisal	 ability.	 C,	 The	 significant	 3-way	 interaction	 shows	 that	 the	impact	of	CER	on	the	influence	of	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	was	dependent	on	both	 the	 Ventral	 Striatal	 Afferent	 (PFC	 vs.	 Other	 Afferents)	 and	 Reappraisal	 Ability	 (Superior	 vs.	Inferior	 regulators).	Error	bars	 indicate	SEM.	A.u.	 –	 arbitrary	units,	 *	p	 <	0.05,	 **	p	 <	0.01,	 ***	p	 <	0.001,	†	trend	(p	<	0.1),	n.s.	–	not	significant.	
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We	 nevertheless	 examined	 planned	 t-tests	 for	 Superior	 and	 Inferior	 regulators,	following	 the	 initial	 hypothesis	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 individual	 differences	 in	reappraisal	ability	on	ventral	striatal	 influences	during	CER	(Fig.	2B,	second	row).	Planned	 t-tests	 revealed	 a	 significant	 decrease	 or	 a	 trend	 of	 hippocampus,	amygdala,	 and	 VTA	 contribution	 to	 striatal	 aPE-activity	 during	 CER	 compared	 to	NoCER	for	Superior	regulators	(hippocampus:	t	=	-1.681,	p	=	0.064;	amygdala:	t	=	-2.292,	p	=	0.024;	VTA:	t	=	-3.505,	p	=	0.004),	but	no	change	(or	a	trend)	for	Inferior	regulators	(hippocampus:	t	=	-0.572,	p	=	0.291;	amygdala:	t	=	-1.613,	p	=	0.071;	VTA:	
t	=	-1.094,	p	=	0.151).	Results	suggest,	in	line	with	our	hypothesis,	that	CER	success	or	reappraisal	ability	is	indeed	relevant	for	the	balanced	influence	of	ventral	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals,	with	a	relatively	higher	impact	of	the	PFC	on	ventral	striatum	during	successful	regulation.	
	
Factor	 Ventral	 Striatal	 Afferent	 Additionally	 Impacts	 the	 Interaction	 Between	
Reappraisal	Ability	and	Regulation	Strategy	To	directly	investigate	potentially	distinct	effects	of	CER	success	on	the	interaction	between	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 and	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals,	 we	 further	examined	 the	 interaction	 patterns	 between	 Regulation	 Strategy	 and	 Reappraisal	Ability	(Fig.	2B,	second	row),	but	now	focusing	on	differences	across	ventral	striatal	afferents.	Single	region	findings	suggest	that	the	Regulation	Strategy	×	Reappraisal	Ability	interaction	pattern	for	the	PFC	influence	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	might	differ	 from	the	patterns	of	hippocampus,	amygdala,	and	VTA.	To	test	 this,	we	 first	carried	 out	 a	 4	 ×	 2	 ×	 2	 ANOVA	 with	 factors	 Ventral	 Striatal	 Afferent	 (PFC,	hippocampus,	 amygdala,	 VTA),	 Reappraisal	 Ability	 (Superior,	 Inferior)	 and	Regulation	Strategy	(NoCER,	CER).	Besides	a	main	effect	of	Regulation	Strategy	(F	=	10.439,	p	=	0.005),	the	ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	 interaction	between	all	three	factors	 (F	 =	 4.195,	 p	 =	 0.01),	 representing	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 Reappraisal	Ability	×	Regulation	Strategy	interaction	patterns	between	the	four	ventral	striatal	afferents.	Then,	to	directly	test	the	difference	between	PFC	and	the	three	subcortical	afferents,	 we	 collapsed	 the	 results	 of	 hippocampus-,	 amygdala-,	 and	 VTA-focused	connectivity	 analyses	 and	 compared	 the	 resulting	 interaction	 effect	with	 the	PFC-focused	 interaction	 pattern	 in	 a	 2	 ×	 2	 ×	 2	 ANOVA,	 with	 factors	 Ventral	 Striatal	Afferent	 (PFC,	 Other	 Afferents),	 Reappraisal	 Ability	 (Superior,	 Inferior)	 and	
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Regulation	 Strategy	 (NoCER,	 CER).	 The	 ANOVA	 revealed	 a	 significant	 interaction	between	 the	 three	 factors	 (F	 =	 20.674,	 p	 =	 0.0003),	 highlighting	 a	 significant	difference	in	Reappraisal	Ability	×	Regulation	Strategy	interaction	patterns	between	the	PFC	and	the	three	subcortical	ventral	striatal	afferents	(Fig.	2C).	This	significant	3-way	interaction	highlighted	that	the	effect	of	CER	on	the	balance	between	PFC	and	subcortical	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents’	 impact	 on	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals	 was	significantly	different	for	superior	and	inferior	regulators	(see	schematic	summary	in	Fig.	3).	
	
Discussion	The	 current	 study	 investigated	whether	 and	 how	CER,	 a	 unique	 human	 ability	 to	face	 emotional	 stimuli	 in	 a	 flexible	 way,	 modulates	 competing	 influences	 from	distinct	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 on	 striatal	 aPE	 signals,	 critical	 for	 aversive	conditioning.	 By	 investigating	 the	 contribution	 of	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	with	and	without	CER,	the	study	shows,	for	the	first	time,	that	CER	can	affect	 the	balance	among	ventral	striatal	afferents,	depending	on	the	person’s	 reappraisal	 ability	 (Figs.	 2).	 Specifically,	 superior	 regulators	 shifted	 the	balance	in	favour	of	PFC	as	opposed	to	subcortical	ventral	striatal	afferents	during	CER,	 by	 reducing	 the	 contribution	 of	 subcortical	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	(hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA)	to	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals,	while	keeping	the	PFC	 contribution	 unchanged.	 Inferior	 regulators,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 showed	 an	opposite	pattern,	with	a	decreased	PFC	influence	and	an	unchanged	contribution	of	subcortical	ventral	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals,	highlighting	the	relevance	of	individual	differences	in	reappraisal	ability	for	the	regulation	of	ventral	striatal	inputs	(Figs.	2	&	3).		Current	 results	 demonstrate	 that	 CER	 affected	 the	 balanced	 influence	 of	 ventral	striatal	 afferents	 on	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals	 in	 the	 network	 of	 motivated	behaviour	presented	in	Fig.	1.	Specifically,	all	four	ventral	striatal	afferents	(i.e.,	PFC,	hippocampus,	 amygdala,	 VTA)	 decreased	 their	 influence	 on	 striatal	 aPE	 activity	during	CER	(Fig.	2B,	 first	row).	A	previous	animal	study	using	in	vivo	intracellular	recordings	 in	adult	male	rats	showed	that	burst-like	activity	 from	the	medial	PFC,	akin	 to	 that	 typically	 seen	 during	 decision-making,	 induced	 a	 suppression	 of	
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hippocampal	 and	 thalamic	 inputs	 into	 the	 ventral	 striatum	 (Calhoon	&	O'Donnell,	2013).	This	is	consistent	with	our	finding	that	CER,	requiring	activity	in	the	PFC	and	analogous	 to	 decision-making,	 reduced	 the	 strength	 of	 influence	 on	 the	 ventral	striatum	by	its	subcortical	afferents:	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	VTA.		
	
Figure	3.	A	schematic	model	summary	of	findings.	As	represented	by	the	figure,	superior	regulators	shifted	 the	 balance	 of	 VST	 inputs	 against	 the	 ‘emotional	 and	 contextual’	 influences	 from	 the	subcortical	regions	and	in	favour	of	the	‘flexible’	PFC	influence,	while	inferior	regulators	exhibited	an	opposite	balance	shift.		Results	of	the	study	by	Calhoon	and	O’Donnell,	however,	additionally	indicate	that	a	decrease	 of	 PFC	 influence	might	 be	 counterproductive.	 Accounting	 for	 individual	differences	 in	 reappraisal	 ability,	 we	 indeed	 observed	 a	 significant	 interaction	between	reappraisal	ability	and	regulation	strategy	for	the	PFC	influence	on	striatal	aPE	activity,	such	that	superior	regulators	in	fact	preserved	the	contribution	of	PFC	to	ventral	striatal	activity	during	CER,	while	inferior	regulators	failed	to	do	so	(Fig.	2B,	 second	 row).	 Furthermore,	 superior	 regulators	 suppressed	 hippocampus,	amygdala,	 and	 VTA	 contribution	 to	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals,	 while	 inferior	regulators	did	not	 (Fig.	 2B,	 second	 row).	These	differences	between	 superior	 and	inferior	regulators,	as	well	as	cortical	and	subcortical	ventral	 striatal	 inputs,	were	further	confirmed	in	a	significant	3-way	interaction,	showing	that	the	impact	of	CER	on	 the	contribution	of	ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 to	ventral	 striatal	 aPE	signals	was	dependent	 on	 both	 the	 ventral	 striatal	 afferent	 (PFC	 vs.	 other	 afferents)	 and	reappraisal	ability	(superior	vs.	inferior	regulators)	(Fig.	2C).	In	summary,	superior	regulators	 followed	 the	 expected	 pattern	 of	 preserving	 the	 influence	 of	 PFC	 and	suppressing	 influences	 of	 subcortical	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 on	 the	 ventral	
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striatum	(Calhoon	&	O'Donnell,	2013),	 thus	 shifting	 the	balance	of	ventral	 striatal	impact	 in	 favour	 of	 PFC	 and	 against	 subcortical	 ventral	 striatal	 inputs.	 Inferior	regulators,	on	the	other	hand,	exhibited	the	opposite	pattern,	reducing	the	influence	of	PFC	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals	and	thus	not	being	able	to	significantly	reduce	the	influences	on	ventral	striatum	from	subcortical	ventral	striatal	afferents	(Fig.	3).		According	 to	 contemporary	 view,	 the	 blood-oxygenation-level	 dependent	 (BOLD)	response	largely	reflects	local	signal	processing	due	to	synaptic	inputs	rather	than	intrinsic	 neuronal	 firing	 within	 the	 region	 (Floresco,	 2015;	 Logothetis,	 Pauls,	Augath,	 Trinath,	 &	 Oeltermann,	 2001).	 We	 therefore	 additionally	 examined	 the	change	 of	 aPE-related	 activation	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum	 ROI	 during	 CER	 in	 a	supplementary	analysis	 (see	Supplementary	Analysis	 and	Supplementary	Fig.	 S1).	An	 increase	of	aPE-related	activity	during	CER	compared	 to	NoCER	conditions	 for	Superior	 Regulators	 further	 confirmed	 the	 interpretation	 that	 a	 successful	implementation	of	CER	shifted	the	balance	of	ventral	striatal	inputs	in	favour	of	PFC	and	against	subcortical	 inputs.	The	 increase	of	aPE-related	ventral	striatal	activity	during	 CER	might	 reflect	 a	 relative	 increase	 of	 the	 PFC	 input	 to	 the	 region	 and	 a	relative	 decrease	 of	 subcortical	 inputs	 into	 the	 ventral	 striatum.	 We	 found	 no	difference	in	aPE-related	ventral	striatal	activation	during	CER	compared	to	NoCER	conditions	 for	 Inferior	 Regulators,	 confirming	 the	 lack	 of	 successful	 CER	implementation	in	relation	to	ventral	striatal	input	regulation	(Supplementary	Fig.	S1).		The	 current	 findings	 could	 have	 significant	 implications	 for	 psychiatric	 disorders,	particularly	 affective	 disorders	 characterised	 by	 impaired	 CER.	 The	 pattern	 of	results	 for	 inferior	 regulators	might	 provide	 an	 explanation	 for	 the	 behaviour	 of	patients	suffering	from	drug	addiction	or	major	depression.	Such	patients	typically	exhibit	problems	with	emotion	 regulation,	 are	 less	 flexible	 in	 their	behaviour	and	seem	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 emotional	 and	 contextual	 information	 in	 the	 current	setting,	 rather	 than	 long-term	 goals	 (Aldao,	 Nolen-Hoeksema,	&	 Schweizer,	 2010;	Cheetham,	 Allen,	 Yücel,	 &	 Lubman,	 2010;	 Sheppes,	 Suri,	 &	 Gross,	 2015).	 These	problems	might	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 inability	 to	 effectively	 shift	 the	 balance	 among	
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ventral	striatal	inputs	in	favour	of	the	‘flexible’	PFC	and	against	the	‘emotional	and	contextual’	inputs	from	the	subcortical	regions.		Altogether,	 the	current	study	provides	new	evidence	 that	CER	 is	able	 to	affect	 the	balance	 among	 competing	 ventral	 striatal	 inputs	 on	 ventral	 striatal	 aPE	 signals.	Data	suggest	that	a	person	with	high	reappraisal	ability	is	able	to	relatively	increase	the	PFC	input	into	the	ventral	striatum	and	reduce	the	impact	of	subcortical	ventral	striatal	afferents,	such	as	hippocampus,	amygdala,	and	VTA,	on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals.		
Materials	and	Methods	
Participants	Twenty-four	 healthy	 subjects	 (all	 female,	mean	 age	 =	 24.8	 years,	 SD	 =	 2.3	 years)	participated	 in	 the	 experiment,	 all	 native	 German	 speakers,	 right-handed,	 with	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	vision,	and	no	history	of	neurological	or	psychiatric	disorders,	 or	 intake	 of	 psychotropic	medication.	 Two	were	 excluded	 from	 further	analysis	due	to	excessive	head	movement	(translation	>	2	mm,	rotation	>	2°),	and	another	two	due	to	inadequate	performance	in	the	learning	task.	Owing	to	previous	reports	 of	 gender	 differences	 regarding	 emotion	 processing	 and	 regulation,	 only	female	 subjects	 were	 tested	 (McRae,	 Ochsner,	 Mauss,	 Gabrieli,	 &	 Gross,	 2008;	Nolen-Hoeksema,	2012;	Whittle,	Yücel,	Yap,	&	Allen,	2011).	The	study	was	approved	by	 a	 local	 ethics	 committee	 (Technische	 Universitaet	 Muenchen)	 and	 written	informed	consent	was	obtained	from	all	participants.	All	methods	were	carried	out	in	 accordance	 with	 relevant	 guidelines	 and	 regulations	 and	 all	 experimental	protocols	 were	 approved	 by	 the	 in-house	 Review	 Board	 of	 the	 Department	 of	Medicine	at	the	Technische	Universitaet	Muenchen.	
	
Experimental	Design	and	Tasks	During	 a	 conditioning	 paradigm	 with	 varying	 CS-US	 contingencies	 (Gläscher	 &	Büchel,	2005;	Mulej	Bratec	et	 al.,	 2015),	 a	 trial	 started	with	a	 fixation	 cross	 (1	 s),	after	which	the	Regulation	Instruction	(‘Distance’	 for	CER	and	 ‘Attend’	 for	NoCER)	was	presented	(2	s).	Then,	a	CS	(blue	square	or	yellow	pentagon)	was	shown	(6	s).	Participants	indicated	whether	a	negative	picture	or	no	picture	would	follow	the	CS	
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via	a	button	press	 in	 the	 first	3	 s	of	CS	presentation.	The	US	 (6	 s)	was	a	negative	picture	from	the	International	Affective	Picture	System	(Lang,	Bradley,	&	Cuthbert,	1997),	shown	on	50%	of	the	trials	(Paired	trials).	The	picture	set	was	balanced	for	arousal	and	valence	across	CER	and	NoCER	conditions.	Next,	participants	had	3	s	to	indicate	their	emotional	state	via	a	button	press	on	a	scale	from	-3	to	3	(increments	of	1;	set	to	0	on	each	trial).	The	inter-trial	interval	lasted	for	4	±	2	s.	Each	participant	completed	 both	 CER	 (i.e.,	 self-distancing)	 and	 NoCER	 (i.e.,	 attentively	 observing)	runs,	with	the	run	order	counterbalanced	across	subjects.		The	 CS-US	 contingency	 fluctuated	 throughout	 each	 run	 (low-frequency	 sine-wave	function,	with	1.75	and	1.5	cycles	for	CS1	and	CS2,	respectively).	The	phase	between	the	two	sine	functions	was	shifted	by	96°	so	that	each	CS	predicted	US	occurrence	with	 a	 different	 probability	 at	 each	 time	 point	 (Gläscher	 &	 Büchel,	 2005;	 Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).	Participants	were	told	that	the	two	symbols	(whose	assignment	to	 a	 particular	 CS-US	 contingency	 was	 counterbalanced	 across	 participants)	predicted	US	 occurence	with	 different	 probabilities,	 and	 that	 they	 should	 keep	 in	mind	that	these	probabilities	could	change.		There	were	two	experimental	runs	(CER	and	NoCER)	of	80	trials	each,	with	an	equal	proportion	 (40	 trials)	 of	 CS1	 and	 CS2	 trials.	 A	 pseudorandom	CS	 event	 train	was	used	 and	 the	 same	 CS	 could	 occur	 on	 no	 more	 than	 two	 consecutive	 trials.	 An	average	reinforcement	probability	of	50%	resulted	in	40	Paired	and	40	non-Paired	trials	 in	each	run.	CS1	and	CS2	were	followed	by	an	equal	number	of	Paired	trials	(i.e.,	20)	in	each	run.	The	sine	waves	were	used	as	threshold	functions	for	the	trial	sequence.	A	trial	was	Paired	or	non-Paired	when	a	random	number	drawn	from	the	amplitude	range	was	below	or	above	the	threshold	function,	respectively.		For	the	learning	task,	participants	were	asked	to	predict	the	occurrence	of	a	US	after	a	 particular	 CS.	 In	 the	 CER	 condition	 of	 the	 regulation	 task,	 participants	 actively	down-regulated	emotions	elicited	by	the	negative	pictures	by	means	of	reappraisal	or	cognitive	self-distancing	(Kalisch	et	al.,	2005;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2004;	Walter	et	al.,	2009).	 As	 trained	 before	 the	 experiment,	 they	 took	 a	 stance	 of	 a	 detached	 third	person,	reminding	themselves	that	the	images	were	not	real	or	were	not	related	to	
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them	 or	 their	 loved	 ones.	 In	 the	 NoCER	 condition,	 participants	 let	 the	 images	passively	sink	in	without	changing	the	evoked	emotions.	All	participants	complied	with	experimental	instructions	regarding	the	tasks.		
Reappraisal	Ability	Participants	rated	their	emotional	feeling	at	the	end	of	each	trial,	for	a	behavioural	measure	 of	 reappraisal	 ability.	 Only	 Paired	 trials	 were	 considered,	 since	participants	typically	use	CER	chiefly	when	presented	with	negative	pictures	(Mulej	Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Regulation	 success	 was	 calculated	 as	 a	 difference	 in	 rating	scores	between	CER	and	NoCER	conditions.	To	account	for	individual	differences	in	reappraisal	 ability	 (McRae,	 Jacobs,	 Ray,	 John,	 &	 Gross,	 2012),	 participants	 were	divided	into	two	groups	of	equal	size,	resulting	in	‘superior’	(regulation	success	>	1)	and	‘inferior’	(regulation	success	<	1)	regulators.		
Computational	Model	APEs	were	computed	based	on	the	Rescorla	Wagner	(RW)	rule	(Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972).	For	a	trial	t,	aPE	was	calculated	as	a	difference	between	the	actual	outcome	
R(t)	and	the	predicted	outcome	aP(t):		
aPE(t)	=	R(T)	–	aP(t)	×	U(t)		In	turn,	predicted	outcome	for	the	next	trial	aP(t+1),	was	updated	by	adding	aPE	of	the	current	trial	aPE(t)	to	aP(t),	weighted	by	a	learning	rate	λ:		
aP(t+1)	=	aP(t)	+	λaPE(t)	×	U(t+1)		We	 used	 a	 low	 λ	 of	 0.05,	 based	 on	 previous	 studies	 (Gläscher	 &	 Büchel,	 2005;	Ouden,	Friston,	Daw,	McIntosh,	&	Stephan,	2009).	For	more	details	on	the	model	see	Supplementary	Methods.		
	
	
	
		 59	
MRI	Acquisition	Measurements	were	performed	on	a	3T	Siemens	scanner	at	the	Klinikum	rechts	der	Isar,	 Technische	 Universitaet	Muenchen,	 following	 a	 standard	 protocol.	 For	more	details,	see	Supplementary	Methods.		
fMRI	Data	Analysis	Analyses	 were	 carried	 out	 with	 SPM8	 (Wellcome	 Department	 of	 Cognitive	Neurology,	London,	UK).	The	T2*-weighted	functional	images	were	slice-timed,	then	realigned	to	the	first	image	of	the	first	run	(after	discarding	the	first	two	volumes)	and	unwarped.	T1-weighted	structural	 images	were	coregistered	to	 the	 functional	images,	segmented	and	then	normalized	to	a	standard	T1	template	in	the	Montreal	Neurological	 Institute	(MNI)	space	with	a	1	×	1	×	1	mm	resolution.	Normalization	parameters	 from	 the	 latter	 were	 used	 to	 normalize	 the	 functional	 images,	 which	were	then	resampled	to	3	×	3	×	3	mm,	smoothed	with	an	8	mm	full-width-at-half-maximum	Gaussian	filter,	and	temporally	high-pass	filtered	with	a	cut-off	of	128	s.		General	linear	model	(GLM)-based	statistical	analysis	with	the	following	regressors	was	performed:	hemodynamic	response	function	(HRF)-convolved	a)	onsets	of	CS1,	CS2,	US-Paired,	US-nonPaired,	Regulation	Instructions,	and	Valence	Scale;	b)	aP	and	aPE	values	derived	from	the	RW	rule	as	parametric	modulations	(PM)	of	the	onset	regressors:	aP1	and	aP2	as	PM	of	CS1	and	CS2	onsets,	respectively,	plus	aPE-Paired	and	aPE-nonPaired	as	PM	of	US-Paired	and	US-nonPaired	onsets,	respectively;	and	c)	 6	movement	 regressors	 derived	 from	 realignment	 as	 regressors	 of	 no	 interest.	Since	 distancing	 is	 chiefly	 utilized	 during	 US	 presentation	 (Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	2015),	analyses	of	the	current	study	focused	on	Paired	trials	only.		To	 test	whether	CER	affected	 the	 influence	of	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 on	ventral	striatal	aPE	signals,	a	generalized	PPI	analysis	was	carried	out	(McLaren,	Ries,	Xu,	&	Johnson,	2012).	PPI	analysis	allows	one	to	examine	whether	a	BOLD	signal	 in	one	region	can	be	explained	by	an	 interaction	of	a	BOLD	signal	 in	another	region	(the	physiological	 component)	 and	 an	 experimental	 factor	 (the	 psychological	component)	(Friston	et	al.,	1997).	In	the	current	study,	the	physiological	component	was	the	BOLD	signal	in	each	ventral	striatal	afferent,	the	psychological	component	
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was	 Regulation	 Strategy,	 and	 the	 target	 was	 aPE-related	 activity	 in	 the	 ventral	striatum.	Considering	the	two	interpretations	of	any	PPI	effect	(Friston	et	al.,	1997),	we	 followed	 the	 interpretation	 that	 CER	 would	 affect	 the	 extent	 of	 activity	contribution	 from	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 to	 aPE-related	 activity	 in	 the	 ventral	striatum.		Based	on	the	model	of	motivated	behaviour	(Fig.	1)	(Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Pennartz	et	al.,	 2011),	 ventral	 striatal	 afferents	 (i.e.,	 PFC,	 hippocampus,	 amygdala	 and	 VTA)	were	used	as	PPI	seeds,	resulting	in	four	PPI	analyses	(Fig.	2A).	The	target	ROI	for	all	 PPI	 analyses	 was	 a	 right	 ventral	 striatum	 ROI,	 based	 on	 a	 recent	 study	 that	investigated	 the	 effect	 of	 stress	 on	 aPE-related	 activity	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum	(Robinson	et	al.,	2013).	A	spherical	ROI	with	a	centre	at	x	=	26,	y	=	6,	z	=	-8	and	an	8	mm	 radius	 was	 used.	 Seed	 ROIs	 for	 the	 PPI	 analyses	 were	 defined	 by	 contrasts	reported	 in	a	previous	study	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015),	additionally	restricted	by	anatomical	 regions	 as	 specified	 by	 the	 model	 of	 motivated	 behaviour	 (Table	 1).	Anatomical	 masks	 were	 defined	 by	 the	 WFU	 PickAtlas	 in	 SPM8	[http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/pickatlas]	for	amygdala,	hippocampus	and	PFC,	and	by	a	custom-made	box	with	x	=	[0	6],	y	=	[-13	-7],	z	=	[-11	-5]	for	VTA.	Due	to	the	 right-sided	 target	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 only	 right-hemisphere	 seeds	 were	considered,	 for	 simplicity	 of	 analysis.	 For	 amygdala,	 hippocampus	 and	VTA,	 time-courses	for	each	region	and	each	participant	were	extracted	from	the	contrast	aPE-Paired:	CER	>	NoCER,	due	to	our	interest	in	both	the	influence	on	aPE	signals	in	the	ventral	striatum	and	the	CER-related	changes	in	this	influence	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).	The	PFC	seed,	typically	a	regulatory	region,	was	defined	by	the	right	DLPFC	cluster	involved	in	CER	(from	the	contrast	US-Paired:	CER	>	NoCER)	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).	Average	ß-values	related	to	the	PPI-aPE	regressor	were	extracted	from	the	 ventral	 striatum	 ROI	 and	 four	 separate	 2	 ×	 2	 flexible	 factorial	 ANOVAs	were	carried	out	in	SPSS,	with	factors	Regulation	Strategy	(CER,	NoCER)	and	Reappraisal	Ability	(Superior,	Inferior).	Considering	multiple	comparisons	due	to	four	separate	analyses,	a	connectivity	result	survived	the	Bonferroni	correction	if	p	<	0.05/4	or	p	
<	0.0125.			
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Table	1.	Summary	of	PPI	Analyses	Seeds.	
PPI	Seed	 Peak	voxel	x,	y,	z	 ROI	size	in	voxels	PFC	 39,	20,	52	 191	Hippocampus	 24,	-22,	-11	 47	Amygdala	 24,	2,	-14	 15	VTA	 6,	-10,	-11	 12		
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Supplementary	 Figure	 S1.	 CER-related	 enhancement	 of	 aPE-related	VST	 activity	and	its	dependence	on	reappraisal	ability.	A,	VST	ROI.	B,	CER	enhanced	aPE-related	activity	 in	 the	 VST	 ROI,	 as	 shown	 by	 the	 significant	 main	 effect	 of	 Regulation	Strategy.	 C,	 The	 enhancement	 of	 aPE-related	 activity	 with	 CER	 was	 related	 to	individuals’	 reappraisal	 ability,	 as	 shown	 by	 a	 trend	 for	 a	 Regulation	 Strategy	 ×	Reappraisal	Ability	interaction.	Superior	regulators	significantly	increased	the	aPE-related	 VST	 activity	 during	 CER,	 while	 inferior	 regulators	 did	 not.	 Error	 bars	indicate	SEM.	A.u.	–	arbitrary	units,	*	p	<	0.05,	†	trend	(p	<	0.1),	n.s.	–	not	significant.		
Supplementary	Methods	
Computational	Model	Aversive	predictions	(aPs)	and	aPEs	were	computed	based	on	the	Rescorla	Wagner	(RW)	 rule	 (Rescorla	 and	 Wagner,	 1972).	 For	 a	 trial	 t,	 aPE	 was	 calculated	 as	 a	difference	between	the	actual	outcome	R(t)	and	the	predicted	outcome	aP(t):	
aPE(t)	=	R(T)	–	aP(t)	×	U(t)	In	turn,	predicted	outcome	for	the	next	trial	aP(t+1),	was	updated	by	adding	aPE	of	the	current	trial	aPE(t)	to	aP(t),	weighted	by	a	learning	rate	λ:	
aP(t+1)	=	aP(t)	+	λaPE(t)	×	U(t+1)	Parameter	R	was	set	to	1	when	the	aversive	picture	was	delivered,	and	to	0	when	no	picture	was	shown.	In	turn,	parameter	U	was	used	to	disentangle	CS1	and	CS2	trials.	Specifically,	 to	 calculate	 aP	 and	 aPE	 values	 related	 to	 CS1,	U	was	 set	 to	 1	 on	 CS1	trials,	 and	 to	 0	 on	 CS2	 trials,	 and	 vice	 versa	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 aPs	 and	 aPEs	related	to	CS2	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).		We	 used	 a	 low	 λ	 of	 0.05,	 based	 on	 previous	 studies	 {Glascher:2005cf,	denOuden:2009gl},	 firstly,	 due	 to	 the	 similarity	 of	 design,	 and	 secondly,	 because	
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they	identified	this	specific	learning	rate	to	be	relevant	for	VST,	the	primary	target	region	 in	the	current	study.	Furthermore,	 the	same	λ	of	0.05	was	also	 found	to	be	relevant	 for	 amygdala	 and	 hippocampus	 {Glascher:2005cf,	 denOuden:2009gl}	 –	emotion-relevant	regions	typically	affected	by	CER	and	serving	as	VST	afferents	in	the	network	of	motivated	behaviour	 (Figure	1)	 (Grace	et	 al.,	 2007;	Ochsner	et	 al.,	2012).	
	
MRI	Acquisition	Measurements	were	performed	on	a	3T	Siemens	scanner	at	the	Klinikum	rechts	der	Isar,	 Technische	 Universitaet	 Muenchen.	 Visual	 stimuli,	 presented	 with	Presentation	software	(Neurobehavioral	Systems),	were	rear-projected	on	a	screen	at	 scanner	head	and	were	visible	via	an	adjustable	mirror	mounted	 to	a	 standard	head	coil.	Presentation	software	also	received	trigger	pulses	from	the	scanner.		Anatomical	 images	 were	 acquired	 with	 the	 magnetization-prepared	 rapid	acquisition	 gradient	 echo	 (MP-RAGE)	 T1-weighted	 sequence	 (1	 ×	 1	 ×	 1	 mm	resolution),	 and	 functional	 scans	 with	 the	 contrast-gradient	 echo-planar	 T2*-weighted	sequence	with	a	 repetition	 time	of	2	 s,	 echo	 time	of	30	ms,	 flip	angle	of	90°,	acquisition	matrix	of	64	×	64,	35	slices,	each	3	mm	thick,	with	a	gap	of	0.6	mm,	and	an	in-plane	resolution	of	3	×	3	mm.		
Supplementary	Analysis	
Effects	of	Regulation	Strategy	and	Reappraisal	Ability	on	aPE-related	VST	activation	Following	the	prediction	that	CER	would	also	affect	aPE-related	activity	in	the	VST,	average	 ß-values	 related	 to	 the	 aPE	 regressor	were	 extracted	 from	 the	 right	 VST	ROI	 and	 a	 2	 ×	 2	 flexible	 factorial	 ANOVA	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 SPSS,	 with	 factors	Regulation	Strategy	(CER,	NoCER)	and	Reappraisal	Ability	(Superior,	 Inferior).	We	first	 examined	 the	 Main	 effect	 of	 Regulation	 Strategy	 (i.e.,	 CER	 vs.	 NoCER)	 and	observed	 a	 significant	 enhancement	of	 aPE-related	 activity	 in	 the	VST	ROI	during	CER	(F	=	4.475,	p	=	0.049)	(Figure	S1B).	Next,	to	account	for	the	effect	of	individual	differences	in	reappraisal	ability,	we	examined	the	interaction	between	Regulation	Strategy	 and	 Reappraisal	 Ability.	 There	 was	 a	 trend	 towards	 a	 significant	interaction	 (F	 =	 3.984,	 p	 =	 0.061),	 with	 planned	 t-tests	 revealing	 a	 significant	
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increase	of	VST	aPE	activity	during	the	CER	compared	to	the	NoCER	condition	 for	Superior	 regulators	 (t	=	2.486,	p	=	0.018),	and	no	change	 in	VST	activity	between	NoCER	 and	 CER	 conditions	 for	 Inferior	 regulators	 (t	 =	 0.106,	 p	 =	 0.459)	 (Figure	S1C).	Results	suggest	that	CER	indeed	affected	aPE-related	VST	activity	in	superior	regulators,	but	did	not	have	an	effect	on	VST	activity	in	inferior	regulators.					 	
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Project	3:	How	Do	You	Make	Me	Feel	
Better?	Social	Cognitive	Emotion	
Regulation	and	the	Default	Mode	
Network	
This	chapter	includes	a	research	article	entitled	“How	do	you	make	me	feel	better?	Social	cognitive	emotion	regulation	and	the	default	mode	network”.	The	manuscript	provides	 first	 insights	 into	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation,	and	shows	that	the	effectiveness	of	social	emotion	regulation	is	related	to	 individual	 attachment	 security	 levels.	 The	 manuscript	 was	 published	 in	NeuroImage	in	2016.		
Contributions:	Authors:	Xiyao	Xie,	Satja	Mulej	Bratec,	Gabriele	Schmid,	Chun	Meng,	Anselm	Doll,	Afra	
Wohlschläger,	Kathrin	Finke,	Hans	Förstl,	Claus	Zimmer,	Reinhard	Pekrum,	Leonhard	
Schilbach,	Valentin	Riedl,	Christian	Sorg	The	author	of	 this	 thesis	 shares	 the	 first	 authorship	of	 the	manuscript	with	Xiyao	Xie.	X.X.,	S.M.B.	and	C.S.	conceived	the	experiment,	with	the	help	of	G.S.,	H.F.	and	C.Z.	X.X.	and	S.M.B.,	supervised	by	C.S.,	filmed	G.S.	to	create	social	regulation	videos	used	in	 the	 experiment.	 X.X.	 and	 S.M.B.	 together	 conducted	behavioural	 and	 fMRI	data	acquisition,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 G.S.	 (the	 psychotherapist,	 as	 described	 in	 the	manuscript).	X.X.	and	S.M.B.	analysed	 the	behavioural	and	the	neuroimaging	data,	with	some	help	from	C.M.,	A.D.	and	A.W.,	and	under	the	supervision	of	V.R.	and	C.S.	X.X.	wrote	the	manuscript,	which	was	revised	by	S.M.B.	The	writing	was	supervised	by	C.S.,	and	the	manuscript	was	commented	on	and	additionally	revised	by	K.F.,	R.P.	and	L.S.		 	
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Socially-induced cognitive emotion regulation (Social-Reg) is crucial for emotional well-being and social function-
ing; however, its brain mechanisms remain poorly understood. Given that both social cognition and cognitive
emotion regulation engage key regions of the default-mode network (DMN), we hypothesized that Social-Reg
would rely on the DMN, and that its effectiveness would be associated with social functioning. During functional
MRI, negative emotions were elicited by pictures, and – via short instructions – a psychotherapist either down-
regulated participants' emotions by employing reappraisal (Reg), or asked them to simply look at the pictures
(Look). Adult Attachment Scale was used to measure social functioning. Contrasting Reg versus Look, aversive
emotions were successfully reduced during Social-Reg, with increased activations in the prefrontal and parietal
cortices, precuneus and the left temporo-parietal junction. These activations covered key nodes of the DMN and
were associatedwith Social-Reg success. Furthermore, participants' attachment security was positively correlated
with both Social-Reg success and orbitofrontal cortex involvement during Social-Reg. In addition, speciﬁcity of the
neural correlates of Social-Reg was conﬁrmed by comparisons with participants' DMN activity at rest and their
brain activations during a typical emotional self-regulation task based on the same experimental paradigm with-
out a psychotherapist. Our results provide ﬁrst evidence for the speciﬁc involvement of the DMN in Social-Reg, and
the association of Social-Reg with individual differences in attachment security. The ﬁndings suggest that DMN
dysfunction, found in many neuropsychiatric disorders, may impair the ability to beneﬁt from Social-Reg.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
From the very beginning of our lives, our emotions are inﬂuenced
by others. Particularly, socially-induced emotion regulation from
caregivers is the cornerstone for developing self-regulatory abilities
(Calkins and Hill, 2007; Fox and Calkins, 2003), and interacts with
the development of social functioning (Láng, 2010; Roque et al.,
2013). In adulthood, emotions are often regulated by family members,
friends, and – when emotions become a burden to our health – by
professional therapists. Socially-induced cognitive emotion regulation
(Social-Reg) is of particular interest. Cognitive emotion regulation
(such as reappraisal, where one reinterprets the meaning of a stimulus
in order to alter its emotional impact; Ochsner et al., 2012) is known
to be one of the most effective ways of regulating emotions (Gross,
2014; Ochsner and Gross, 2005), and is widely applied both in everyday
life (Niven et al., 2009) and in clinical practice (Cuijpers et al., 2013;
DeRubeis et al., 2008). The current study focused on Social-Reg and its
underlying brain mechanisms.
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To accurately place the current study, we ﬁrst clarify the relevant
concepts linked with Social-Reg. In general, emotion regulation refers
to a set of processes that can alter emotional experiences (Gross,
2014). Adding the social realm, emotions can either be regulated by
the person experiencing them, termed intrapersonal emotion regulation
(here referred to as self-induced emotion regulation), or by another
person, termed interpersonal (Zaki and Williams, 2013) or social emo-
tion regulation (Reeck et al., 2015) (here also referred to as socially-
induced emotion regulation; the term ‘induced’ is used to explicitly
stress the origin of regulation). Social emotion regulation and related
phenomena have recently received increased attention across multiple
research domains, particularly in social and cognitive neuroscience.
For instance, verbal support from others, like emotional supportive
messages and empathic paraphrasing, has been shown to attenuate
negative feelings induced by socially unpleasant events (Onoda et al.,
2009; Seehausen et al., 2012); likewise, holding hands or viewing
photos of one's partner was also reported to reduce fear and fear-
related neural activations induced by electric shocks (Coan et al.,
2006; Eisenberger et al., 2011; Younger et al., 2010). Referring to these
examples, we can further differentiate social emotion regulation from
social emotion modulation. Social emotion regulation refers to a goal-
driven process, in which one person (the regulator) regulates another
person's (the target's) emotions (Reeck et al., 2015; Zaki and Williams,
2013), while social emotion modulation is a more passive process,
which often occurs outside of any explicit goal (Zaki and Williams,
2013). In more detail, if people wish to inﬂuence their own emotions
by engaging an external regulator, the process is referred to as intrinsic
social emotion regulation (Gross, 2013, 2014, 2015; Zaki and Williams,
2013). For example, people draw on others' support as a resource to
attenuate negative affect and intensify positive affect (Gable and Reis,
2010; Rimé, 2009). On the other hand, if the regulatory process is initi-
ated by the regulator in order to target the emotions of another person,
this is called extrinsic social emotion regulation (Gross, 2013, 2014,
2015; Zaki andWilliams, 2013). It has been shown that people attempt
to regulate others' emotions through empathic and supportive behav-
iors (Batson, 2011; Niven et al., 2009). Furthermore, a recent neuroim-
aging study found that the attempt to regulate another's emotions
activated brain regions linked with both affective and cognitive empa-
thy (Hallam et al., 2014).
Social-Reg is particularly important, both for general well-being
and in psychotherapy. Social-Reg refers to the process during which
the regulator provides the target with alternative interpretations
for emotion-triggering stimuli in order to alter the target's emotions
(Reeck et al., 2015). Besides their effectiveness, cognitive strategies for
emotion regulation are highly adaptive, and are especially valuable
when the stimulus has to be approached or is unavoidable (Gross,
1998; Ochsner et al., 2012). In daily life, when people are troubled
with emotional difﬁculties, positively reframing the situation or talking
about their opportunities can foster a positive outlook on the situation
so as to help them overcome negative affect (Burleson, 2003; Clark
et al., 1998). Importantly, Social-Reg is also a main treatment strategy
for neuropsychiatric disorders featured with impaired emotion regula-
tion (e.g., major depression and anxiety) (Borkovec and Ruscio, 2001;
Cuijpers et al., 2013; DeRubeis et al., 2008; Frewen et al., 2008). In
cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT), for example, a therapist instructs
and guides the patient to identify and change negative thoughts
through a series of treatment sessions (Beck, 1997; Butler et al., 2006).
Social-Reg in psychotherapy is an essential approach to equip patients
with skills of identifying and regulating emotions — to ultimately
train them to become their own therapists (Berking et al., 2013;
Biesheuvel-Leliefeld et al., 2015; Neacsiu et al., 2014).
Despite its relevance in both daily life and the clinical context,
the neural basis of Social-Reg remains poorly understood. The neural
processes underlying Social-Reg in the target likely overlap with those
of social cognition and cognitive emotion regulation (Reeck et al.,
2015). Social cognition encompasses all processes dealing with social
information, such as perceiving, thinking about, and making sense of
ourselves and others in the social world. It relies on a distributed set
of brain areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), anterior and
posterior cingulate cortex (ACC and PCC, respectively), precuneus, and
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (for reviews, see Adolphs, 2009;
Frith, 2007; Lieberman, 2007). Cognitive emotion regulation, on the
other hand, refers to cognitive processes formanaging emotional events
and responses (e.g., reappraisal; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Existing
ﬁndings suggest that cognitive emotion regulation relies on the dorso-
lateral and dorsomedial PFC as well as parietal cortices (Buhle et al.,
2014; Ochsner et al., 2012).
Interestingly, brain structures involved in social cognition and cogni-
tive emotion regulation overlap in prefrontal and parietal lobes, more
speciﬁcally, in areas of the so-called default mode network (DMN).
The DMN is an intrinsic brain network of coherent ongoing low-
frequency activity, initially identiﬁed during resting-state (i.e., a state
of passive viewing or with eyes closed without performing a task) as
a task-negative network (Amft et al., 2015; Andrews-Hanna, 2012;
Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). However, recent evidence re-
vealed that theDMN is in fact consistently activated during tasks involv-
ing social, affective and introspective processes (Mason et al., 2007;
Northoff et al., 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008). Evenmore, an explicit over-
lap has been reported between the resting-state DMN and areas related
to social cognition in the dorsomedial PFC, precuneus and TPJ (Amft
et al., 2015; Mars et al., 2012; Schilbach et al., 2012). Critically, aberrant
functioning of the DMN is a prominent neurophysiological vulnerability
for psychiatric disorders hallmarked by emotion dysregulation, such
as major depression (Broyd et al., 2009; Hamani et al., 2011; Orosz
et al., 2012).
Besides its neural basis, it also remains unexplored whether the
effectiveness of Social-Reg or the DMN involvement during Social-Reg
might interact with certain individual characteristics of social function-
ing, such as attachment security. Adult attachment security refers to
the extent to which one is willing to trust and rely on others, which is
an important modulator of social–emotional information processing
(Mikulincer and Shaver, 2008; Vrtička and Vuilleumier, 2012). Existing
studies found that the attachment security level shaped the effects of so-
cial support on pain ratings and associated neural processing (Hurter
et al., 2014; Krahé et al., 2015; Sambo et al., 2010).
Considering the above-presented background, we inferred the
following hypotheses. First of all, we expected that Social-Reg would
recruit regions of the DMN due to their involvement in both social
cognitive processes and cognitive emotion regulation. In addition, we
expected that people would vary in the extent to which they beneﬁt
from Social-Reg based on their social functioning, as measured with
the individual attachment security. Moreover, we also expected a posi-
tive association between attachment security and DMN involvement
during Social-Reg.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a functional MRI (fMRI)
experiment, in which pictures were used to elicit aversive emotions in
healthy individuals. A psychotherapist either down-regulated partici-
pants' emotions by employing the reappraisal strategy, or asked them
to simply look at the pictures without changing their emotions. Con-
trasting these two conditions allowed us to identify the neural corre-
lates of Social-Reg. To investigate the relationship of Social-Reg with
social functioning, participants' attachment security was measured by
the Adult Attachment Scale, and linked to both Social-Reg effectiveness
and Social-Reg-related brain activations. To further specify the neural
correlates of Social-Reg, two additional control experiments were
included. 1) To formally assess the link between neural correlates of
Social-Reg and the DMN, resting-state fMRI was carried out to identify
the participants-speciﬁc DMN; we then compared Social-Reg-related
activations with this DMN. 2) To examine whether Social-Reg was dis-
tinct from self-induced cognitive emotion regulation (Self-Reg), the
same experimental procedure was repeated without a psychotherapist,
wherein participants either actively down-regulated their emotions
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using reappraisal or passively looked at the pictures. Neural correlates of
Social-Reg were then compared with those of Self-Reg.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
After giving informed consent, twenty-two females (aged between
22 and 32 years, M= 24.95, SD= 2.30; all right-handed) participated
in the study, which was approved by the local ethics committee
(TechnischeUniversitätMünchen). Only femaleswere tested to prevent
previously reported gender differences in emotion regulation (McRae
et al., 2008). All participants reported no history of mental or neurolog-
ical disorders, no current use of psychoactive medications, were native
German speakers, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 3
participants were excluded from the analysis due to excessive head
movement (n = 2; cumulative translation or rotation N2 mm or 2°)
or failure to comply with instructions (n = 1; negative Social-Reg
success) during the fMRI experiment.
2.2. Experimental paradigm for Social-Reg
The experimental paradigm (Fig. 1) for Social-Regwas adapted from
previous neuroimaging studies on cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner et al.,
2004; Kim and Hamann, 2007; McRae et al., 2010; Mulej Bratec et al.,
2015), such that an antecedent-focused strategy in the formof cognitive
reappraisal was induced by a psychotherapist. Each trial began with
a ﬁxation cross presented for 1 s, followed by 1) an instruction
phase (6 s), which varied between conditions to instruct participants
on how to appraise the upcoming emotional stimulus; 2) an anticipa-
tion phase (6 s), during which participants waited for the emotional
stimulus; 3) a picture presentation phase (6 s), to induce negative
emotions; and 4) a rating phase (3 s), in which participants rated
their emotional feelings (on a 7-point scale ranging from−3 = very
negative to 3 = very positive). A black screen was presented for a
jittered inter-trial interval (3 ± 2 s). During the picture presentation
phase, aversive pictures from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS, Lang et al., 2005; the list of used pictures in the Supplementary
methods) were presented to elicit negative emotions. Of main interest
in the current study were picture-induced brain activations and their
changes in different task conditions.
During the instruction phase, one and the same female psychother-
apist instructed participants via a short video clip, in two conditions. In
the regulation condition (Social-Reg), the psychotherapist regulated
participants' emotions by helping them create mental distance from
the negative pictures, using statements such as “Don't forget, the pictures
are not related to you”. The Social-Reg condition directly resembled
socially-induced reappraisal (Reeck et al., 2015). Furthermore, all
of the Social-Reg instructions were compiled based on a distancing
strategy — a speciﬁc reappraisal strategy aiming to reduce emotional
reactions through a detached perspective, e.g., suggesting that the emo-
tional scenes are less personally relevant, are unreal, or are physically
further away from observers (McRae et al., 2012). In the look condition
(Social-Look), the psychotherapist told participants to look at the pic-
tures and respond naturally, using statements such as “Simply look at
the picture”. Social-Look was an adapted version of the ‘look’ condition
from previous neuroimaging studies on cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner
et al., 2004; Kim and Hamann, 2007; McRae et al., 2010; Mulej Bratec
et al., 2015). The order of the two conditions was counterbalanced
across participants. The two conditions were carried out separately in
two runs. Each run consisted of 80 trials (40 of which included a nega-
tive picture). Accordingly, 80 unique video clips of instructions were
used for each condition (the list of instructions in the Supplementary
methods). Participants were told that they should listen carefully
to the instructions and follow them during the picture presentation.
The psychotherapist thereby initiated and guided the regulatory process
by providing an explicit reappraisal strategy for participants, conform-
ing to the aforementioned deﬁnition of Social-Reg (Reeck et al., 2015).
In respect of practice, the operation of deliberately providing instruc-
tions and guiding individuals to regulate their emotions is in line with
the approach of Social-Reg used in psychotherapy (Berking et al.,
2013; Biesheuvel-Leliefeld et al., 2015; DeRubeis et al., 2008; Jacobsen
and Jim, 2008; Marroquín, 2011) and in daily life (Niven et al., 2009).
Participants were also told to entrust the psychotherapist with the reg-
ulation procedure, to not judge the contents of the instructions, and to
not use any other strategies on their own.
Critically, before the experiment, the psychotherapist was intro-
duced face-to-face to the participant as an expert whowould accompa-
ny and assist them via a communication system during the task by
providing online instructions. Participants were informed that the psy-
chotherapistwas able to see themduring scanning, and that they should
follow her guidance. In this way, we attempted to build a comparatively
real social context. This seemingly face-to-face communication is called
para-social interaction in mass media research (Horton and Richard
Wohl, 1956), which can provide a social milieu where the primary
properties of a social interaction and sociability are demonstrated and
reafﬁrmed (Giles, 2002; Perse and Rubin, 1989; Schiappa et al., 2007).
It's noteworthy that the psychotherapist was introduced to the partici-
pants as an expert in emotion regulation to develop participants' trust
in her and to ensure they would follow her instructions without doubt
Fig. 1. Trial structure of the Social-Reg task. In the Social-Reg task, each trial consisted of a ﬁxation cross, an instruction and anticipation phases, a negative picture, and a rating scale, with
varying inter-trial intervals (3± 2 s). The instructionwas a 6 s video clip, inwhich a psychotherapist regulated participants' emotions by using a distancing strategy, or told participants to
look at and respondnaturally to thepictures, depending on the condition. In the anticipation phase, participantswere asked to predictwhether a negative picture or nopicture (i.e., a blank
screen) would follow the presented cue. The analysis focused on brain activity during picture presentation, contrasting Social-Reg and Social-Look.
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or hesitation. It was also emphasized to the participants that the
psychotherapist's intention was to help them feel better and that they
should cooperate with the psychotherapist to accomplish the task,
through which a connection similar to the ‘work alliance’ in real-life
psychotherapy was established between the participant and the
psychotherapist during the experiment. Before the experiment, partici-
pantswere trainedwith the same paradigm, but observed pre-recorded
videos of a fellow female colleague instead of the psychotherapist, to
prevent them from suspecting the reality of the “online” communica-
tion with the psychotherapist during scanning. They practiced until
they were conﬁdent that they could understand and follow the instruc-
tions in the videos. For a more detailed description of the experimental
procedure, see the Supplementary methods.
2.3. Experimental paradigm for control experiments
In order to specify the neural correlates of Social-Reg, two additional
control experiments were included, which identiﬁed participants' DMN
at rest and neural correlates of Self-Reg, respectively.
2.3.1. Resting-state assessment
To assess the extent to which the neural correlates of Social-Reg
covered the DMN, an 8-min resting-state scan was conducted before
the tasks to identify the group-speciﬁc DMN. Participants were
instructed to keep their eyes closed, remain still, stay awake, and not
think about anything in particular.
2.3.2. Self-Reg task
To specify the neural correlates of Social-Reg, the Social-Reg taskwas
complemented with a standard Self-Reg task (Ochsner et al., 2004; Kim
and Hamann, 2007; McRae et al., 2010; Mulej Bratec et al., 2015), based
on the same paradigm and using the same participants (Fig. S1). In this
task, the emotion regulation instructions were presented via a written
word cue (2 s). In the regulation condition (Self-Reg; cue= “Distance”),
participants were instructed to down-regulate their emotions by
employing a pre-learned distancing strategy (e.g., reminding them-
selves that the pictures are not real and/or do not affect them). It was
emphasized that participants should do their best to generate appropri-
ate distancing sub-strategies at the presentation of each emotional pic-
ture during Self-Reg. Participants were also reminded that they should
only use the distancing strategy (rather than, for example, closing
their eyes or thinking about something positive) to down-regulate
their emotions. In the look condition (Self-Look; cue= “Attend”), partic-
ipants were told to respond naturally while looking at the pictures.
The Social- and Self-Reg tasks were conducted a week apart. And in
each task, the Reg and Look conditions were carried out separately in
two runs. The order of the tasks and conditions was counterbalanced
across participants.
2.4. Questionnaire on social functioning
Before scanning, participants completed the German version of the
Adult Attachment Scale (AAS, Close Relationship Version, Schmidt
et al., 2004) with 15 items rated along a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. AAS includes three sub-
scales ‘Close’, ‘Depend’, and ‘Anxiety’. The Close-subscale measures the
extent to which one is comfortable with intimacy and emotional close-
ness (5 items; e.g., “I am comfortable developing close relationships
with others”; α= 0.84). The Depend-subscale measures the extent to
which one trusts and relies on others (5 items; e.g., “I know that people
will be there when I need them”; α = 0.85). Finally, the Anxiety-
subscale measures the extent to which one is worried about being
rejected or abandoned (5 items; e.g., “I oftenworry that a person impor-
tant to me will leave me”; α= 0.51). In line with previous studies, the
attachment security score was calculated by summing up the Close and
Depend subscales scores and subtracting the Anxiety subscale score
(Goldman and Anderson, 2007).
2.5. Acquisition of imaging data
MRI images were collected on a 3 T Siemens Verio scanner. For co-
registration and normalization, high-resolution T1-weighted 3D images
were acquired with the magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition
gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (1× 1× 1mm3 resolution). During
resting-state and task measurements, T2*-weighted functional images
were acquired with the Echo-Planar Imaging pulse sequence (TE =
30 ms, TR = 2000 ms, ﬂip angle =90°, acquisition matrix =64 × 64,
35 slices, each 3 mm thick, with a gap of 0.6 mm, and an in-plane
resolution of 3 × 3 mm).
2.6. Analysis of imaging data
2.6.1. Preprocessing
All imaging data analysis was carried out with SPM8 (www.ﬁl.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/) unless otherwise stated. Preprocessing steps of task
fMRI data included the removal of the ﬁrst two volumes, slice-timing
correction, head motion correction, spatial normalization and smooth-
ing. In more detail, realignment of functional images to the ﬁrst func-
tional image of the ﬁrst scanning session was performed by using the
rigid body transformation. Alignment of functional and anatomical
(T1) images was estimated via the SPM8 coregistration module. For
normalization, the T1 image was segmented into gray andwhitematter
as well as cerebrospinal ﬂuid and transformed into the ICBM template
(Montreal Neurological Institute or MNI system). The received normal-
ization parameters were used to transform the functional images into
the MNI space. Normalized functional images were ﬁnally smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel (FWHM= 8 mm).
2.6.2. Analysis of brain activations during Social-Reg
For the ﬁrst-level analysis of each participant, preprocessed task
fMRI images were entered into a General Linear Model, to estimate
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal changes for each ex-
perimental condition. Onsets of emotion induction (i.e., picture
presentation phase) were entered as the regressor-of-interest, while
regressors-of-no-interest were created by onsets of other stimuli
(i.e., ﬁxation cross, and instruction, anticipation and rating phases), as
well as the 6 movement parameters (to remove artiﬁcial motion-
related signal changes). All regressors were convolved with the hemo-
dynamic response function. Intrinsic autocorrelations were accounted
for by the ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, and low-frequency drifts
were removed via a high-pass ﬁlter (128 s).
Individual contrast images of the ﬁrst-level analysis were fed into a
second-level random-effects group analysis, using a ﬂexible factorial
model with factors subject, instruction (Reg/Look), and task (Social/
Self). The contrast Social-Reg vs. Social-Look was the contrast-of-
interest, while other contrasts (as deﬁned below) were used for control
analyses. All contrasts were analyzed at a cluster-wise threshold of
p b 0.05, family-wise error (FWE)-corrected, based on a height thresh-
old of p b 0.001.
2.6.3. Brain-behavior correlation analysis
To investigate the relationship between the increase of brain activity
during Social-Reg and both Social-Reg success (here referred to as
regulation success for the Social-Reg − Social-Look difference in
emotional rating scores) and attachment security, we extracted and
averaged β-values for each signiﬁcant cluster in the contrast Social-
Reg N Social-Look, and correlated these values with corresponding
behavioral scores using Pearson's correlation with a signiﬁcance level
of p b 0.05, uncorrected. Because the PFC cluster of Social-Reg N Social-
Look was large (cluster size k = 1212) and covered several PFC
sub-regions of likely distinct functions, we divided it into three sub-
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regions to improve analysis speciﬁcity, namely the dorsomedial
PFC, dorsolateral PFC, and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) following the
Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) templates (i.e., Frontal_Sup_
Medial_L/R; Frontal_Sup/Mid_L/R; Frontal_Sup/Mid_Orb_L/R).
2.6.4. Speciﬁcity control: comparison with the DMN at rest
To assess the degree of overlap between the neural correlates of
Social-Reg and the DMN at rest, canonical high model order indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) was conducted on the resting-state
fMRI data, with a subsequent template-based selection of the DMN
(for details, see Supplementary analyses and results). Finally, spatial
overlap of the contrast Social-Reg N Social-Look with the identiﬁed
DMN was assessed.
2.6.5. Speciﬁcity control: comparison with brain activations during Self-Reg
To identify the neural correlates of Social-Reg, in contrast to Self-Reg,
we examined the commonalities and differences between the Social-
and Self-Reg tasks. Regarding the common regions (i.e., brain areas
with signiﬁcantly increased activations for both Social- and Self-Reg),
we applied a conjunction approach, in which we used the contrasts
Social-Reg N Social-Look and Self-Reg N Self-Look as inclusive masks
for each other. Regarding the distinct regions (i.e., brain areas more
active during the Reg condition compared to the Look condition and
more active during one task – Social-Reg or Self-Reg – than the other),
we examined the interaction contrasts instruction (Reg/Look) × task
(Social/Self), i.e., the contrasts (Reg N Look)Social N (Reg N Look)Self and
(Reg N Look)Self N (Reg N Look)Social, which deﬁned speciﬁc activations
for Social-Reg and Self-Reg, respectively. To further determine whether
signiﬁcant activations from the interactions were restricted to areas
that engaged in the regulation, we tested the interaction contrasts in
conjunction with the contrasts Social-Reg N Social-Look and Self-
Reg N Self-Look, respectively. The Fisher method of combining p values
was used, to identify voxels that randomly activated in both contrasts at
p b 0.001 (Lazar et al., 2002). Finally, two additional control analyses
were performed to conﬁrm that the speciﬁcity of brain activations for
Social-Reg were still tenable after we (1) controlled for a possible
session order effect; and (2) removed any possible carry-over effects
of events that preceded the regulation phase (i.e., instruction and antic-
ipation phases) (for details, see Supplementary analyses and results).
3. Results
3.1. Manipulation check
Post-experimental interview veriﬁed that all participants believed
that the psychotherapist was indeed present throughout the scanning
in an adjacent observation room, and that they engaged in the task by
following the psychotherapist's guidance.
3.2. Regulation success of Social-Reg
Emotional rating scores were signiﬁcantly higher during Social-Reg
than during Social-Look (paired t-test, t18 = 8.55, p b 0.001, d =
1.44), indicating that Social-Reg effectively reduced participants' nega-
tive feelings (Fig. S2).
3.3. Neural mechanisms of Social-Reg
To analyze the effect of Social-Reg, we examined the contrast Social-
Reg N Social-Look, and found enhanced activations in bilateral dorsolat-
eral and dorsomedial PFC, bilateral OFC, dorsal ACC, inferior parietal
cortex and precuneus (Fig. 2A, Table 1). Activations largely overlapped
with key regions of the DMN identiﬁed in previous studies (Andrews-
Hanna, 2012; Buckner et al., 2008). To evaluate whether the observed
activationswere indeed linked to emotion regulation, we further tested
whether regulation success co-varied with activation changes of Social-
Reg (Fig. 2B). Analysis showed that activations in the left inferior parie-
tal cortex (peak at [−48–61 46], k= 449) and the precuneus (peak at
[−3–70 43], k = 279) positively correlated with regulation success
(r=0.73, p b 0.001, and r=0.44, p b 0.05, respectively). Other clusters
that were signiﬁcantly activated during Social-Reg were not correlated
with regulation success (see Table S1).
To identify regions whose activity decreased during Social-Reg,
we examined the contrast Social-Look N Social-Reg and found reduced
activations in the bilateral supramarginal, temporal and occipital corti-
ces, and the left insula (Fig. S3), areas known to bemodulated by cogni-
tive emotion regulation (Kanske et al., 2010; McRae et al., 2010).
3.4. Correlations between attachment security and Social-Reg
The association of individual differences in attachment security with
Social-Reg at both behavioral and brain levels was tested by means of
Pearson's correlation analysis (Fig. 3). At the behavioral level, attach-
ment security scores were indeed positively correlated with regulation
success (r= 0.42, p b 0.05). At the brain level, averaged beta values of
the bilateral OFC from the Social-Reg activation pattern (k = 34, r =
0.44, p b 0.05)were also positively associated with attachment security.
Other clusters that were signiﬁcantly activated during Social-Reg were
not correlated with attachment security (see Table S1). To further test
the speciﬁcity of the correlation between Social-Reg and attachment
security, similar correlations analyses were conducted for Self-Reg. No
signiﬁcant correlations were observed between attachment security
and either Self-Reg success or Self-Reg brain activations (Table S2). In
addition, we found trends towards signiﬁcant differences between
Social-Reg- and Self-Reg-related correlations at both behavioral and
brain levels (details in Supplementary analyses and results).
3.5. Speciﬁcity of neural mechanisms of Social-Reg
3.5.1. Overlap between the neural mechanisms of Social-Reg and the DMN
at rest
To further assess the degree of overlap with the DMN, brain activa-
tions of Social-Reg were compared with the DMN at rest identiﬁed in
the current sample. ICA of resting-state fMRI data identiﬁed 4 DMN
sub-networks (one-sample t-test, p b 0.05, FWE corrected), which
were merged to represent the DMN as a whole (Fig. S4). The DMN
included dorsal and ventral medial PFC, PCC, precuneus, and parietal
and posterior temporal areas including TPJ (Fig. 4A), in line with previ-
ous ﬁndings (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner et al., 2008). A conjunc-
tion between the DMN and the Social-Reg recruited areas showed
a large overlap in the medial and bilateral lateral PFC, bilateral inferior
parietal cortex, and precuneus, which quantitatively represents more
than 60% of all the Social-Reg recruited voxels (Fig. 4B).
3.5.2. Common and different neural mechanisms of Social-Reg and Self-Reg
To investigate the speciﬁcity of Social-Reg, areas recruited by Social-
Reg were compared with those recruited by Self-Reg. At the behavioral
level, Self-Reg also proved effective at reducing participants' negative
feelings (paired t-test, t18 = 10.29, p b 0.001, d = 2.38) (Fig. S2). At
the brain level, it yielded enhanced activations in bilateral dorsolateral
and dorsomedial PFC, and inferior parietal cortex (contrast Self-
Reg N Self-Look; Figs. 5A and S5A, Table S3), and reduced activations
in the bilateral insula, occipital cortices, the left thalamus and the
periaqueductal gray (contrast Self-Look N Self-Reg; Fig. S5B).
To directly compare Social- and Self-Reg effectiveness at the behav-
ioral level, a planned t-test was conducted, comparing Social-Reg
success (Social-Reg–Social-Look) and Self-Reg success (Self-Reg–Self-
Look). The t-test showed that Self-Reg led to a greater reduction of
negative emotional rating scores than Social-Reg (t18 = 2.47, p b 0.05,
d = 1.16) (Fig. S2). This was expected, given that our participants
were healthy young females, adept at Self-Reg, and regularly using it
in their daily lives. At the brain level, both conjunction and interaction
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analyses were performed. Concerning commonalities, the conjunction
between the contrasts Social-Reg N Social-Look and Self-Reg N Self-
Look showed a signiﬁcant overlap in the bilateral dorsolateral and
medial PFC and the inferior parietal cortices (Fig. 5B, Table 2), as in-
dicated by spatial overlaps in Fig. 5A. Concerning differences, distinct
areas recruited by Social-Reg, i.e., areas with a stronger regulatory
effect in the Social-Reg task, were tested by the interaction effect
(Reg N Look)Social N (Reg N Look)Self in conjunction with the effect of
Social-Reg N Social-Look. This analysis yielded activations in the
dorsomedial PFC, precuneus, and left TPJ (Fig. 5C, Table 3). Impor-
tantly, these regions partly overlapped with areas whose activation
was positively related to the Social-Reg success (Fig. 2B), and remark-
ably overlapped with particular regions of the DMN that have been
observed as critical for social cognition in a meta-analysis of imaging
studies by Schilbach and colleagues (the ‘social-DMN’) (Schilbach
et al., 2012) (Fig. 5D). In contrast, distinct areas preferentially involved
in Self-Reg were tested by the conjunction between the contrasts
(Reg N Look)Self N (Reg N Look)Social and Self-Reg N Self-Look, which
yielded the left triangular part of the inferior frontal gyrus, and the infe-
rior parietal cortex (Table 3).
Finally, control analyses conﬁrmed that the speciﬁcity of brain acti-
vations for Social-Reg was not confounded by either the session order
effect (i.e., whether the Social-Reg or the Self-Reg task was conducted
ﬁrst) or potential carry-over effects of the instruction and anticipation
phases (for details, see Supplementary analyses and results).
Table 1
Areas recruited by Social-Reg.
Brain region H BA CS MNI coordinates T
x y z
Social-Reg N Social-Look
Inferior parietal R 39 231 51 −58 37 7.06
Inferior parietal L 39 449 −48 −61 46 6.44
Superior frontal (DMPFC) R 8/9/10 1212 18 56 25 6.00
Middle frontal (DLPFC) R 9/44 45 29 40 5.63
Superior frontal (DMPFC) L 9/32 −18 47 34 4.85
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) R 8 9 32 61 4.71
Middle orbital frontal (lateral OFC) L 47 −36 53 −2 4.61
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) L 9/10 −3 53 43 4.35
Anterior cingulate 32 0 41 25 4.18
Superior orbital frontal (lateral OFC) R 11 27 53 −2 3.99
Inferior frontal (DLPFC) L 45 −36 44 13 3.88
Precuneus L 7 279 −3 −70 43 5.67
Precuneus R 7 9 −67 37 4.93
Posterior cingulate L 23 −6 −52 28 3.46
Middle frontal (DLPFC) L 9 84 −42 11 52 5.06
Inferior frontal (DLPFC) L 44 −39 23 31 4.20
Note: Results are derived from a voxel-wise t-test based on the contrast Social-Reg N
Social-Look. All results are shown at a cluster-wise threshold of p b 0.05, FWE corrected,
based on a voxel-wise threshold of p b 0.001 and a minimum cluster size threshold of k
= 70 voxels. Abbreviations: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in the
number of activated voxels; L, left; R, right; DL, dorsolateral, DM, dorsomedial; OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; and T, t-values for each given peak.
Fig. 2. Neural mechanisms of Social-Reg. (A) Brain areas recruited by Social-Reg were examined by the contrast Social-Reg N Social-Look (p b 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected). (B) During
Social-Reg, brain activations in the left inferior parietal cluster (B1) (peak at [−48, −61, 46], k = 449), and precuneus cluster (B2) (peak at [−3, −70, 43], k = 279) positively
correlated with Social-Reg success (Pearson's correlations, p b 0.05).
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4. Discussion
The present study used fMRI, aversive picture presentation, and
socially-induced reappraisal in healthy females to investigate the
brain mechanisms of Social-Reg. We found that (i) in contrast to
Social-Look, Social-Reg reduced negative feelings and was related
to increased activations in the dorsolateral and medial PFC and pari-
etal cortices; (ii) individual differences in attachment security were
positively associated with the degree of both Social-Reg success
and lateral OFC involvement during Social-Reg. Speciﬁcity of the
neural underpinnings of Social-Reg was conﬁrmed by comparisons
with both participants' DMN activity at rest and activations during
Self-Reg. More speciﬁcally, Social-Reg recruited brain regions largely
overlappedwith the participants' DMN, and compared with Self-Reg,
Social-Reg recruited speciﬁc activations in the left TPJ, dorsomedial
PFC, and precuneus, which overlapped with the so-called ‘social-
DMN’ as described in the meta-analysis by Schilbach et al. (2012).
The ﬁndings provide ﬁrst-time evidence that Social-Reg is subserved
by the DMN and associatedwith individual differences in attachment
security.
4.1. Neural mechanisms of Social-Reg
During Social-Reg, results showed signiﬁcantly increased activations
in a widely distributed medial and lateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal,
as well as parietal–temporal network, in comparison with the Social-
Look condition (Fig. 2A). Furthermore, activations in the parietal parts
of this networkwere positively correlatedwith regulation success, indi-
cating that the observed activations were relevant for down-regulating
negative emotions during Social-Reg (Fig. 2B). To specify the nature
of activations associated with Social-Reg in more detail, we directly
compared the neural correlates of Social-Reg with those of Self-Reg.
On the one hand, Social-Reg activations in the dorsolateral and medial
PFC and the inferior parietal cortex overlapped with the activations
related to Self-Reg (Fig. 5A, B). This prefrontal–parietal network is
well known for its critical role in cognitive emotion regulation and
top-down cognitive control (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner et al., 2012).
The overlap, therefore, suggests that Social-Reg partly draws on re-
sources from the general cognitive control network common to typical
self-induced reappraisal. On the other hand, we found that beyond
these regions, Social-Reg speciﬁcally recruited the left TPJ, dorsomedial
PFC and precuneus (Fig. 5A, C). These brain regions are typically in-
volved in complex social functions required for successful social inter-
actions (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Carter and Huettel, 2013; Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006). The speciﬁc recruitment of these brain regions
indicates that Social-Reg also relies on social cognitive processes
(e.g., comprehending the psychotherapist's intentions and actions, and
shifting between one's own and the psychotherapist's perspective).
From an intrinsic brain network point-of-view, brain regions recruit-
ed by Social-Reg largely overlapped with the DMN (Fig. 4), which is
generally critical for emotion processing and regulation (Lindquist
et al., 2012; Sylvester et al., 2012). Previous ﬁndings have suggested
that aberrant functioning of the DMN can result in emotional dysregula-
tion (Broyd et al., 2009; Orosz et al., 2012; Schilbach et al., 2014; Sheline
et al., 2009). Consistent with these ﬁndings, the DMN was engaged in
Social-Reg in the present study. Remarkably, distinct activations of the
Social-Reg partially overlapped with all three regions of the so-called
‘social-DMN’ (Fig. 5D), identiﬁed recently in a large-scale fMRI meta-
analysis by overlapping DMN with brain regions typically involved in
social cognitive processes (Schilbach et al., 2012).
The overlap between the Social-Reg activations and the DMN
suggests a speciﬁc social–cognitive component in Social-Reg, mediated
by the ‘social-DMN’. Brain regions of the ‘social-DMN’ are consistently
involved in tasks that require mental state attributions to oneself and
others (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). Recently,
the recruitment of these brain regions has also been shown during
online social interactions as a function of the degree to which individ-
uals connect and coordinate with each other (Fairhurst et al., 2013;
Schilbach et al., 2010). Our ﬁndings support this view, as participants
also reported to have experienced the communication with the
Fig. 3. Social-Reg correlation with attachment security at both behavioral and brain levels. (A) Behaviorally, Social-Reg success positively correlatedwith attachment security scores from
the Adult Attachment Scale (AAS). (B) Regarding brain imaging data, activity changes in the bilateral OFC (k= 34) also positively correlated with attachment security scores (Pearson's
correlations, p b 0.05). A.u.: arbitrary units.
Fig. 4. Overlap of neural mechanisms of Social-Reg with the DMN. (A) The DMN was identiﬁed by group independent component analysis of resting-state fMRI data from the current
participants (one-sample t-test, p b 0.05, FWE corrected). Analysis revealed four DMN sub-networks, which were then merged together. (B) Brain areas recruited by Social-Reg largely
overlapped with the DMN.
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psychotherapist as occurring in real-time in our post-experimental in-
terview. Furthermore, precuneus and inferior parietal cortex, whose ac-
tivations were directly linked to regulation success (Fig. 2B), belonged
to areas speciﬁcally recruited by Social-Reg (Fig. 5C), suggesting a link
between Social-Reg effectiveness and interaction with others.
In summary, our data suggest a dual-source model of Social-Reg,
with a fronto-parietal source, common to typical Self-Reg, for top-
Fig. 5. Common and distinct neural mechanisms of Social-Reg and Self-Reg. (A) Overlapping areas (in yellow) recruited by Social-Reg (contrast Social-Reg N Social-Look, in red) and Self-
Reg (contrast Self-Reg N Self-Look, in blue) (p b 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected). (B) Common areas recruited by both Social-Reg and Self-Reg, as examined with the conjunction analysis of
the contrasts Social-Reg N Social-Look and Self-Reg N Self-Look (p b 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected). (C) Distinct areas recruited by Social-Reg, as examined by the conjunction analysis of the
contrasts (Reg N Look)Social N (Reg N Look)self and Social-Reg N Social-Look (height threshold p b 0.001, with a cluster extent of 15 voxels). (D) Overlap between the distinct areas recruited
by Social-Reg and the ‘social-DMN’. In the left panel, the ‘social-DMN’ boundary was identiﬁed by a previous ALE meta-analysis of social and unconstrained cognition (reproduced, with
permission, from Schilbach et al., 2012). Right panel shows the overlap between the distinct areas recruited by Social-Reg and all three ‘social-DMN’ regions (i.e., precuneus, dorsomedial
PFC and left TPJ).
Table 2
Common areas recruited by Social-Reg and Self-Reg.
Brain region H BA CS MNI coordinates T
x y z
(Reg N Look)Social ∩ (Reg N Look)Self
Inferior parietal R 39 317 51 −58 37 7.06
Superior frontal (DLPFC) R 9/10 628 18 56 22 5.16
Middle frontal (DLPFC) R 9/44/47 21 50 28 5.79
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) R 8 9 32 61 4.71
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) L 32 −9 41 34 3.86
Angular L 39 314 −48 −61 46 6.44
Middle frontal (DLPFC) L 9/46 307 −42 11 52 5.06
Inferior frontal (DLPFC) L 44 −39 23 31 4.20
Note: Results are derived from a conjunction approach by employing the respective con-
trasts as inclusive masks, at an overall cluster-wise threshold of p b 0.05, FWE-corrected,
based on a voxel-wise threshold of p b 0.01 for each contrast, and a minimum cluster
size threshold of k = 266 voxels. Abbreviations: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS,
cluster size in the number of activated voxels; L, left; R, right; DL, dorsolateral, DM,
dorsomedial; PFC, prefrontal cortex; and T, t-values for each given peak.
Table 3
Distinct areas recruited by either Social-Reg or Self-Reg.
Brain region H BA CS MNI coordinates T
x y z
Distinct areas recruited by Social-Reg: (Reg N Look)Social N (Reg N Look)Self ∩
(Reg N Look)social
Cerebellum L 15 −6 −55 −26 4.46
Lingual L 18 146 −6 −64 2 3.99
Cuneus R 3 −73 31 3.82
Precuneus L −6 −55 40 2.76
Angular (TPJ) L 39 136 −39 −52 25 3.64
Superior frontal (DMPFC) L 9/32 222 −12 50 43 3.61
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) L 10 −3 59 22 3.60
Superior frontal (DMPFC) R 9/10 18 56 25 2.84
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) R 10 9 59 19 2.70
Distinct areas recruited by Self-Reg: (Reg N Look)Self N (Reg N Look)social ∩
(Reg N Look)Self
Inferior frontal (IFG) L 48 27 −42 26 25 3.35
Inferior parietal L 40 41 −42 −46 49 3.11
Note: Results are derived from a conjunction approach by employing the interaction
effects and respective contrasts as inclusive masks, at an overall voxel-wise threshold of
p b 0.001 (a voxel-wise threshold of p b 0.01 for each contrast) with a minimum cluster
size of k = 15 voxels. Abbreviations: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size
in the number of activated voxels; L, left; R, right; DL, dorsolateral, DM, dorsomedial;
PFC, prefrontal cortex; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; and T,
t-values for each given peak.
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down cognitive control, and a ‘social-DMN’ source, speciﬁc for social
cognition (Fig. 5B, C). For both sources, the overlap with the DMN is
striking. Noticeably, a recent constructivist model of emotion suggests
that the DMN may contribute to emotions and their regulation by
creatingmeaning of ongoing sensations based on both represented pre-
vious experiences and particular context (Barrett and Satpute, 2013;
Lindquist et al., 2012). One could thus speculate that Social-Reg, via
the DMN, promotes a speciﬁc trajectory of emotion processing by
accounting for social information (e.g., “I am here to help you”), serving
as a ‘safety signal’ in the immediate context.
4.2. Attachment security and Social-Reg
Individual differences in attachment security were positively asso-
ciated with both regulation success and brain activation in the OFC
(Fig. 3). Attachment security reﬂects the propensity to establish inti-
mate emotional bonds with others, manifested by the extent to which
a person is willing to trust and rely on others for support (Collins and
Feeney, 2000). Our data indicate that secure attachment is related to
greater beneﬁts from Social-Reg, consistent with previous suggestions
that securely attached individuals are more sensitive to and reliant
on the protection, support and guidance from others (Mikulincer and
Shaver, 2008; Shaver and Mikulincer, 2007). Furthermore, research in
psychotherapy has suggested that a client's sense of security in close
relationships and in the relationship with the therapist will facilitate
the therapeutic process and enhance therapeutic outcomes (Bowlby,
2005; Mikulincer et al., 2013). In line with this, a recent meta-analysis
demonstrated that attachment security was signiﬁcantly positively
associated with treatment effects of psychotherapy (Levy et al., 2011).
Our brain data further suggest that the susceptibility to this form of
social inﬂuence correlates with activity changes in the lateral OFC. The
lateral OFC has been widely discussed in relation to emotion regulation
as a key region of the cognitive control network (Canterberry and
Gillath, 2013; Eippert et al., 2007), and is furthermore seen as a critical
region for encoding attachment-relevant stimuli, such as one's own in-
fant, romantic partner, or attachment-related words (Minagawa-Kawai
et al., 2009; Vrtička and Vuilleumier, 2012). The observed correlation
may indicate that attachment security facilitates both cognitive control
and social relatedness speciﬁcally via the lateral OFC. Noticeably, no
similar correlations for Self-Reg were found (Table S2), suggesting
that individuals' attachment security speciﬁcally contributes to the
effectiveness of Social-Reg.
4.3. Implications for psychotherapy and affective disorders
Concerning psychotherapy, interaction-based interventions are
recognized as particularly powerful therapeutic tools in disorders
hallmarked by emotion dysregulation, and basically rely on Social-Reg
by the therapist (Barker and Pistrang, 2002; Cuijpers et al., 2013;
DeRubeis et al., 2008). CBT, especially, represents one of the clear suc-
cess stories in interaction-based interventions. Social-Reg is a cardinal
technology of CBT, during which therapists instruct and guide clients
to identify negative, self-destructive thoughts, and assist them to develop
positive, adaptive thought patterns so as to improve their emotional state
and equip them with the skills to better regulate their own emotions in
the long run (Beck, 1997; Butler et al., 2006; Frewen et al., 2008). CBT
has shown encouraging effects on reducing negative thinking, depressive
feelings and anxious responses (Cuijpers et al., 2013; Park et al., 2014),
and more importantly, people treated with CBT show improved compe-
tences in cognitive regulation as well as increases in PFC function
(DeRubeis et al., 2008; Siegle et al., 2007). Our experimental design
mimics the basic aspects of CBT. Outside the clinical context, the Social-
Reg can also be used by friends and family to provide emotional support
in the emotionally-challenging moment, without an outlook on the
target's own regulatory abilities (Reeck et al., 2015).
The present design offers the means to assess immediate effects
and brain mechanisms of a Social-Reg session with a psychotherapist.
The current ﬁndings provide an account of how DMN-related neural
mechanisms may underlie interaction-based psychotherapeutic inter-
ventions. Data also shed light on why such interaction-based interven-
tions are only partially successful in some speciﬁc disorder conditions,
as the DMN is highly impaired in most of these disorders, e.g., in autism
and treatment-resistant depression (Assaf et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013;
Lynch et al., 2013; Orosz et al., 2012; Sheline et al., 2009). Finally, the ob-
served association between attachment security, regulation success,
and the DMN suggests that the DMN and Social-Reg may provide a
link between attachment insecurity and an increased risk for affective
disorders (Hankin et al., 2005; Marganska et al., 2013; von dem Hagen
et al., 2012). More speciﬁcally, persons who have problems relying on
others might ﬁnd it hard to proﬁt from Social-Reg. The reduced capabil-
ity of using social resources for emotion regulation, in turn,may explain
the increased risk for emotion dysregulation, which is at the core of
many affective disorders and associated with the DMN.
4.4. Conceptual and methodological issues
The present work represents the ﬁrst investigation into the neural
mechanisms of Social-Reg. Therefore, some conceptual and methodo-
logical issues are worth noting.
Social-Reg was launched via instructions that preceded emotional
stimulation, in line with the deﬁnition of cognitive emotion regulation
as an antecedent regulatory approach. Participants might have thus
implemented these social instructions independently (i.e., in a self-
regulatory way) at a later point in time (during picture presentation),
which the present design cannot completely rule out. However, it is
reasonable to assume that Social-Reg, in general, partly draws on self-
regulation resources, as was also suggested by the regional overlap be-
tween Social-Reg and Self-Reg (Fig. 5). In fact, social- and self-regulation
do not have anabsolute boundary and occur in the overlapping intervals
on a self-to-social continuum (Zaki and Williams, 2013). Social regula-
tion is thus socially-induced, but eventually self-implemented, in most
cases. In the present design, consistent with the deﬁnition of Social-
Reg (i.e., offering targets alternative interpretations for emotionally
evocative stimuli to minimize their distress, Reeck et al., 2015), the
manipulation of Social-Reg conﬁgured the processes in which an expert
initiated and guided the regulation by assigning precise reappraisal sub-
strategies to participants who were asked to simply follow the instruc-
tions. In contrast, during Self-Reg, participants decided when to start
the regulation and which particular tactic to use for each picture,
based on the pre-experimental training. Crucially, Social-Reg, as re-
vealed by our analysis, was supported not only by the typical cognitive
control network associated with Self-Reg, but also by an additional
network speciﬁcally related to social cognition. At the very least, the
observed Social-Reg effects might be a rather conservative estimate of
the actual effects of Social-Reg. Future studies, directly manipulating
the level of social involvement in different types of socially-induced
emotion regulation, are needed to conﬁrm and supplement the current
ﬁndings.
To establish a regulator–target relationship of trust and conﬁdence, a
psychotherapist was used as the regulator and introduced face-to-face
to the participants prior to the experiment as an expert that can help
them regulate their emotions. On the one hand, the relatively weak
and temporary tie between the regulator and targetmight have reduced
the effects of Social-Reg. In real life, it is hard to form a close connection
between two strangers within a short time, while rapport is a main
curative component in therapy (Horvath and Symonds, 1991; Martin
et al., 2000). Thus, an established close relationship with a therapist or
friend might result in an even more effective Social-Reg. On the other
hand, the psychotherapist was more likely to be perceived as both
warm and competent on an initial encounter, compared to an unfamil-
iar other, the twomain traits responsible for a positive social perception
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(Fiske et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the current study should only be taken
as an approximation to real-life Social-Reg in psychotherapy. Follow-up
studies are needed to assess whether and how the quality of a regula-
tor–target relationship may alter the beneﬁts of Social-Reg. To avoid
possible gender and familiarity effects (McRae et al., 2008), the study
sample included only female subjects, and Social-Reg instructions
were communicated by an unfamiliar female psychotherapist. As such,
the results cannot be generalized to male participants or social interac-
tions between opposite-sex or familiar individuals. Similarly, as partici-
pants recruited in this study were healthy with sound Self-Reg abilities,
Social-Reg in fact appeared less effective than Self-Reg. Future work
could examine the generalizability of the study ﬁndings to other kinds
of populations, especially clinical populations that are troubled with
impaired Self-Reg abilities, such as major depression patients. Likewise,
although the IAPS pictures used in the present study were effective
at evoking aversive emotions, they have less ecological validity than
stimuli derived from real-life experiences, such as personal memories
or social interactions. Future studies can help assess the generalizability
of the study ﬁndings to other types of emotionally-evocative stimuli.
5. Conclusion
The present study provides initial insights into the neural mecha-
nisms of Social-Reg. Our results provide evidence for the speciﬁc
involvement of the DMN in Social-Reg and its association with individ-
ual differences in attachment security. These ﬁndings are relevant for
our understanding of affective disorders, such as the reduced suscepti-
bility to social emotion regulation in depressed patients, which might
be due to an impaired DMN. They may also help to understand the
increased risk of individuals with low attachment security for affective
disorders, which may also be due to an impaired DMN and deﬁcient
capabilities to use social resources for emotion regulation.
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Supplementary Methods 
 
1. Experimental procedure 
In the Social-Reg task, participants first met the psychotherapist, who was introduced as an 
expert that would accompany and assist them in regulating their emotions during the task. 
Participants were then trained to follow the psychotherapist’s instructions while viewing 
negative pictures. They were presented with the same paradigm, but observed pre-recorded 
videos of a fellow female colleague instead of the psychotherapist. They practiced until they 
were confident that they could understand and follow the instructions in the videos without 
effort. Participants met the psychotherapist again immediately before scanning and were 
reminded that she would be in an adjacent room and give them on-line instructions during 
scanning. They were also told that they should entrust the psychotherapist with the regulation 
process and should not use any other strategies to change their emotions. The scanning took 
about 1 hour, with a short anatomical scan between two half-hour runs. The practice videos 
and pictures were not used in the experiment. After the entire experiment, participants 
completed an interview to confirm whether they believed the cover story and engaged in the 
task. 
 
The Self-Reg task started with a training session, to teach participants how to generate and 
implement concrete distancing strategies by themselves while viewing negative pictures, in 
preparation for scanning. The experimenter guided and shaped the specific strategy based on 
feedback from the participant to ensure that they could employ the distancing strategy 
successfully. Participants were reminded that they should only use distancing (rather than, for 
example, closing their eyes or thinking about something positive) to down-regulate their 
emotions. The training and pre-scanning preparation lasted for about 35 minutes. After 
training, participants completed the 1-hour-long scanning. Training pictures were not used in 
the experiment. After scanning, participants were asked to describe the specific regulation 
strategy/strategies they used during scanning to confirm whether they correctly followed the 
instructions. 
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2. Experimental materials  
Emotional pictures: To elicit aversive emotions, 160 negative pictures were selected from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 2005), and assigned to four 
experimental conditions (i.e., Social-Reg, Social-Look, Self-Reg and Self-Look), based on 
normative ratings of valence and arousal (valence: M = 2.22, SD = 0.47; arousal: M = 6.07, 
SD = 0.61) (all pictures are listed below). Two one-way ANOVAs showed that the pictures of 
the four experimental conditions did not differ in valence (F3, 159 = 0.41, p > 0.70) or arousal 
(F3, 159 = 0.06, p > 0.95). The picture presentation order was random and differed for each 
participant. 
 
IAPS picture list 
9185, 2981, 3053, 6313, 9630, 3530, 9620, 3180, 9301, 1111, 6370, 3015, 3140, 2800, 3069, 9050, 9904, 
2710, 9500, 3101, 3181, 3220, 9909, 6243, 3195, 9325, 9184, 9163, 3001, 3120, 9425, 9810, 3400, 2661, 
3103, 3062, 9920, 2141, 3059, 3063, 3110, 9921, 3150, 9423, 3060, 9414, 3068, 9412, 9008, 3191, 4664.2, 
9435, 6350, 9623, 3213, 3230, 6520, 9295, 2375.1, 8230, 9910, 9901, 9321, 3019, 9253, 9040, 9187, 3225, 
9599, 9600, 3131, 9611, 3130, 9410, 9905, 3215, 9140, 6022, 6231, 2205, 3160, 9400, 9415, 9911, 9007, 
3010, 3170, 9322, 3051, 9421, 9900, 6838, 3550, 6021, 6571, 3301, 2683, 9181, 3212, 8485, 6550, 6563, 
3100, 9635.1, 2730, 2352.2, 3185, 6212, 9183, 3071, 2717, 3016, 9800, 9075, 3005.1, 1930, 3102, 2095, 
6821, 9902, 9420, 2799, 3064, 9908, 3266, 2053, 3061, 3500, 2691, 3080, 9250, 6830, 9571, 6315, 9940, 
9433, 9428, 9903, 9941, 9006, 3030, 3350, 3261, 6300, 9326, 3000, 6560, 2703, 3168, 9252, 9405, 9332, 
9043, 9300, 9560, 7380, 3017, 9570, 9254, 6230 
 
Social-Reg instructions: 33 sentences were used as instructions for the Social-Reg task, 22 
for the Reg and 11 for the Look condition (listed separately below). The psychotherapist 
spoke each sentence several times, to resemble natural communication and prevent repetition 
of non-verbal movements. Totally, 80 unique video clips were created for each of the Reg 
and Look conditions, one for each trial. The instructions were presented in a pseudorandom 
order, such that no repetitions of the same sentence were presented consecutively. 
 
Social-Reg instructions list 
22 Sentences Used in the Social-Reg Condition (English Translation) 
Sie wissen, Sie sind nicht betroffen. You know that you are not affected. 
Denken Sie daran, dass Sie hier sicher sind. Keep in mind that you are safe here. 
Vergessen Sie nicht, die Bilder haben nichts mit Ihnen Don't forget, the pictures are not related to you. 
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zu tun. 
Vergessen Sie nicht, Sie sind nicht auf den Bildern 
dargestellt. 
Don't forget, you are not depicted in the pictures. 
Das hier ist eine Untersuchung, nicht die Realität. This is just an experiment, not reality. 
Denken Sie daran, dass die Bilder nur gestellt sind. You know that the scenes are just staged. 
Sie wissen, die Bilder betreffen Sie nicht. You know that these pictures do not affect you. 
Weder Sie noch Ihre Familienangehörigen sind 
betroffen. 
Neither you nor your relatives are involved. 
Sorgen Sie sich nicht, Sie sind hier sicher. Don't worry, you are safe here. 
Sie müssen keine Angst haben, die Bilder sind gestellt. You don’t have to be afraid, the pictures are staged. 
Erschrecken Sie nicht, die Bilder sind nur gestellt. Don't be scared, the pictures are just staged. 
Sie sind in Sicherheit, Ihnen kann nichts passieren. You are safe, nothing bad can happen to you. 
Auf den Bildern sind Szenen dargestellt. The pictures depict scenes. 
Die Bilder haben nichts mit ihrem Leben zu tun. The pictures don’t concern your life. 
Sie und Ihre Familie sind in Sicherheit. You and your family are safe. 
Sie wissen, dass die Bilder nichts mit der Realität zu 
tun haben. 
You know that the pictures are not related to reality. 
Sie wissen, dass Sie an einer Untersuchung 
teilnehmen. 
You know that you are simply participating in an 
experiment. 
Sie wissen, die Bilder sind nicht real. You know that the scenes in the pictures are not real. 
Sie wissen, dass Sie hier sicher sind. You know that you are safe here. 
Atmen Sie ruhig weiter, Sie sind hier sicher. Keep breathing calmly, you are safe here. 
Denken Sie daran, die Bilder haben nichts mit Ihrem 
Alltag zu tun. 
Keep in mind that the pictures are not related to your 
everyday life. 
Denken Sie daran, die Bilder haben nichts mit Ihrem 
Situation zu tun. 
Keep in mind that the pictures have nothing to do with 
your situation. 
 
11 Sentences Used in the Social-Look Condition (English Translation) 
Schauen Sie das Bild einfach an. Simply look at the picture. 
Schauen Sie das Bild an. Look at the picture. 
Verdeutlichen Sie sich den Inhalt des Bildes. Pay attention to the picture’s content. 
Machen Sie sich den Inhalt des Bildes klar. Bring the content of the picture to your mind. 
Lassen Sie Ihre Gefühle zu. Experience your feelings. 
Lassen Sie Ihre Gefühle beim Betrachten des Bildes 
zu. 
Experience your feelings when looking at the picture. 
Ändern Sie Ihre Gefühle nicht. Don't change your feelings. 
Lassen Sie die Gefühle, die das Bild auslöst, zu. Experience the feelings induced by the picture. 
Schauen Sie sich das Bild an. Look at the picture. 
Machen Sie sich klar, was auf dem Bild dargestellt ist. Make what is shown on the picture clear to you. 
Seien Sie sich im Klaren über die Bedeutung des 
Bildes. 
Be aware of the picture’s meaning. 
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Supplementary Analyses and Results 
 
1. Group ICA to identify the DMN 
Resting-state fMRI data were acquired before each task (Social- and Self-Reg) on the same 
sample (22 healthy female participants) with the same scanning parameters (see	Materials and 
Methods in the main text). Altogether, 480 volumes were acquired. Data were preprocessed 
by SPM8, including motion correction, spatial normalization (resulted voxel size = 3×3×3 
mm) based on unified segmentation of T1-weighted images, and smoothing (FWHM = 
8mm). Preprocessed data were decomposed into 75 spatial independent components within a 
group-ICA framework, based on the Infomax algorithm and implemented by GIFT (GIFT 
v1.3h; http://mialab.mrn.org/software/#gica) (Allen 2013). In detail, data were temporally 
concatenated and reduced by a two-step principal component analysis (PCA), followed by 
spatial independent component estimation with the Infomax algorithm. To ensure stability of 
the estimated components, ICA was repeated 100 times (with ICASSO). Group ICA provided 
a set of group-level independent components, which were then back-reconstructed into single 
subject space. Each back-reconstructed component consisted of a whole-brain intensity map 
reflecting the component’s functional connectivity pattern across the entire space, and an 
associated time course reflecting the component’s activity across time. 
 DMN identification was performed by a spatial cross-correlation between the generated 
ICA maps and four DMN templates described in Allen et al. (2011). Four independent 
components, which exhibited the largest correlation coefficient with each DMN sub-network 
template, were selected (Figure S4A). To determine voxel-wise statistics, one-sample t-tests 
with a gray-matter mask were carried out for each component, with a rigorous multiple 
comparison correction (voxel-wise p < 0.05, FWE corrected) and an extent threshold (k = 60 
voxels). The significant results were merged into a DMN map (Figure S4B). The identified 
DMN map included dorsal and ventral portions of the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior 
cingulate cortex extending into the precuneus, and bilateral parietal and posterior temporal 
areas around the temporo-parietal junction. 
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2. Specificity of the correlations between attachment security and Social-Reg 
To confirm the specificity of the correlations between Social-Reg and attachment security, 
we also examined the correlations between Self-Reg and attachment security. We found that: 
(i) at the behavioral level, the correlation between attachment security and Self-Reg success 
was not significant (r = -0.043, p > 0.1), and that there was a trend towards a difference 
between this coefficient and the one for Social-Reg (r = 0.42; z = 1.39, p = 0.082); (ii) the 
activation increases during Self-Reg (i.e., averaged ß-values of each significant cluster in the 
contrast Self-RegSelf-Look, p < 0.05, FWE corrected) were not correlated with attachment 
security (-0.104 < r < 0.301, all p > 0.1; see Table S2); (iii) the bilateral OFC activation (i.e., 
averaged ß-values of the OFC, as identified by the AAL template, in the contrast Self-Reg > 
Self-Look, p < 0.001, uncorrected) was not correlated with attachment security (r = -0.053, 
p > 0.4), and that there was a trend towards a difference between this coefficient and the one 
for Social-Reg (r = 0.44; z = 1.49, p = 0.068). Results suggest that the observed correlation 
patterns were specific for Social-Reg.  
 
3. Task order effects 
Social- and Self-Reg tasks were conducted successively for each participant. To rule out any 
possible differences in results induced by the task order, participants were separated into two 
groups according to their actual task order in the experiment (i.e., Group 1: Social-Reg task 
-> Self-Reg task, including 9 participants; Group 2: Self-Reg task -> Social-Reg task, 
including 10 participants). Two-sample t-tests were then conducted to test whether the effect 
of Reg > Look differed between the two groups in either the Social- or Self-Reg tasks.  
 At the brain level, whole-brain analyses showed no significant between-group 
differences for the effect of Reg > Look in either the Social- or the Self-Reg task, at both the 
predefined statistical threshold (p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected) and a more liberal threshold 
(p < 0.001, uncorrected). We further restricted the analysis to the DMN key regions that were 
recruited by Social-Reg (i.e, the precuneus, the medial frontal cortex and the temporo-parietal 
junction), and still found no between-group differences for the effect of Reg > Look in either 
the Social- or the Self-Reg task (p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected). Results therefore show 
that, at the brain level, the task order did not affect the spatial extent of the network 
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supporting Social-Reg, indicating that no matter which task the participant did first, they all 
exhibited a consistent brain activation pattern in both the Social- and the Self-Reg tasks.  
 At the behavioral level, we examined whether either the Self-Reg or the Social-Reg 
success might have been affected by the task order (i.e., might have been augmented by the 
preceding task when either task was performed second). Regarding Self-Reg, analysis 
showed that Self-Reg success did not differ between the two groups (t17= 1.58, p > 0.05, d = 
0.77), indicating that completing the Social-Reg task first did not augment the Self-Reg 
success in Group 1. This is reasonable considering the Social-Reg paradigm. Despite the fact 
that our Social-Reg implementation resembled the Social-Reg used in psychotherapy, the 
goal of which is to eventually improve the patient’s Self-Reg ability, it is reasonable to 
assume that a single Social-Reg session cannot have a significant impact on Self-Reg, 
especially in young, healthy individuals with sound reappraisal skills to start with. Regarding 
the Social-Reg success, results showed that Group 2 participants, who first completed the 
Self-Reg task, had a higher Social-Reg success than Group 1 participants who started with 
the Social-Reg task (t17= 4.29, p < 0.001, d = 2.08). There are two noncompeting possibilities. 
First, it could be that the Self-Reg task facilitated the effectiveness of Social-Reg, such that 
previous experiences of reappraisal might have assisted participants in better understanding 
and recognizing reappraisal instructions in the Social-Reg task. Similar findings have been 
reported in relation to psychotherapy, where non-disorder-specific training of general 
emotion regulation skills has been shown to improve the effects of CBT-based treatments 
(Berking et al., 2008; 2015). Second, it is also possible that participants in Group 2, who first 
(successfully) regulated negative emotions by themselves in the same context, found it more 
difficult to completely entrust the psychotherapist with the regulation in the second session a 
week later and perhaps partly enhanced the regulation by themselves when needed. This 
result does, however, not affect either the effectiveness or the distinctiveness of Social-Reg in 
the present study. First, Social-Reg success was significant in both task-order groups, 
including Group 1 that started with Social-Reg (both t17 > 6.0, p < 0.001, and d > 1.02), 
showing that Social-Reg was effective regardless of the task order. Second, the distinct 
network supporting Social-Reg, including DMN regions, was evident in both task-order 
groups, including Group 1 that started with Social-Reg, showing that the task order had no 
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effect on the main finding of this study. 
 
4. Impact of preceding events on picture presentation  
When comparing Social- and Self-Reg effects on brain activity during the picture 
presentation phase, a potential confound might have occurred due to carry-over effects from 
preceding events, i.e., the instruction (6 s) and anticipation (6 s) phases. To control for these 
potential carry-over effects from the preceding events, a new second level GLM analysis was 
performed based on different contrast images from the first level analysis. While the original 
contrast images of the first level analysis were based on the contrast picture vs. baseline in 
the initial analysis, the control analysis included first level contrast images defined by the 
contrast picture vs. instruction-anticipation (combined instruction and anticipation regressors). 
The control analysis thus focused on brain activity during picture presentation, controlled for 
any activation induced by the instruction or anticipation phases. Individual contrast images 
were subjected to a flexible factorial model with the factors	instruction (Reg/Look) and task 
(Social/Self), mirroring the initial analysis.  
The contrast Social-Reg > Social-Look identified activations in the bilateral dorsolateral 
and dorsomedial PFC, bilateral inferior parietal cortex, OFC, dorsal ACC, and 
precuneus/PCC (p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected), covering all clusters of the initial analysis 
focused on picture presentation (Figure S6A). In particular, the interaction contrast (Reg > 
Look)Social > (Reg > Look)Self also yielded a highly similar activity pattern as the initial 
analysis focused on picture presentation (p < 0.005, Figure S6B). The data confirm that the 
Social-Reg activity observed during picture presentation was not confounded by carry-over 
effects from preceding events.	
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Supplementary Figures 
 
Figure S1 
 
Figure S1: Trial structure of the Self-Reg task 
The paradigm fully resembled that of the Social-Reg task, with the instruction phase duration 
reduced to 2 s, for presenting the cue word. Participants were asked to down-regulate their 
emotions by using self-distancing (‘Distance’) or to simply attend to the pictures (‘Attend’) 
while viewing the negative pictures. 
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Figure S2 
 
Figure S2: Emotional rating scores results 
To evaluate the effects of regulation on emotional rating scores, paired t-tests were conducted. 
Data showed that negative emotions were significantly lower in the Reg condition compared 
to the Look condition, in both the Social-Reg (t18= 8.55, p < 0.001, d = 1.44) and the Self- 
Reg task (t18= 10.29, p < 0.001, d = 2.38). An additional planned t-tests, comparing 
Social-Reg (Social-Reg – Social-Look) and Self-Reg success (Self-Reg – Self-Look), showed 
that Self-Reg led to a greater reduction in rating scores than Social-Reg (t18 = 2.47, p < 0.05, 
d = 1.16). Absolute values of the rating scores are shown, and error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure S3 
 
Figure S3: Areas modulated by Social-Reg 
Brain areas modulated by Social-Reg were examined by the contrast Social-Look > 
Social-Reg. All p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected, except for the left insula (peak at [-39 -1 1], 
k=17 voxels; survived at the height threshold p < 0.001). 
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Figure S4 
 
Figure S4: DMN as identified by the resting-state fMRI data 
(A) Four independent components were identified based on a group ICA and DMN 
sub-network templates (Allen et al., 2011). Spatial maps are based on all participants and 
plotted as t-statistical maps (p < 0.05, FWE voxel-corrected). (B) Significant results were 
merged into a single map to represent the DMN as a whole.  
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Figure S5 
 
Figure S5: Areas recruited and modulated by Self-Reg 
(A) Brain areas recruited by Self-Reg were examined by the contrast Self-Reg > Self-Look. 
(B) Brain areas modulated by Self-Reg were examined by the contrast Self-Look > Self-Reg. 
Images are displayed at p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected threshold. 
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Figure S6 
 
Figure S6: Social-Reg activation controlled for potential carry-over effects of preceding 
events 
(A) Activations revealed by the contrast Social-Reg > Social-Look, based on the individual 
contrast images from the original first-level analysis (left panel) and the adapted first-level 
analysis with the effects of preceding events regressed out (right panel). Images are displayed 
at p < 0.05, FWE cluster-corrected threshold. (B) Activations yielded by the interaction 
contrast (Reg > Look)Social > (Reg > Look)Self, based on the individual contrast images from 
the original first-level analysis (left panel) and the adapted first-level analysis with the effects 
of preceding events regressed out (right panel). Images are displayed at a voxel-wise 
threshold p < 0.005, with a cluster extent of 15 voxels. 
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Supplementary Tables 
 
Table S1: Social-Reg, regulation success, and attachment: correlation analyses 
Brain regions 
  Regulation Success   Attachment Security 
  r p   r p 
Social-Reg > Social-Look 
R_Inferior parietal  0.269 0.133  0.239 0.162 
L_Inferior parietal  0.734 0.0001  0.375 0.057 
Precuneus  0.441 0.029  0.137 0.288 
L_Middle frontal (DLPFC)  0.048 0.423  0.154 0.264 
Superior frontal (DMPFC)  0.117 0.317  0.149 0.271 
Bilateral orbitofrontal (OFC)  0.068 0.391  0.444 0.028 
Medial frontal (DMPFC)  0.093 0.353  0.069 0.389 
Bilateral superior and middle frontal (DLPFC)   0.107 0.331   0.141 0.283 
Note: Averaged ß-values for 5 significant clusters in the contrast Social-RegSocial-Look were extracted and correlated 
with corresponding behavioral scores using Pearson’s correlation with a significance level of p < 0.05, uncorrected. Since 
the superior frontal cortex cluster covered several prefrontal subregions, we divided it into 3 subregions following the 
Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) templates to improve analysis specificity. Significant values are shown in bold. 
Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; DL, dorsolateral, DM, dorsomedial; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; and PFC, prefrontal cortex. 
The significant correlations are displayed in bold letters. 
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Table S2: Self-Reg, regulation success, and attachment: correlation analyses 
Brain regions 
  Regulation Success   Attachment Security 
  r p   r p 
Self-Reg > Self-Look 
Inferior parietal  0.066 0.394  0.134 0.293 
Middle frontal (DLPFC)  -0.239 0.163  0.123 0.309 
Inferior parietal  0.100 0.342  0.301 0.106 
Inferior frontal (DLPFC)  -0.286 0.118  0.292 0.113 
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC)  -0.094 0.351  -0.104 0.336 
Bilateral orbitofrontal (OFC)   -0.289 0.115   -0.053 0.414 
Note: Averaged ß-values for 5 significant clusters in the contrast Self-RegSelf-Look were extracted and correlated with 
corresponding behavioral scores using Pearson’s correlation with a significance level of p < 0.05, uncorrected. The lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, in italics) was identified following the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) template, to 
confirm that the correlation between the OFC activation and attachment security was specific for Social-Reg and not for 
emotion regulation in general. Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; DL, dorsolateral, DM, dorsomedial; and PFC, prefrontal 
cortex. 
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Table S3: Areas recruited by Self-Reg 
    Brain region H BA CS 
MNI coordinates 
T 
x y z 
Self-Reg > Self-Look 
Inferior parietal R 39/40 343 54 -55 49 6.32 
Middle frontal (DLPFC) R 9 176 45 20 43 6.05 
Inferior parietal L 40 306 -42 -58 55 5.82 
Supramarginal L 40  -60 -49 31 3.58 
Inferior frontal (DLPFC) L 45/48 212 -42 26 28 5.37 
Middle frontal (DLPFC) L 6/9  -39 8 55 5.06 
Superior medial frontal (DMPFC) L 8/32 81 -3 38 34 4.27 
Superior frontal (DMPFC) L 32  -12 20 43 3.89 
Note: Results are derived from a voxel-wise t-test for the contrast Self-Reg > Self-Look. All results are given at a 
cluster-wise threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected, based on a voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.001 and a minimum cluster size 
k = 70 voxels. Abbreviations: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in number of activated voxels; L, left; R, 
right; DL, dorsolateral, DM, dorsomedial; PFC, prefrontal cortex; and T, t-values for each given peak. 
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Project	4:	Social	Context	Affects	Distinct	
Types	of	Emotional	Activity	in	
Subregions	of	the	Human	Insula	
The	current	chapter	includes	a	research	manuscript	entitled	“Social	context	affects	distinct	types	of	emotional	activity	in	subregions	of	the	human	insula”.	Using	a	novel	paradigm,	it	provides	a	first	account	on	how	social	emotion	modulation	affects	two	distinct	 types	 of	 neural	 activity	 –	 emotional	 response-	 and	 aversive	 prediction	error-related	activity	–	in	the	left	and	right	anterior	and	posterior	insula	parts,	and	thus	illuminates	the	anterior-posterior	gradient	hypothesized	in	the	human	insula.	The	manuscript	is	currently	unpublished.		
Contributions:	Authors:	 Satja	Mulej	 Bratec,	 Xiyao	 Xie,	 Leonhard	 Schilbach,	 Gabriele	 Schmid,	 Claus	
Zimmer,	Afra	Wohlschläger,	Valentin	Riedl,	Christian	Sorg	The	author	of	 this	 thesis	 shares	 the	 first	 authorship	of	 the	manuscript	with	Xiyao	Xie.	S.M.B.,	X.X.	and	C.S.	conceived	the	experiment,	with	the	help	of	C.Z.	S.M.B.	and	X.X.,	under	the	supervision	of	C.S.,	filmed	G.S.	to	create	the	social	modulation	videos	used	 in	 the	experiment.	S.M.B.	 and	X.X.	 together	 conducted	behavioural	 and	 fMRI	data	acquisition,	with	the	help	of	G.S.	(the	psychotherapist).	S.M.B.	and	X.X.	analysed	the	 behavioural	 and	 the	 neuroimaging	 data,	 with	 some	 help	 from	 A.W.	 and	 V.R.,	supervised	 by	 C.S.	 S.M.B.	 wrote	 the	 manuscript,	 which	 was	 revised	 by	 X.X.	 The	writing	 was	 supervised	 by	 C.S.,	 and	 the	 manuscript	 was	 commented	 on	 and	additionally	revised	by	L.S.		 	
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Abstract	The	human	insula	is	one	of	the	most	differentially	expanded	brain	parts	to	support	complex	 human	 socio-emotional	 behavior;	 however,	 the	 mechanisms	 underlying	such	behavior	 in	 the	 insular	 cortex	 are	 incompletely	understood.	We	 investigated	differential	 effects	of	 social	 context	 change	during	aversive	conditioning	on	 insula	activity	 for	 3	 contrasting	 dimensions:	 anterior	 versus	 posterior	 insula	 (AI	 and	PI,	respectively),	 due	 to	 the	 posterior-to-anterior	 insular	 processing	 hierarchy	 and	functional	 gradient;	 aversive	 prediction	 error-	 versus	 aversive	 stimulus-related	activity,	two	functionally	distinct	types	of	activity	relevant	for	emotional	behavior;	and	right	versus	left	insula,	based	on	the	proposed	differential	insular	control	of	the	sympathetic	and	parasympathetic	nervous	systems.	Results	confirmed	a	three-fold	dissociation	 between	 signal	 types	 and	 insula	 subregions:	 social	 presence	 reduced	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	only	in	the	PI	but	not	the	AI;	aversive	prediction	error-related	 activity	was	 increased	during	 social	 presence	only	 in	 the	AI	 but	not	the	 PI;	 and	 the	 social	 presence	 effect	 on	 aversive	 prediction	 error	 activity	 was	positively	associated	with	aversive	learning	in	the	right	AI,	but	negatively	in	the	left	AI.	 Findings	provide	new	 insights	 into	 both	 the	 effects	 of	 social	presence	 and	 the	mechanisms	supporting	socio-emotional	behavior	in	the	human	insula.			 	
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Introduction	The	human	insular	cortex	is	one	of	the	most	differentially	expanded	brain	regions,	compared	 with	 other	 primates	 (Bauernfeind	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 making	 it	 a	 prime	candidate	to	support	complex	social	and	emotional	behavior	(Craig,	2009;	Lamm	&	Singer,	 2010).	 Ample	 work	 has	 underlined	 the	 importance	 of	 insula	 in	 detecting	salient	environmental	events,	as	well	as	the	disparate	roles	of	insula	subregions	in	marking	 these	 events	 for	 further	 processing	 to	maintain	 optimal	 socio-emotional	functioning	 (Bauernfeind	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Kurth,	 Zilles,	 Fox,	 Laird,	 &	 Eickhoff,	 2010;	Menon	&	Uddin,	2010).		For	instance,	anterior	insula	(AI)	is	known	to	be	involved	in	complex	emotional	and	social	processing,	 information	 integration,	 and	emotional	 awareness	 (Craig,	 2009;	Gu,	 Hof,	 Friston,	 &	 Fan,	 2013;	 Hogeveen,	 Bird,	 Chau,	 Krueger,	 &	 Grafman,	 2016;	Kelly	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kurth	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Lamm	 &	 Singer,	 2010;	 Singer,	 Critchley,	 &	Preuschoff,	 2009).	 More	 specifically,	 AI	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 region	 that	 detects	 and	integrates	 information	 about	 salience	 from	 all	 relevant	conditions	in	 a	 given	moment	to	support	awareness	(Craig,	2009;	2010;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Seth,	2013).	The	ventral	AI	has	been	implicated	in	complex	social	emotions	(Lamm	&	Singer,	2010)	and	 is	 known	 to	 contain	 von	 Economo	 neurons	 (i.e.,	 large	 projection	 neurons	specific	 to	 few	 socially	 highly	 developed	 species)	 (Allman	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 AI	 has	furthermore	been	 associated	with	 various	 types	 of	 prediction	 errors,	 such	 as	 risk	prediction	errors	(Bossaerts,	2010;	Preuschoff,	Quartz,	&	Bossaerts,	2008;	Singer	et	al.,	 2009),	 interoceptive	 prediction	 errors	 (Gu	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Paulus	 &	 Stein,	 2006;	Seth,	 2013;	 Seth,	 Suzuki,	 &	 Critchley,	 2012),	 and	 aversive	 prediction	 errors	 (i.e.,	prediction	 errors	 associated	 with	 aversive	 emotional	 events	 in	 the	 context	 of	associative	learning)	(Garrison,	Erdeniz,	&	Done,	2013;	Kim,	Shimojo,	&	O’Doherty,	2006;	 Pessiglione,	 Seymour,	 Flandin,	 Dolan,	 &	 Frith,	 2006;	 Seymour	 et	 al.,	 2004).	Prediction	errors,	in	general,	represent	a	mismatch	between	prior	expectations	and	reality,	 and	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 universal	 computation	 across	 the	 brain	 (Clark,	 2013;	Friston,	2005;	Ouden,	Kok,	&	de	Lange,	2012).	In	the	context	of	associative	learning,	prediction	 errors	 serve	 as	 teaching	 signals	 that	 drive	 motivated	 behavior,	 by	providing	 us	with	 information	 on	whether	 and	 how	much	 to	 adapt	 our	 behavior	(Pearce	&	Bouton,	2001;	Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000).		
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	While	 AI	 supports	 higher-order	 integrated	 representations	 of	 interoceptive	 and	emotional	 states	 and	 encodes	 various	 types	 of	 prediction	 errors,	 the	 posterior	insula	 (PI),	 in	 contrast,	 supports	 primary	 representations	 of	 interoceptive	 states	and	feelings	(Craig,	2009;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Lamm	&	Singer,	2010;	Seth,	2013).	The	PI	has	 been	 repeatedly	 involved	 in	 regulating	 homeostatic	 states	 and	 physiological	reactivity	and	to	salient	stimuli	(Bauernfeind	et	al.,	2013;	Craig,	2003;	Kurth	et	al.,	2010;	 Menon	 &	 Uddin,	 2010).	 Moreover,	 the	 representation	 of	 one’s	 body	 state	created	 by	 the	 PI	 is	 essential	 for	 generating	 subjective	 feelings	 and	 emotional	awareness	 in	 the	AI	 (Bauernfeind	 et	 al.,	 2013;	Menon	&	Uddin,	 2010).	 Functional	differences	 between	 PI	 and	 AI	 and	 the	 hierarchical	 organization	 of	 the	 insula	represent	 a	 posterior-to-anterior	 gradient	 in	 the	 human	 insula,	 with	 increasing	processing	complexity	toward	AI	(Craig,	2009;	2011;	2010).			In	 addition,	 an	 emotional	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 right	 and	 left	 AI	 has	 been	proposed,	such	that	the	right	AI	is	preferentially	involved	in	aversive	emotions,	due	to	 the	 right-sided	 control	 of	 the	 sympathetic	 nervous	 system,	while	 the	 left	 AI	 is	predominantly	 relevant	 for	 positive	 emotions,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 left-centered	parasympathetic	 nervous	 system	 control	 (Craig,	 2009;	 2005;	 2010).	 However,	despite	elaborate	theoretical	and	empirical	work,	our	mechanistic	understanding	of	the	right	and	left	AI	and	PI	function	is	still	 incomplete,	particularly	concerning	the	distinction	of	aversive	prediction	error	and	aversive	stimulus	processing	along	the	insula	in	socio-emotional	contexts.		Previous	studies	demonstrated	that	insula	activity	can	be	targeted	by	manipulating	the	social	context	in	the	framework	of	aversive	emotional	processing	(Eisenberger,	2013;	Eisenberger	et	al.,	2011;	Younger,	Aron,	Parke,	Chatterjee,	&	Mackey,	2010).	Combining	 this	with	an	established	Pavlovian	conditioning	paradigm	with	varying	conditioned-unconditioned	 stimulus	 contingencies,	 the	 current	 study	 investigated	whether	the	social	presence	of	a	trustworthy	other	would	target	AI	and	PI	regions	differently,	 by	modulating	 different	 types	 of	 activity	 in	 the	 insula	 subregions.	We	hypothesized	that	a	change	in	the	social	context	from	‘alone’	to	 ‘social’	would	only	affect	 stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	 PI	 (but	 not	 AI),	 while	 only	 modulating	
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prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	AI	(and	not	PI)	(Craig,	2009;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Seth,	 2013).	 We	 further	 expected	 that	 the	 latter	 effect	 would	 be	 differentially	associated	with	social	context	effects	on	learning	performance	in	the	right	and	left	AI,	due	to	the	involvement	of	right	and	left	AI	in	aversive	and	positive	emotions,	and	the	 control	 of	 the	 sympathetic	 and	 the	 parasympathetic	 nervous	 systems,	respectively	(Craig,	2009;	2005;	2010).		
Materials	and	Methods	
Participants	Twenty-two	 healthy	 subjects	 (all	 female,	mean	 age	 =	 24.8	 years,	 SD	 =	 2.4	 years)	participated	 in	 the	 experiment,	 all	 native	 German	 speakers,	 right-handed,	 with	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	vision,	and	no	history	of	neurological	or	psychiatric	disorders,	 or	 intake	 of	 psychotropic	medication.	 Two	 participants	 were	 excluded	from	further	analysis	due	to	excessive	head	movement	during	imaging	(translation	>	 2	 mm,	 rotation	 >	 2°),	 and	 another	 two	 due	 to	 inadequate	 performance	 in	 the	learning	 task.	 Owing	 to	 previous	 reports	 of	 gender	 differences	 regarding	 socio-emotional	 processing,	 only	 female	 subjects	 were	 tested	 (Eagly	 &	 Wood,	 2013;	McRae,	 Ochsner,	Mauss,	 Gabrieli,	 &	 Gross,	 2008;	 Nolen-Hoeksema,	 2012;	Whittle,	Yücel,	 Yap,	 &	 Allen,	 2011).	 After	 completion,	 participants	 received	 a	 financial	reward	for	their	participation.	Written	informed	consent	from	all	participants	was	obtained	 and	 the	 study	 was	 approved	 by	 a	 local	 ethics	 committee	 (Technische	Universitaet	Muenchen).	
	
Experimental	Design	and	Tasks	The	conditioning	paradigm	closely	resembled	that	of	a	previous	study	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).	A	trial	started	with	a	fixation	cross	(1	s),	after	which	the	 ‘Instruction’	was	 presented:	 the	word	 ‘Attend’	 for	 trials	without	 a	 psychotherapist	 (Alone;	 2s)	and	a	video	of	a	psychotherapist	 for	supportive	social	presence	trials	(Social;	5	s).	Then,	 a	 CS	 (blue	 square	 or	 yellow	pentagon)	was	 presented	 (6	 s)	 and	during	 the	first	3	s	of	CS	presentation,	participants	indicated	whether	a	negative	picture	or	no	picture	would	follow	the	CS	via	a	button	press.	The	US	(6	s)	was	a	negative	picture	from	the	International	Affective	Picture	System	(Lang,	Bradley,	&	Cuthbert,	2008),	shown	on	50%	of	the	trials	(Paired	trials).	The	picture	set	was	balanced	for	arousal	
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and	 valence	 across	 Alone	 and	 Social	 conditions.	 Next,	 participants	 had	 3	 s	 to	indicate	their	emotional	state	via	a	button	press	on	a	scale	from	-3	to	3	(increments	of	1;	set	to	0	on	each	trial).	The	inter-trial	interval	lasted	for	4	±	2	s.	Analysis	of	the	current	 study	 focused	 on	 brain	 activity	 during	 US	 presentation,	 i.e.,	 during	 the	induction	of	aversive	emotions.	Each	participant	completed	both	Alone	and	Social	runs,	on	different	days,	with	the	run	order	counterbalanced	across	subjects.		The	Social	run	was	inspired	by	previous	studies	on	social	support	(Coan,	Schaefer,	&	Davidson,	2006;	Eisenberger	et	al.,	2011;	Younger	et	al.,	2010),	but	was	adapted	to	resemble	 a	 more	 realistic	 social	 interaction	 with	 an	 unknown	 but	 trustworthy	individual.	 Each	 trial	 in	 the	 Social	 run	 started	 with	 a	 5	 s	 video	 of	 a	 female	psychotherapist	 (G.S.),	 whom	 participants	 briefly	met	 and	 interacted	with	 before	the	experiment.	She	wore	 the	exact	same	clothes	and	haircut	as	 in	 the	videos	and	participants	 were	 told	 that	 sitting	 in	 the	 scanner-adjacent	 room,	 the	psychotherapist	will	have	the	opportunity	to	briefly	speak	to	them	at	the	beginning	of	each	trial.	Her	‘instructions’	were	variations	of	the	phrases	‘Please	attend	to	the	pictures.’	and	‘Do	not	try	to	alter	your	emotions	when	looking	at	the	pictures.’	At	the	end	of	the	experiment	(after	both	runs),	participants	filled	out	a	short	post-scanning	interview,	which	confirmed	that	all	participants	believed	our	cover	story	regarding	the	 online	 presence	 of	 the	 psyhotherapist.	 In	 the	 Alone	 run,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	prompted	 by	 the	 word	 ‘Attend’,	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 images	they	were	presented	with	without	 actively	 trying	 to	 change	 the	evoked	emotions.	Both	Alone	and	Social	runs	thus	resembled	an	‘attend’	or	‘no	regulation’	condition	of	a	typical	emotion	regulation	experiment.			The	 two	experimental	 runs	(Alone	and	Social)	consisted	of	80	 trials	each,	with	an	equal	proportion	(40	trials)	of	CS1	and	CS2	trials.	A	pseudorandom	CS	event	train	was	used	and	the	same	CS	could	not	occur	on	more	than	two	consecutive	trials.	An	average	reinforcement	probability	of	50%	resulted	in	40	Paired	and	40	non-Paired	trials	in	each	run.	Furthermore,	CS1	and	CS2	were	followed	by	an	equal	number	of	Paired	trials	(i.e.,	20)	in	each	run.	The	sine	waves	were	used	as	threshold	functions	fort	 the	 trial	 sequence.	 A	 trial	was	 Paired	 or	 non-Paired	when	 a	 random	number	
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drawn	 from	 the	 amplitude	 range	 was	 below	 or	 above	 the	 threshold	 function,	respectively.		The	 CS-US	 contingency	 fluctuated	 throughout	 each	 run	 (low-frequency	 sine-wave	function,	with	1.75	and	1.5	cycles	for	CS1	and	CS2,	respectively)	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).	The	phase	between	the	two	sine	functions	was	shifted	by	96°	so	that	each	CS	predicted	US	occurrence	with	a	different	probability	at	each	time	point.	Participants	were	 told	 that	 the	 two	 symbols	 (whose	 assignment	 to	 a	 particular	 CS-US	contingency	was	counterbalanced	across	participants)	predicted	US	occurence	with	different	probabilities,	 and	 that	 they	 should	keep	 in	mind	 that	 these	probabilities	could	change	throughout	the	run.	With	this	in	mind,	they	were	asked	to	predict	the	occurrence	of	a	US	after	a	particular	CS,	with	the	CS-US	contingency	systematically	fluctuating	 throughout	 the	 experiment,	 forcing	 participants	 to	 constantly	 adapt	their	predictions.	All	participants	complied	with	experimental	instructions.		
Behavioral	Measures	Learning	 performance	 scores	 were	 calculated	 as	 subject-specific	 correlations	between	predicted	and	actual	outcomes	across	trials	for	each	condition.	Emotional	intensity	ratings,	 in	contrast,	were	 feeling	scores	gathered	at	 the	end	of	each	trial.	The	two	behavioral	measures	were	subjected	to	paired	t-tests,	comparing	Alone	and	Social	 conditions.	 More	 importantly,	 the	 two	 measures	 were	 used	 for	 testing	associations	 between	 brain-	 and	 behavior-related	 changes	 induced	 by	 a	 social	context	change.		
Computational	Model	Aversive	predictions	(aPs)	and	aPEs	were	computed	based	on	the	Rescorla	Wagner	(RW)	 rule	 (Rescorla	 &	 Wagner,	 1972).	 For	 a	 trial	 t,	 aPE	 was	 calculated	 as	 a	difference	between	the	actual	outcome	R(t)	and	the	predicted	outcome	aP(t):	
aPE(t)	=	R(T)	–	aP(t)	×	U(t)		In	turn,	predicted	outcome	for	the	next	trial	aP(t+1),	was	updated	by	adding	aPE	of	the	current	trial	aPE(t)	to	aP(t),	weighted	by	a	learning	rate	λ:	
aP(t+1)	=	aP(t)	+	λaPE(t)	×	U(t+1)	
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	Parameter	R	was	set	to	1	when	the	aversive	picture	was	delivered,	and	to	0	when	no	picture	was	shown.	In	turn,	parameter	U	was	used	to	disentangle	CS1	and	CS2	trials.	Specifically,	 to	 calculate	 aP	 and	 aPE	 values	 related	 to	 CS1,	U	was	 set	 to	 1	 on	 CS1	trials,	 and	 to	 0	 on	 CS2	 trials,	 and	 vice	 versa	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 aPs	 and	 aPEs	related	to	CS2	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).		We	 used	 a	 low	 λ	 of	 0.05,	 due	 to	 the	 similarity	 of	 design	 and	 to	 be	 able	 to	meaningfully	 compare	 results	 of	 this	 study	 with	 a	 recent	 study	 investigating	 the	effects	of	cognitive	emotion	regulation	on	aversive	stimulus-	and	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	brain,	including	AI	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015).		
MRI	Acquisition	Measurements	were	performed	on	a	3T	Siemens	scanner	at	the	Klinikum	rechts	der	Isar,	 Technische	 Universitaet	 Muenchen.	 Visual	 stimuli,	 presented	 with	Presentation	software	(Neurobehavioral	Systems),	were	rear-projected	on	a	screen	at	 scanner	head	and	were	visible	via	an	adjustable	mirror	mounted	 to	a	 standard	head	coil.	Presentation	software	also	received	trigger	pulses	from	the	scanner.		Anatomical	 images	 were	 acquired	 with	 the	 magnetization-prepared	 rapid	acquisition	 gradient	 echo	 (MP-RAGE)	 T1-weighted	 sequence	 (1	 ×	 1	 ×	 1	 mm	resolution),	 and	 functional	 scans	 with	 the	 contrast-gradient	 echo-planar	 T2*-weighted	sequence	with	a	repetition	time	of	2	s,	echo	time	of	30	ms,	flip	angle	of	90°,	acquisition	matrix	of	64	×	64,	35	slices,	each	3	mm	thick,	with	a	gap	of	0.6	mm,	and	an	in-plane	resolution	of	3	×	3	mm.		
fMRI	Data	Analysis	All	 analyses	 were	 carried	 out	 with	 SPM8	 (Wellcome	 Department	 of	 Cognitive	Neurology,	London,	UK).	The	T2*-weighted	functional	images	were	slice-timed,	then	realigned	to	the	first	image	of	the	first	run	(after	discarding	the	first	two	volumes)	and	unwarped.	T1-weighted	structural	 images	were	coregistered	to	 the	 functional	images,	segmented	and	then	normalized	to	a	standard	T1	template	in	the	Montreal	Neurological	 Institute	(MNI)	space	with	a	1	×	1	×	1	mm	resolution.	Normalization	
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parameters	 from	 the	 latter	 were	 used	 to	 normalize	 the	 functional	 images,	 which	were	then	resampled	to	3	×	3	×	3	mm,	smoothed	with	an	8	mm	full-width-at-half-maximum	Gaussian	filter,	and	temporally	high-pass	filtered	with	a	cut-off	of	128	s.	General	linear	model	(GLM)-based	statistical	analysis	with	the	following	regressors	was	performed:	a)	hemodynamic	response	function	(HRF)-convolved	onsets	of	CS1,	CS2,	US-Paired,	US-nonPaired,	Regulation	Instructions,	and	Valence	Scale;	b)	aP	and	aPE	values	derived	from	the	RW	rule	as	parametric	modulations	(PM)	of	the	onset	regressors:	aP1	and	aP2	as	PM	of	CS1	and	CS2	onsets,	respectively,	plus	aPE-Paired	and	aPE-nonPaired	as	PM	of	US-Paired	and	US-nonPaired	onsets,	respectively;	and	c)	 6	movement	 regressors	 derived	 from	 realignment	 as	 regressors	 of	 no	 interest.	Analysis	 of	 the	 current	 study	 focused	 on	 Paired	 trials	 only,	 (Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	2015).		Based	on	 the	hypothesis	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	social	 context	would	affect	different	types	 of	 activity	 in	 insula	 subregions	 during	 aversive	 conditioning,	 a	 ROI-based	analysis	 focused	 on	 AI	 and	 PI	 was	 carried	 out.	 The	 two	 right	 insula	 ROIs	 were	spheres	centered	on	coordinates	from	previous	studies,	with	a	radius	of	8	mm.	The	right	AI	ROI	central	coordinate	(x	=	40,	y	=	24,	z	=	 -8)	was	 taken	 from	a	study	on	aversive	 PE-related	 activity	 in	 the	 AI	 (Pessiglione	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 while	 the	 PI	 ROI	coordinate	 (x	=	45,	y	=	 -20,	z	=	16)	was	 taken	 from	a	study	 in	which	PI	 stimulus-related	 activity	 was	 suppressed	 by	 social	 context	 in	 the	 context	 of	 aversive	emotional	processing	(Younger	et	al.,	2010).	The	two	left	insula	ROIs	were	spheres	with	a	radius	of	8	mm,	reflecting	right	AI	and	PI	coordinates.	The	left	AI	ROI	central	coordinate	(x	=	-40,	y	=	24,	z	=	-8)	was	a	left-sided	‘mirror’	coordinate	of	the	right	AI	coordinate.	The	left	PI	ROI	central	coordinate	(x	=	-41,	y	=	-20,	z	=	16)	was	similarly	a	‘mirror’	coordinate	of	the	right	PI	ROI,	taken	from	the	same	study	as	the	right	PI	ROI	(Younger	et	al.,	2010).		With	 regard	 to	 social	 context	 effects	 on	 the	 two	 types	 of	 brain	 activity,	 a	 similar	pattern	of	results	was	expected	for	the	right	and	left	insula.	We	thus	completed	the	analyses	for	right	and	left	insulae	consecutively.	For	both	AI	and	PI	ROIs	of	one	side,	the	 two	dependent	variables	were	prediction	error-	and	aversive	stimulus-related	blood-oxygen-level	 dependent	 (BOLD)	 activity,	 while	 the	 two	 factors	 were	 Social	
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Context	 (Alone,	 Social)	 and	 Insula	 Subregion	 (AI,	 PI).	 Average	 ß-values	 for	 both	prediction	 error-	 and	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity	 were	 extracted	 from	 the	ROIs	and	subjected	 to	a	2x2	multivariate	analysis	of	variance	 (MANOVA).	The	 left	insula	 MANOVA	 was	 based	 on	 17	 participants,	 after	 removing	 an	 outlier	 (>	 2.5	standard	deviations	for	prediction	error-related	activity).				To	 explore	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 above	 effect	 with	 the	 social	 context	 effect	 on	learning	 performance	 and	 feelings,	 the	 extracted	 ß-values	 from	 the	 right	 and	 left	insula	ROIs	were	additionally	subjected	to	correlations	with	behavioral	scores	(i.e.,	learning	performance	and	emotional	intensity	ratings).		
Results	
Social	Context	Affects	Distinct	Types	of	Activity	in	the	AI	and	PI	Subregions	of	the	
Right	and	Left	Insula	Motivated	 by	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 social	 context	 would	 affect	different	types	of	activity	in	the	right	and	left	insula	subregions,	we	carried	out	two	2x2	MANOVAs,	 with	 two	 dependent	 variables	 –aversive	 stimulus-	 and	 prediction	error-related	 BOLD	 activity.	 Focusing	 on	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	right	insula,	MANOVA	revealed	a	significant	main	effect	of	Social	Context	(F	=	8.07,	p	=	 0.011)	 and	 Insula	 Subregion	 (F	 =	 14.21,	 p	 =	 0.002).	 Crucially,	 there	 was	 a	significant	 interaction	 between	 the	 two	 factors	 (F	 =	 8.10,	 p	 =	 0.011),	 such	 that	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	was	differentially	affected	by	social	context	in	the	right	 AI	 and	 PI.	 Planned	 t-tests	 revealed	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 psychotherapist	affected	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	only	in	the	right	PI	(t	=	-3.33,	p	=	0.002)	but	not	in	the	right	AI	(t	=	0.06,	p	=	0.475),	as	expected	(Figure	1A	left).		Results	for	the	left	insula	were	analogous	to	those	of	the	right	insula.	Concentrating	on	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity,	 the	 left	 insula-focused	 MANOVA	 revealed	 a	significant	main	effect	of	Social	Context	(F	=	12.10,	p	=	0.003)	and	Insula	Subregion	(F	=	16.72,	p	=	0.001).	Crucially,	there	was	a	significant	interaction	between	the	two	factors	(F	=	9.87,	p	=	0.006),	such	that	aversive	stimulus-related	BOLD	activity	was	differentially	affected	by	social	context	in	the	left	AI	and	PI.	Planned	t-tests	revealed	that	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 psychotherapist	 affected	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity	
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only	in	the	left	PI	(t	=	-4.07,	p	=	0.0004)	but	not	in	the	left	AI	(t	=	-0.07,	p	=	0.472),	as	expected	(Figure	1B	left).		
	
Figure	 1.	The	 effect	 of	 social	 context	 on	 the	 right	 and	 left	AI	 and	PI	 activity.	 (A)	 Social	 Context	 ×	Insula	Subregion	interaction	pattern	for	the	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	(left)	and	the	aversive	prediction	 error-related	 activity	 (right)	 of	 the	 right	 insula.	 (B)	 Social	 Context	 ×	 Insula	 Subregion	interaction	pattern	for	the	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	(left)	and	the	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	(right)	of	the	left	insula.	*	p	<	0.05;	n.s.	–	non-significant.		
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Focusing	on	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	right	insula,	the	MANOVA	revealed	a	significant	interaction	between	the	two	factors	Social	Context	and	Insula	Subregion	(F	=	4.91,	p	=	0.041),	such	that	prediction	error-related	BOLD	activity	was	differentially	affected	by	social	context	in	the	AI	and	PI.	Planned	t-tests	revealed	that	the	presence	of	a	psychotherapist	affected	prediction	error-related	activity	only	in	the	AI	(t	=	2.25,	p	=	0.019)	but	not	in	the	PI	(t	=	-1.18,	p	=	0.128),	as	hypothesized	(Figure	1A	right).		The	 result	was	 consistent	 in	 the	 left	 insula.	 Concentrating	 on	 aversive	 prediction	error-related	 activity,	 the	 left	 insula-focused	 MANOVA	 revealed	 a	 trend	 for	 a	significant	interaction	between	the	two	factors	Social	Context	and	Insula	Subregion	(F	=	4.14,	p	=	0.059).	Planned	t-tests	revealed	that	the	presence	of	a	psychotherapist	affected	prediction	error-related	activity	only	in	the	AI	(t	=	2.01,	p	=	0.031)	but	not	in	the	PI	(t	=	-0.71,	p	=	0.244),	as	hypothesized	(Figure	1B	right).		Altogether,	results	confirm	that	a	change	in	the	social	context	from	Alone	to	Social	reduced	only	stimulus-related	activity	in	the	left	and	right	PI,	while	enhancing	only	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	left	and	right	AI.		
Enhanced	Activity	in	the	Right	and	Left	AI	Distinctively	Relates	to	Social	Context-
Induced	Changes	in	Behavioral	Learning	Performance	Paired	 t-tests	 revealed	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 social	 context	 did	 not	 significantly	influence	emotional	intensity	(t	=	1.12,	p	=	0.279)	or	learning	performance	scores	(t	=	 -1.21,	 p	 =	 0.245).	 Following	 our	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 expected	 increase	 of	 AI	activity	in	the	right	and	left	AI	might	be	differentially	associated	with	social	context-induced	 changes	 in	 the	 behavioral	 learning	 performance	 scores,	 we	 correlated	aversive	prediction	error-related	fluctuations	due	to	the	social	context	change	in	the	right	and	left	AI,	respectively,	with	changes	in	behavioral	learning	performance	due	to	social	context.	First	examining	the	right	AI,	correlation	analysis	revealed	that	the	increase	of	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	right	AI	was	positively	correlated	with	 the	 change	 in	 learning	performance	during	 the	 social	 compared	 to	 the	alone	run	 (r	 =	 0.42,	 p	 =	 0.043)	 (Figure	 2A	 center).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 stronger	 the	
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increase	 of	 prediction-error	 activity	 in	 the	 right	 AI,	 the	 higher	 the	 learning	performance	during	the	social,	compared	to	the	alone,	session.		
	
Figure	 2.	 Brain-behavior	 correlations	 for	 right	 and	 left	 AI.	 (A)	 The	 effect	 of	 social	 context	 on	 the	prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 right	 AI	 (left)	 was	 positively	 correlated	 with	 learning	performance	change	during	the	social	run,	compared	to	the	alone	run	(center),	but	did	not	correlate	with	 emotional	 intensity	 ratings	 (right).	 (B)	 The	 effect	 of	 social	 context	 on	 the	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 left	 AI	 (left)	 was	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 learning	 performance	 change	during	 the	 social	 run,	 compared	 to	 the	 alone	 run	 (center),	 but	 did	 not	 correlate	 with	 emotional	intensity	ratings	(right).	*	p	<	0.05;	n.s.	–	non-significant;	AI	–	anterior	insula.		Focusing	on	the	left	AI,	correlation	analysis	revealed	that	the	increase	of	prediction	error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 left	 AI	 was	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 the	 change	 in	learning	performance	during	the	social	run	(r	=	-0.59,	p	=	0.005;	Figure	2B	center),	showing	an	opposite	correlation	to	that	of	the	right-sided	AI	(Figure	2A	center).	In	other	words,	while	 the	 stronger	activity	 in	 the	 right	AI	was	 related	 to	a	 relatively	higher	 aversive	 learning-related	 performance,	 the	 stronger	 activity	 in	 the	 left	 AI	was	related	to	a	relatively	lower	aversive	learning-related	performance	during	the	social	session,	in	contrast	to	the	alone	session.			To	 test	whether	 correlations	with	AI	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 fluctuations	were	 specific	 to	 learning	 performance	 scores,	 a	 similar	 correlation	 analysis	 was	
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carried	out	on	emotional	intensity	ratings.	The	correlation	analysis	relating	changes	in	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	with	emotional	 intensity	 fluctuations	due	 to	social	context	change	revealed	no	significant	correlations	for	either	the	right	AI	(r	=	-0.22,	p	=	0.186;	Figure	2A	right)	or	the	left	AI	(r	=	-0.05,	p	=	0.426;	Figure	2B	right).		To	 further	specify	whether	social	context-induced	activity	 fluctuations	 in	the	right	and	 left	 AI	 were	 indeed	 specifically	 differentially	 correlated	 with	 behavioral	learning	 performance	 changes	 and	 were	 not	 directly	 negatively	 related	 to	 each	other,	we	correlated	the	prediction	error-related	activity	fluctuations	due	to	social	context	 change	 of	 the	 right	 AI	 with	 that	 of	 the	 left	 AI.	 The	 correlation	 was	 not	significant,	 r	 =	 0.17,	 p	 =	 0.257),	 showing	 that	 social	 context-induced	 activity	increases	in	the	right	and	left	AI	were	not	related	to	each	other.		Altogether,	results	confirm	a	differential	association	between	activity	changes	in	the	right	 and	 left	 AI	 and	 behavioral	 learning	 performance	 fluctuations	 due	 to	 social	context	 change.	 The	 stronger	 the	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 right	 AI	during	 the	 social	 session,	 compared	 to	 the	alone	session,	 the	 relatively	higher	 the	learning	performance	during	the	social	in	contrast	to	the	alone	run.	In	contrast,	the	stronger	 the	 social	 context-induced	prediction	error-related	activity	 in	 the	 left	AI,	the	 lower	 the	 learning	 performance	 during	 the	 social,	 compared	 to	 the	 alone,	session.		
Discussion	The	 current	 study	 investigated	 neural	 mechanisms	 supporting	 socio-emotional	processing	 in	 the	 insula	 subregions	 by	way	 of	manipulating	 social	 context	 during	aversive	 conditioning.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 study	 focused	 on	 the	 question	 of	whether	a	change	in	the	social	context	from	‘alone’	to	‘social’	would	affect	AI	and	PI	differently,	 by	 targeting	 distinct	 types	 of	 aversive	 emotional	 activity	 in	 the	 two	regions,	 and	 the	 right	 and	 left	 AI	 differently,	 in	 line	 with	 their	 differential	involvement	 in	 aversive	 and	 positive	 emotions,	 respectively.	 Results	 point	 to	 a	three-fold	dissociation	between	brain	signal	types,	insula	sub-regions,	and	right	and	left	 AI.	 1)	 In	 both	 right	 and	 left	 insula	 sub-parts,	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	was	affected	by	the	social	context	in	the	AI	but	not	the	PI,	while	aversive	stimulus-
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related	activity	was	changed	by	the	social	context	in	the	PI	but	not	the	AI	(Figure	1).	The	 finding	 highlights	 a	 double	 dissociation	 between	 signal	 types	 and	 insula	subregions	(Craig,	2009;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Lamm	&	Singer,	2010;	Seth,	2013).	2)	The	change	 in	 learning	performance	due	to	social	context	was	differentially	correlated	with	the	right	and	left	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	increase	during	the	social	session,	 compared	 to	 the	 alone	 session	 (Figure	 2).	 The	 higher	 the	 social	 context-induced	 enhancement	 of	 right	 AI	 prediction	 error-related	 activity,	 the	 better	 the	learning	performance	during	the	social,	in	comparison	to	the	alone	run.	In	contrast,	the	more	left	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	increased	during	the	social	run,	the	worse	 the	 social	 learning	 performance.	 The	 finding	 illuminates	 the	 negative-positive	 affect	 dissociation	 between	 right	 and	 left	 AI,	 respectively	 (Craig,	 2009;	2005;	 2010).	 In	 summary,	manipulating	 the	 social	 context,	 the	 current	 study	was	able	to	reveal	differences	 in	the	underlying	mechanisms	of	posterior	and	anterior,	as	well	as	right	and	left	insula	subregions.		
Social	 Context	 Specifically	 Affects	 Aversive	 Stimulus-Related	 Activity	 in	 the	 PI	
and	Aversive	Prediction	Error-Related	Activity	in	the	AI	A	 change	 in	 the	 social	 context	 from	 ‘alone’	 to	 ‘social’	 affected	 aversive	 stimulus-related	activity	in	the	bilateral	PI	but	not	AI	(Figures	1A	left	&	1B	left,	for	right	and	left	insula,	respectively),	while	modulating	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	in	 the	 AI	 but	 not	 the	 PI	 (Figures	 1A	 right	 &	 1B	 right,	 for	 right	 and	 left	 insula,	respectively),	 as	 hypothesized.	 Results	 support	 and	 extend	 previous	work	 on	 the	posterior-to-anterior	gradient	in	the	insula,	which	posits	that	posterior	parts	of	the	insula	 mostly	 support	 primary	 representations	 of	 interoceptive	 states	 associated	with	experiencing	salient	events,	such	as	pain	or	risk	(Singer	et	al.,	2006,	2009;	Xue	et	al.,	2010),	while	anterior	parts	support	higher-order	 integrated	representations	of	feelings,	also	expressed	as	aversive	prediction	errors	(Craig,	2009;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Lamm	&	Singer,	2010;	Seth,	2013).		Correspondingly,	 current	 results	 show	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 social	 context	specifically	affected	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	in	the	bilateral	PI	(Figures	1A	
left	 &	 1B	 left,	 for	 right	 and	 left	 insula,	 respectively).	 Based	 on	 the	 general	 linear	model,	stimulus-related	activity	reflected	a	consistent	activation	in	the	region	every	
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time	a	negative	picture	was	presented,	and	thus	likely	represents	activity	related	to	primary	 representations	 of	 interoceptive	 states	 and	 negative	 feelings	 associated	with	 the	 shown	 aversive	 pictures,	 in	 line	 with	 previous	 accounts	 of	 functional	specialization	of	the	PI	(Bauernfeind	et	al.,	2013;	Craig,	2009;	2003;	2010;	Menon	&	Uddin,	2010).		In	 further	 correspondence	 with	 the	 posterior-to-anterior	 insula	 gradient,	 social	context	change	in	the	current	study	specifically	affected	aversive	prediction	error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 (ventral)	 AI	 (Figures	 1A	 right	 &	 1B	 right,	 for	 right	 and	 left	insula,	 respectively).	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 stimulus-related	 activity,	 based	 on	 the	general	 linear	 model,	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 represents	 a	 parametric	modulation	of	 the	aversive	stimulus	onset,	and	thus	reflects	activity	related	to	the	mismatch	between	a	prior	expectation	of	seeing	an	aversive	picture	on	the	next	trial	and	 the	 reality	 of	 such	 a	 picture	 being	 present	 or	 absent	 on	 the	 said	 trial	 (Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015;	Ouden	et	al.,	2012;	Schultz	&	Dickinson,	2000).	The	association	of	AI	with	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	confirms	previous	accounts	of	aversive	 prediction	 error	 encoding	 within	 the	 (ventral)	 AI	 in	 the	 context	 of	associative	learning	(Garrison	et	al.,	2013;	Kim	et	al.,	2006;	Pessiglione	et	al.,	2006;	Seymour	et	al.,	2004).			The	 current	 findings	 can	 also	 be	 considered	 from	 the	 predictive	 coding	 account	(Clark,	2013;	Friston,	2005;	2009).	Predictive	coding	models	see	prediction	error-based	processing	as	the	universal	computation	of	the	layered	cortex,	such	that	the	cortex	 is	 viewed	as	organized	 in	 a	hierarchical	 fashion,	with	every	 level	 (or	brain	region)	 containing	 two	 types	 of	 units	 –	 prediction	 error	 units	 and	 representation	units	 (Clark,	 2013;	 Friston,	 2005;	 2009).	 The	 representation	 units	 provide	predictions,	based	on	a	complex	model	of	the	world,	to	hierarchically	 lower	areas,	thus	representing	feedback	signals.	The	latter	are	compared	with	the	feed-forward	signals	 (i.e.,	 prediction	 error	 signals	 from	 the	 preceding	 level)	 by	 the	 prediction	error	units	at	every	level	(Clark,	2013;	Friston,	2005;	2009).	The	predictive	coding	account	 thus	proposes	 that	 two	 types	 of	 activity	 –	 prediction	 error-	 and	 stimulus	representation-related	 activity	 –	 should	 be	 present	 in	 every	 region	 of	 the	 brain,	including	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 insula.	 In	 this	 framework,	 results	 of	 our	 study	
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suggest	 that	 social	 context	 specifically	 targets	 prediction	 error	 ‘units’	 in	 the	 AI,	while	selectively	affecting	the	representation	‘units’	in	the	PI.	Further	studies	could	help	 investigate	 the	 existence	 and	 functional	 properties	 of	 prediction	 error	 and	representation	‘units’	in	the	insula	subregions.		
The	 Social	 Context	 Effects	 on	 Insular	 Activity	 Resemble	 those	 of	 Cognitive	
Emotion	Regulation	A	change	in	the	social	context	did	not	only	affect	different	types	of	brain	activity	in	the	bilateral	AI	and	PI,	but	in	fact	modulated	the	two	activity	types	in	opposite	ways.	The	shift	from	‘alone’	to	‘social’	in	the	current	study,	or	in	other	words	from	being	by	 yourself	 to	 being	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 trustworthy	 but	 newly	 acquainted	individual,	 suppressed	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	 PI,	 but	 enhanced	aversive	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 AI	 (Figure	 1).	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	that	the	effects	of	social	presence	seem	to	resemble	those	of	self-administered	cognitive	 emotion	 regulation.	 In	 a	 recent	 study,	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	enhanced	aversive	prediction	error	activity	in	a	range	of	areas,	including	the	ventral	insula,	but	suppressed	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	 in	an	extended	emotional	brain	 network,	 including	 the	 posterior	 dorsal	 insular	 cortex	 (Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	2015).		The	 correspondence	 between	 simple	 social	 presence	 effects	 and	 the	 impact	 of	cognitive	emotion	regulation	in	the	insula	is	striking,	especially	considering	that	the	social	session	in	the	current	study	resembled	a	‘no	regulation’	or	‘attend’	condition	of	 a	 typical	 emotion	 regulation	 experiment,	 including	 the	 above-mentioned	 study	(Mulej	Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 It	 implies	 that	 a	 supportive	presence	of	 a	 trustworthy	individual,	 even	 if	 previously	 unknown,	 can	 have	 a	 powerful	 effect	 on	 the	 insula	activity,	resembling	that	of	cognitive	emotion	regulation,	a	highly	effective	strategy	of	emotion	control	(Ochsner,	Silvers,	&	Buhle,	2012).	This	is	 in	line	with	the	social	baseline	 theory,	 which	 posits	 that	 social	 proximity	 of	 trusting	 others	 reduces	threatening	 feelings,	 resembling	 cognitive	 affect	 regulation	without	 the	 additional	use	 of	 cognitive	 control	 systems	 (Beckes	 &	 Coan,	 2011;	 Coan	 &	 Sbarra,	 2015).	Moreover,	a	change	in	the	social	context	further	modulated	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	AI	due	to	changed	primary	representations	of	interoceptive	states	in	
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response	 to	 aversive	 stimuli,	 as	 indexed	 by	 the	 PI	 activity	 fluctuations.	 This	 is	 in	good	 agreement	 with	 the	 posterior-to-anterior	 insula	 gradient	 account,	 which	underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 AI	 in	 integrating	 PI’s	 representations	 of	 sensations	and	homeostatic	states	to	salient	stimuli	into	higher-order	cognitive	processes,	such	as	aversive	conditioning	(Bauernfeind	et	al.,	2013;	Menon	&	Uddin,	2010).			
	
Differential	Relationships	Between	AI	Activity	Increase	and	Behavioral	Learning	
Performance	Change	Point	to	Right-Left	AI	Differences.	Results	 show	 that	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 was	 consistently	 increased	 by	the	social	context	change	in	both	right	and	left	AI	(Figures	2A	left	&	2B	left	for	right	and	 left	 insula,	 respectively).	 To	 examine	 potential	 hemispheric	 differences,	supported	 by	 the	 differential	 involvement	 or	 right	 and	 left	 insula	 sub-parts	 in	aversive	 and	 positive	 emotions,	 respectively,	 the	 increase	 of	 right	 AI	 activity	was	correlated	with	 the	 subject-specific	 learning	performance	 changes	 induced	by	 the	social	context.	The	 increase	of	prediction	error-related	activity	 in	 the	right	AI	was	associated	with	an	increase	in	learning	performance	during	the	social,	compared	to	the	alone,	session	(Figure	2A	center),	while	the	increase	of	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	left	AI	was	associated	with	a	decrease	in	learning	performance	during	the	social	session,	 in	contrast	 to	 the	alone	one	(Figure	2B	center).	The	association	between	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	and	learning	performance	was	specific,	as	 corresponding	 associations	 with	 changes	 in	 emotional	 rating	 scores	 were	 not	significant	(Figure	2).		Results	 are	 well	 aligned	 with	 Craig’s	 account	 of	 left-right	 AI	 asymmetry,	 which	states	 that	 left	 and	 right	 AI	 are	 typically	 co-activated	 yet	 seem	 to	 be	 involved	 in	positive	 and	 negative	 affect	 and	 in	 the	 control	 of	 the	 parasympathetic	 and	sympathetic	 autonomous	 system,	 respectively	 (Craig,	 2009;	 2005;	 2010).	Correspondingly,	current	results	demonstrate	that	on	average,	both	left	and	right	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	was	increased	with	social	context	change,	but	that	the	 level	 of	 increase	 was	 associated	 with	 an	 increased	 aversive	 learning	performance	in	the	right	AI	and	a	decreased	learning	of	aversive	associations	in	the	left	AI,	 in	 line	with	both	negative-positive	affect	and	sympathetic-parasympathetic	control	 asymmetry	 for	 right	 and	 left	 AI,	 respectively.	 We	 additionally	 tested	
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whether	 the	 social	 context-related	 increases	 of	 both	 right	 and	 left	 AI	 aversive	prediction	 error-related	 activations	 were	 related	 to	 each	 other	 via	 correlation	analysis	and	did	not	find	a	significant	association.	The	result	indicates	that	the	social	impact	on	AI	prediction	error-related	activity	 increase	 is	 independent	 for	 left	 and	right	 AI.	 Assuming	 that	 the	 increase	 of	 prediction	 error-related	 AI	 activity	 is	relevant	 for	 controlling	 the	 autonomous	 nervous	 system,	 the	 result	 suggests	 that	social	 context	 influences	 such	 control	 of	 the	 parasympathetic	 and	 sympathetic	nervous	systems	independently,	with	independent	effects	on	learning	performance.		
Conclusion	Drawing	on	the	posterior-to-anterior	insula	gradient	account,	the	current	study	was	able	 to	demonstrate	a	 three-fold	dissociation	between	AI	and	PI,	 left	and	right	AI,	and	 two	 distinct	 brain	 activity	 types,	 induced	 by	 the	 social	 context.	 While	 the	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	was	affected	by	the	change	from	‘alone’	to	‘social’	only	 in	 the	 PI,	 the	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 was	 affected	 only	 in	 the	 AI;	furthermore,	 the	AI	 activity	 increase	was	differentially	 associated	with	behavioral	learning	performance	scores	for	the	right	and	left	AI	parts.	The	study	provides	new	insights	 into	 how	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 trustworthy	 other	 can	 affect	 distinct	 types	 of	emotional	activity	in	insula	subregions,	while	also	contributing	a	novel	paradigm	to	study	the	effects	of	social	context	on	emotional	brain	activity.		
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6	
General	Discussion:	An	Extended	
Account	of	Emotion	Regulation	
	The	 current	 thesis	 aimed	 to	 extend	 the	 concept	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	 re-evaluating	 both	 the	 emotion	 and	 the	 regulation	 parts	 of	 the	 concept	 as	 it	 is	conventionally	viewed.	To	achieve	this	aim,	four	projects	were	conducted,	the	first	two	 focused	on	the	emotion,	and	the	second	two	centred	on	the	regulation	part	of	emotion	 regulation.	 The	 General	 Discussion	 section	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	studies,	their	findings	and	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	them.	The	first	part	of	the	section	summarises	main	findings	and	relates	them	to	the	current	state	of	the	literature,	 separately	 touching	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 emotion	 and	 the	 extension	 of	
regulation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 emotion	 regulation.	 To	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	account	 of	 the	 findings	 and	how	 they	 relate	 to	 each	other,	 the	 second	part	 of	 the	section	provides	an	additional	analysis	of	similarities	and	differences	in	the	relevant	effects	across	projects.	The	 third	part	of	 the	General	Discussion	section	 includes	a	critical	 analysis	 of	 important	 methodological	 issues,	 while	 the	 fourth	 part	 offers	suggestions	for	future	research.	The	section	finishes	with	a	conclusion.		
6.1	Key	Findings	and	Their	Implications	for	Emotion	Regulation	To	address	 the	aims	of	 the	 current	 thesis,	 four	 separate	projects	were	 conducted,	resulting	 in	 four	 original	 research	 manuscripts:	 1)	 Cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	enhances	 aversive	 prediction	 error	 activity	 while	 reducing	 emotional	 responses	(Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2015);	2)	Cognitive	emotion	regulation	modulates	the	balance	of	 competing	 influences	 on	 ventral	 striatal	 aversive	 prediction	 error	 signals	(unpublished);	 3)	 How	 do	 you	 make	 me	 feel	 better?	 Social	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 and	 the	 default	mode	 network	 (Xie,	Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2016);	 and	 4)	Social	context	affects	distinct	types	of	emotional	activity	in	subregions	of	the	human	insula	 (unpublished).	While	 projects	 1	 and	 2	 extend	 the	 emotion	 part	 of	 emotion	regulation,	projects	3	and	4	expand	the	regulation	part.	The	current	section	includes	
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a	summary	of	key	findings	and	how	they	relate	to	the	current	state	of	the	field.	The	first	part	of	the	section	focuses	on	main	results	of	projects	1	and	2,	while	the	second	part	discusses	findings	of	projects	3	and	4.		
6.1.1	Extending	the	Emotion	Part	of	Emotion	Regulation	In	 the	context	of	emotion	regulation,	emotions	are	primarily	seen	as	responses	 to	stimuli	 in	 the	 environment	 (Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	consider	that	emotions	have	other	important	roles,	including	that	of	motivating	our	actions	 (Izard,	 2009;	 Lang	 &	 Bradley,	 2010).	 With	 the	 aim	 of	 incorporating	 the	motivating	aspect	of	emotions	into	the	theory	of	emotion	regulation	(see	section	1.2	
Emotion,	Motivation	and	Prediction	Errors),	 projects	 1	 and	 2	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	examined	whether	emotion	regulation	modulates	not	only	emotional	responses,	but	also	affects	the	brain	signal	for	motivated	behaviour	–	the	prediction	error	signal.		
Project	 1	 (Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 set	 out	 to	 directly	 compare	 the	 influence	 of	cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 on	 aversive	 prediction	 error-related,	 in	 contrast	 to	aversive	response-related,	activity	across	the	whole	brain.	In	the	study,	participants	employed	 a	 reappraisal	 strategy	 of	 self-distancing	 while	 being	 exposed	 to	 an	aversive	 Pavlovian	 learning	 paradigm	 involving	 highly	 arousing	 and	 aversive	pictures	as	unconditioned	stimuli.	This	was	contrasted	with	the	condition	in	which	participants	 simply	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	 stimuli,	 without	 trying	 to	 change	 their	emotions	in	any	way.		Results	 demonstrated,	 firstly,	 that	 emotion	 regulation	 indeed	 reduced	 subjective	emotional	 feelings,	 as	well	 as	 emotional	 response-related	 brain	 activity	 in	 a	wide	network	of	brain	regions,	including	the	insula,	hippocampus,	ventral	tegmental	area	and	 periaqueductal	 gray.	 The	 higher	 the	 regulation	 success	 (i.e.,	 suppression	 of	negative	feelings),	the	stronger	the	reduction	of	aversive	response-related	activity,	indicating	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 latter	 effect	 for	 emotion	 regulation.	 Secondly,	 and	most	importantly,	the	study	showed	that	emotion	regulation	also	affected	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity,	such	that	this	activity	was	enhanced	in	the	ventral	tegmental	 area,	 ventral	 striatum,	 ventral	 insula	 and	 hippocampus.	 The	worse	 the	participants’	 learning	 performance	 during	 reappraisal,	 the	 stronger	 the	
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enhancement	 of	 aversive	 prediction	 error	 activity,	 suggesting	 a	 meaningful	relationship	 between	 the	 behavioural	 and	 the	 neural	 effects	 of	 reappraisal	 on	motivational	 learning.	 Interestingly,	 the	 effects	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 on	 aversive	response-	 and	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	overlapped	 in	 the	ventral	tegmental	area,	insula	and	hippocampus,	implying	a	shared	regulatory	source.	Last	but	not	least,	a	ventral	PFC	cluster,	one	of	three	involved	in	regulation	in	this	study,	increased	its	connectivity	with	the	ventral	tegmental	area	during	reappraisal,	with	the	effect	being	related	to	the	learning	performance	change	during	regulation.		All-in-all,	project	1	of	this	thesis	extends	the	emotion	concept	of	emotion	regulation,	by	 showing	 that	 emotion	 regulation	 influences	 not	 only	 emotional	 responses,	 but	also	the	brain	signal	related	to	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions	–	the	prediction	error	 signal.	 The	 effect	 of	 reappraisal	 on	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 was	centred	 on	 the	 ventral	 tegmental	 area,	 also	 considered	 the	 source	 of	 prediction	error	 signals	 (Bromberg-Martin,	 Matsumoto,	 &	 Hikosaka,	 2010;	 Matsumoto	 &	Hikosaka,	2009),	ventral	striatum,	ventral	insula	and	hippocampus.		
Project	 2’s	 (unpublished)	 aim	 was	 to	 determine	 whether	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 targets	 the	 network	 of	 motivated	 behaviour	 by	 targeting	 prediction	error-related	input	to	the	ventral	striatum.	As	such,	the	aim	of	project	2	was	similar	to	 that	 of	 project	 1,	 i.e.,	 to	 test	 whether	 emotion	 regulation	 also	 affects	 the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions.	However,	 the	 research	question	was	approached	from	 a	 different	 angle.	 In	 brief,	 we	 took	 an	 established	 model	 of	 motivated	behaviour,	based	on	animal	studies,	and	used	it	to	test	whether	reappraisal,	a	type	of	cognitive	emotion	regulation,	affects	the	influence	of	ventral	striatal	afferents	on	ventral	 striatal	 prediction	 error-related	 activity.	 In	 animal	 models	 of	 motivated	behaviour,	 ventral	 striatum	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 integration	 centre,	 receiving	 and	integrating	 information	 from	 various,	 often	 competing,	 sources	 (i.e.,	 PFC,	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	ventral	tegmental	area)	(Grace	et	al.,	2007;	Pennartz	et	al.,	2009;	2011;	Sesack	&	Grace,	2010).		Combining	 model-based	 fMRI	 and	 psychophysiological	 interaction	 analysis,	 the	study	 was	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 reappraisal	 indeed	 affects	 the	 influence	 of	
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striatal	 afferents	 on	 the	 ventral	 striatal	 prediction	 error	 signals.	 Even	 more,	 the	effect	 was	 related	 to	 participants’	 reappraisal	 ability.	 In	 superior	 regulators,	 the	relative	influence	of	PFC	on	ventral	striatal	prediction	error	activity	was	increased,	while	 the	 impact	 of	 subcortical	 afferents	 (i.e.,	 ventral	 striatum,	 ventral	 tegmental	area	 and	 hippocampus)	 was	 reduced.	 In	 contrast,	 inferior	 regulators	 failed	 to	suppress	the	subcortical	influence	and	instead	showed	a	reduced	impact	of	the	PFC.		Altogether,	 project	 2	 extends	 the	 emotion	 part	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	 showing	that	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 directly	 targets	 the	 network	 of	 motivated	behaviour	 centred	 on	 the	 ventral	 striatum	 and	 its	 inputs,	 representing	 the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions.	Furthermore,	project	2	highlights	the	importance	of	 inter-individual	 differences	 in	 reappraisal	 ability	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	 ventral	striatum	and	the	associated	network	of	motivated	behaviour.		
6.1.2	Extending	the	Regulation	Part	of	Emotion	Regulation	It	 is	 often	 underemphasized	 or	 even	 overlooked	 that	 our	 emotions	 are	 not	 only	regulated	by	ourselves,	but	are	also	influenced,	intentionally	and	unintentionally,	by	others	around	us	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).	As	a	result,	social	emotion	regulation	and	its	neural	underpinnings	remain	largely	unexplored,	despite	the	known	importance	of	social	emotion	regulation	for	both	the	general	well	being	(Clark	et	al.,	1998;	Reeck	et	 al.,	 2015)	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 affective	 disorders	 characterised	 by	 impaired	emotion	 regulation,	 such	 as	 major	 depression	 and	 anxiety	 (Cuijpers	 et	 al.,	 2013;	DeRubeis,	Siegle,	&	Hollon,	2008;	Frewen,	Dozois,	&	Lanius,	2010).	Projects	3	and	4	of	this	thesis	focused	on	the	effects	and	the	neural	underpinnings	of	social	emotion	regulation	 and	 modulation,	 respectively,	 thus	 extending	 the	 regulation	 part	 of	emotion	 regulation	 to	 include	 not	 only	 intrapersonal,	 but	 also	 interpersonal,	 i.e.,	social	emotion	regulation.		
Project	3	of	the	current	thesis	(Xie,	Mulej	Bratec	et	al.,	2016)	aimed	to	explore	the	neural	 underpinnings	 of	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 by	 way	 of	 social	reappraisal.	Participants	met	a	psychotherapist	at	 their	arrival	and	were	 told	 that	she	 could	 communicate	 with	 them	 ‘online’	 throughout	 the	 experiment,	 in	 which	they	were	exposed	to	highly	aversive	pictures.	In	reality,	pre-recorded	videos	were	
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used	at	the	beginning	of	each	trial.	In	half	of	the	trials,	the	therapist	used	reappraisal	to	regulate	participants’	emotions;	in	the	other	half,	she	simply	told	them	to	attend	to	 the	 pictures,	 resembling	 an	 ‘attend’	 or	 no	 regulation	 condition	 of	 a	 typical	emotion	regulation	experiment.		The	 study	 showed	 that	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation	 was	 successful	 at	lowering	 participants’	 negative	 feelings.	 Most	 importantly,	 social	 reappraisal	recruited	dorsolateral	and	dorsomedial	PFC,	orbitofrontal	cortex,	anterior	cingulate,	inferior	parietal	 cortex,	and	precuneus,	 largely	overlapping	with	 the	default	mode	network,	 whose	 areas	 are	 known	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 both	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	 and	 social	 cognitive	 processes	 (Lindquist	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Schilbach	 et	 al.,	2012).	Confirming	that	the	activations	were	indeed	related	to	the	social	regulation	of	 emotion,	 activity	 increases	 in	 the	 left	 inferior	 parietal	 cortex	 and	 precuneus	correlated	 with	 social	 regulation	 success	 (i.e.,	 the	 difference	 in	 feeling	 scores	between	 the	social	 regulation	and	no	regulation	conditions).	 In	contrast,	emotion-related	activity	was	suppressed	by	social	regulation	in	the	bilateral	supramarginal	gyrus,	temporal	and	occipital	cortices,	and	the	left	insula,	consistent	with	previous	emotion	regulation	studies	(Kanske	et	al.,	2011;	McRae	et	al.,	2010).	Results	of	the	study	 further	 showed	 that	 social	 reappraisal	 was	 related	 to	 individual	characteristics	of	social	functioning,	such	that	individual	attachment	security	scores	were	related	to	both	social	regulation	success	and	the	involvement	of	OFC	in	social	reappraisal.	 Attachment	 security	 has	 previously	 been	 associated	 with	 changes	 in	pain	 ratings	 and	 the	 associated	 neural	 activity	 during	 social	 support	 (Hurter,	Paloyelis,	 Williams,	 &	 Fotopoulou,	 2014;	 Krahé	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Sambo,	 Howard,	Kopelman,	Williams,	&	Fotopoulou,	2010).		The	 study	 involved	 two	additional	 analyses	 to	 further	 specify	 the	neural	 network	supporting	 social	 reappraisal.	 Firstly,	 there	 was	 a	 high	 (around	 60	 %)	 overlap	between	 the	 social	 reappraisal	 network	 and	 the	 default	mode	 network	 identified	from	resting-state	data	of	the	same	participants.	The	overlap	confirmed	that	social	reappraisal	 indeed	 largely	 involved	 the	 default	 mode	 network.	 Secondly,	 social	reappraisal	 was	 contrasted	 with	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal.	 The	 self-social	reappraisal	 network	 overlap	 demonstrated	 that	 both	 types	 of	 emotion	 regulation	
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recruited	 a	 cognitive	 control	 network,	 including	 dorsolateral	 and	medial	 PFC	 and	the	 inferior	 parietal	 cortex.	 Crucially,	 social	 reappraisal-specific	 brain	 regions	 (in	contrast	to	intrapersonal	reappraisal)	spanned	dorsomedial	PFC,	precuneus	and	left	TPJ,	all	of	which	belong	to	the	so-called	‘social	default	mode	network’,	i.e.,	a	default	mode	network	sub-network	involved	in	social	cognitive	processes	(Schilbach	et	al.,	2012).		In	 summary,	 project	 3	 extends	 the	 regulation	 part	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	delineating	 the	 neural	 underpinnings	 of	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation,	particularly	 social	 reappraisal.	 The	 project	 shows	 that	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	regulation	recruits	 the	default	mode	network,	whose	regions	are	 involved	 in	both	cognitive	emotion	regulation	and	social	cognitive	processes	(Lindquist	et	al.,	2012;	Schilbach	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 It	 further	 demonstrates	 the	 relevance	 of	 individual	differences	in	attachment	security	for	social	reappraisal	effectiveness.	
	
Project	 4	 (unpublished)	 set	 out	 to	 determine	 the	 impact	 of	 social	 emotion	modulation	 on	 aversive	 conditioning	 in	 the	 insula,	 to	 better	 delineate	 the	 role	 of	insula	 and	 its	 subregions	 in	 social-emotional	behaviour.	 In	detail,	we	 investigated	the	 influence	 of	 a	 social	 context	 change	 (i.e.,	 from	 ‘alone’	 to	 ‘social’)	 on	 insular	activity	with	 regard	 to	3	dimensions:	 aversive	 stimulus	–	prediction	error-related	activity	 (distinct	 types	 of	 activity,	 both	 relevant	 for	 emotional	 behaviour	 (Mulej	Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Ouden	 et	 al.,	 2012)),	 anterior	 –	 posterior	 insula	 (due	 to	 the	proposed	 posterior-to-anterior	 functional	 gradient	 in	 the	 insula	 (Craig,	 2009;	 Gu,	Hof,	Friston,	&	Fan,	2013;	Lamm	&	Singer,	2010;	Seth,	2013)),	and	right	–	left	insula	(due	 to	 their	 control	 of	 sympathetic	 and	 parasympathetic	 nervous	 systems,	respectively	 (Craig,	 2009;	 2005;	 2010)).	 Participants	 were	 exposed	 to	 aversive	Pavlovian	 conditioning,	 with	 highly	 negative	 pictures	 serving	 as	 unconditioned	stimuli.	 A	 psychotherapist,	 whom	 they	 had	 met	 in	 person	 before	 scanning,	accompanied	 them	 in	 half	 of	 the	 experiment	 (seemingly	 live	 via	 a	 camera-microphone	system;	in	reality,	videos	were	used);	in	the	other	half,	they	completed	the	task	while	being	alone.	Both	self	and	social	sessions	resembled	a	no-regulation	condition	 of	 a	 typical	 emotion	 regulation	 experiment,	 with	 participants	 or	 the	
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psychotherapist	 (depending	 on	 the	 condition)	 not	 trying	 to	 change	 participants’	emotions.		Results	demonstrated	that	the	presence	of	a	trustworthy	person	supressed	aversive	stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	posterior,	 but	 not	 the	 anterior,	 insula.	 In	 contrast,	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	was	enhanced	in	the	anterior,	but	not	the	posterior,	insula.	The	differential	effect	of	social	context	on	activity	types	in	the	two	insula	subregions	reinforces	the	view	of	a	posterior-to-anterior	functional	gradient	in	the	insula,	which	suggests	that	functional	complexity	increases	from	posterior	to	anterior	 insula	 parts	 (Craig,	 2009;	 Gu	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Lamm	 &	 Singer,	 2010;	 Seth,	2013).	 Furthermore,	 the	 study	 showed	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 social	 context	 was	positively	 correlated	with	 behavioural	 aversive	 learning	 performance	 in	 the	 right	insula,	but	negatively	correlated	with	the	same	performance	in	the	left	insula.	This	second	 finding	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 differential	 control	 of	 sympathetic	 and	parasympathetic	nervous	 systems	by	 the	 right	 and	 left	 insula,	 respectively	 (Craig,	2009;	2005;	2010).		Altogether,	project	4	extends	the	regulation	part	of	emotion	regulation	by	exploring	the	 effects	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 on	 distinct	 types	 of	 neural	 activity	 in	different	 insula	 subregions.	 Importantly,	 the	 project	 also	 takes	 the	 motivational	aspect	of	emotions	into	account	by	analysing	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	insula,	 thus	 additionally	 touching	 on	 and	 expanding	 the	 emotion	part	 of	 emotion	regulation.	 As	 such,	 the	 last	 project	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	 represents	 a	 study	 that	fully	 incorporates	 the	 extended	 account	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 considering	emotions	to	be	more	than	responses	to	stimuli,	as	well	as	 incorporating	the	so-far	under-investigated	social	modulation	of	emotion.		
6.2	Analysis	of	Relevant	Effects	Across	Projects	As	a	whole,	projects	of	the	current	thesis	expand	the	concept	of	emotion	regulation.	To	 that	 end,	 each	 project	 focused	 on	 a	 specific	 emotion	 regulation	 type	 and	examined	its	effect	on	relevant	brain	activity	and/or	connectivity.	The	projects	thus	covered	 three	 types	 of	 emotion	 regulation:	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 (projects	 1	
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and	2),	social	reappraisal	(project	3)	and	social	emotion	modulation	(project	4),	and	focused	 on	 specific	 research	 questions	 (see	 section	 6.1	 Key	 Findings	 and	 their	
Implications	 for	 Emotion	 Regulation).	 The	 current	 section	 discusses	 noteworthy	similarities	and	differences	 in	emotion	regulation	effects	across	projects.	The	 first	part	 of	 the	 section	 examines	 effects	 of	 different	 regulation	 types	 on	 aversive	stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	 posterior	 insula	 (drawing	 on	 projects	 1,	 3	 and	 4),	while	the	second	part	focuses	on	the	effects	of	intrapersonal	reappraisal	and	social	emotion	 modulation	 on	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 anterior	 insula	(drawing	on	projects	1	and	4).		
6.2.1	Reduction	of	Stimulus	Activity	Across	Regulation	Types	in	the	Posterior	Insula	A	 closer	 examination	 of	 results	 from	 projects	 1,	 3	 and	 4	 reveals	 that	 aversive	stimulus-related	 activity	was	 reduced	 in	 the	posterior	 insula	 in	 all	 three	projects.	Since	 each	 project	 focused	 on	 a	 different	 type	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 this	 implies	that	 all	 three	 types	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 (i.e.,	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal,	 social	reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	 modulation)	 similarly	 affected	 emotion-related	activity	in	the	posterior	insula.		The	reduction	of	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	during	intrapersonal	reappraisal	was	centred	on	bilateral	posterior	regions	of	the	posterior	insula	(local	maxima	at	x	=	-39,	y	=	-22,	y	=	1	and	x	=	39,	y	=	-16,	y	=	-2;	see	Supplementary	Material	of	project	1).	 Social	 reappraisal	 reduced	 stimulus-related	 activity	 in	 the	 left	 anterior	 part	 of	the	posterior	insula	(at	x	=	-39,	y	=	-1,	y	=	1;	see	Supplementary	Material	of	project	3).	Finally,	during	social	emotion	modulation,	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	was	suppressed	 in	 bilateral	 posterior	 parts	 of	 the	 posterior	 insula	 (region	 of	 interest	analysis	for	spheres	centred	around	x	=	-41,	y	=	-20,	z	=	16	and	x	=	45,	y	=	-20,	z	=	16;	 see	Methods	 and	 Results	 of	 project	 4).	 Since	 project	 4	 employed	 a	 region-of-interest	 analysis	 and	 the	 coordinates	 above	 thus	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	 strongest	suppression	 of	 activity	 within	 the	 posterior	 insula,	 an	 additional	 whole	 brain	analysis	 was	 carried	 out	 (thresholded	 at	 p	 <	 0.05,	 FWE	 cluster-corrected,	 with	 a	height	threshold	of	p	<	0.005	and	an	extent	threshold	of	180	voxels)	on	the	contrast	no	 regulation	 >	 regulation	 for	 social	 emotion	modulation.	 It	 revealed	 that	 during	social	 emotion	 modulation,	 aversive	 stimulus-related	 activity	 was	 maximally	
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reduced	in	bilateral	posterior	insula	at	x	=	45,	y	=	-10,	z	=	1	(i.e.,	the	anterior	part	of	the	right	posterior	insula)	and	x	=	-39,	y	=	-22,	z	=	13	(i.e.,	the	posterior	part	of	the	left	posterior	insula).	
Figure	1:	Overlap	of	 the	contrast	no	regulation	>	regulation	 for	aversive	stimulus-related	activity	 during	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 (in	 red),	 social	 reappraisal	 (in	 blue)	 and	 social	emotion	modulation	(in	green).	The	activation	maps	were	thresholded	at	a	height	threshold	of	p	<	0.001	(uncorrected);	x	=	-41.		To	get	a	better	overview	of	the	effects,	the	three	activation	maps	from	the	contrast	no	 regulation	 >	 regulation	 for	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal,	 social	 reappraisal	 and	social	emotion	modulation	were	overlapped	with	each	other,	each	thresholded	at	a	height	threshold	of	p	<	0.001	(uncorrected).	As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	1,	the	effects	of	intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 (depicted	 in	 red)	 and	 social	 reappraisal	 (in	 blue)	overlapped	 in	 the	 anterior	 part	 of	 the	 left	 posterior	 insula,	 while	 intrapersonal	reappraisal	(in	red)	and	social	emotion	modulation	(in	green)	effects	overlapped	in	the	 posterior	 region	 of	 the	 left	 posterior	 insula.	 Despite	 the	 clear	 anatomical	separation,	 the	 affected	 anterior	 and	 posterior	 subregions	 of	 the	 posterior	 insula	were	 found	 to	 be	 highly	 similar	 in	 function	 by	 a	 recent	 meta-analysis:	 both	subregions	 are	 a	 part	 of	 the	 insula	 that	 is	 typically	 associated	with	 sensorimotor	processing,	interoception	and	pain	(Kurth,	Zilles,	Fox,	Laird,	&	Eickhoff,	2010).	It	is	nevertheless	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 social	 reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	modulation	 seem	 to	 target	 different	 sub-parts	 of	 the	 posterior	 insula;	 further	studies	could	help	delineate	functional	differences	between	the	affected	insula	sub-parts	to	better	explain	the	disparate	effects	of	social	regulation	types.	
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More	generally,	posterior	insula	represents	interoceptive	states	and	bodily	feelings,	and	also	relays	these	to	the	anterior	insula,	which	then	generates	subjective	feeling	states	(Bauernfeind	et	al.,	2013;	Craig,	2009;	2003;	Kurth	et	al.,	2010;	V.	Menon	&	Uddin,	 2010).	 It	 is	 thus	 highly	 beneficial	 to	 target	 activity	 in	 the	 posterior	 insula	related	 to	 the	 processing	 of	 aversive	 emotional	 stimuli	 when	 trying	 to	 regulate	emotions.	 Indeed,	 the	 finding	 that	 emotional	 stimulus-related	 activity	 was	suppressed	in	the	posterior	insula	by	various	types	of	emotion	regulation	is	in	line	with	a	variety	of	previous	 studies:	 e.g.,	 those	employing	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	(Kanske	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 McRae	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Ochsner	 et	 al.,	 2004),	 intrapersonal	distraction	(Kanske	et	al.,	2011;	McRae	et	al.,	2010),	or	social	emotion	modulation	(Younger	et	al.,	2010).	All-in-all,	results	of	the	additional	analysis	across	projects	1,	3	and	4	indicate:	1)	that	emotional	stimulus-related	activity	in	the	posterior	insula	is	 reduced	 by	 emotion	 regulation	 across	 regulation	 types;	 and	 2)	 that	 social	reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 seem	 to	 target	 different	 parts	 of	 the	posterior	 insula,	 whose	 potential	 functional	 differences,	 however,	 are	 yet	 to	 be	revealed.		
6.2.2	Enhancement	of	Prediction	Error	Activity	Across	Regulation	Types	in	the	Anterior	
Insula	Two	projects	 of	 the	 current	 thesis,	 projects	 1	 and	 4,	 looked	 at	 effects	 of	 emotion	regulation	on	prediction	error-related	activity.	Despite	the	use	of	different	emotion	regulation	 types	 (i.e.,	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	 modulation,	respectively),	 a	 similar	 effect	 across	 both	 projects	 stands	 out:	 1)	 both	 types	 of	emotion	regulation	enhanced	(rather	than	reduced)	prediction	error-related	brain	activity;	and	2)	both	regulation	types	enhanced	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	right	anterior	 insula.	At	 the	 first	glance,	 the	 focus	of	effect	within	 the	anterior	insula	 appears	 to	 differ	 across	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	modulation.		Intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 enhanced	 prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 a	 more	posterior	 ventral	 part	 of	 the	 right	 anterior	 insula	 (whole-brain	 analysis,	 local	maximum	at	x	=	42,	y	=	-4,	z	=	-17;	see	Supplementary	Material	of	project	1).	Social	emotion	modulation,	on	the	other	hand,	enhanced	prediction	error-related	activity	
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in	a	more	anterior	part	of	the	right	anterior	insula	(region	of	interest	analysis	for	a	sphere	centred	around	x	=	40,	y	=	24,	z	=	-8;	see	Methods	and	Results	of	project	4).	To	check	whether	intrapersonal	reappraisal	and	social	emotion	modulation	indeed	targeted	 different	 subregions	 of	 the	 anterior	 insula,	 additional	 region-of-interest	analyses	were	carried	out.	Two	spherical	regions	of	interest	were	used,	centred	on	above-presented	coordinates	from	projects	1	and	4,	with	a	radius	of	8	mm.	Data	of	project	4	 on	 social	 emotion	modulation	were	 re-analysed	 first:	 after	 extracting	β-values	 from	 the	 region	 of	 interest	 defined	 by	 results	 of	 project	 1	 (posterior-anterior-insula	 sphere	 centre	 at	 x	 =	 42,	 y	 =	 -4,	 z	 =	 -17),	 no	 significant	 effect	was	revealed	(t	=	-0.752,	p	=	0.463).	Data	of	project	1	on	intrapersonal	reappraisal	were	re-analysed	 next:	 after	 extracting	 β-values	 from	 the	 region	 of	 interest	 defined	 by	project	4	(anterior-anterior-insula	sphere	centre	at	x	=	40,	y	=	24,	z	=	-8),	I	found	a	significant	effect	of	intrapersonal	reappraisal	on	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	 anterior	 part	 of	 the	 anterior	 insula,	 equal	 to	 that	 affected	 by	 social	 emotion	modulation	(t	=	2.291,	p	=	0.034).		Firstly,	it	is	interesting	that	both	types	of	emotion	regulation,	albeit	very	different	in	nature,	 enhanced	 (rather	 than	 reduced)	 prediction-error	 related	 brain	 activity.	Owing	 to	 the	 narrow	 definition	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 currently	 in	 use,	 very	 few	studies	 to	 date	 have	 investigated	 the	 effects	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 on	 prediction	error-related	 activity.	 One	 recent	 study	 showed	 that	 mild	 stress,	 which	 typically	invokes	automatic	emotion	regulation	(Mauss,	Bunge,	&	Gross,	2007;	Phillips	et	al.,	2008),	 similarly	 increased	aversive	prediction	error-related	activity	 in	 the	ventral	striatum	(Robinson	et	al.,	2013).	Considering	findings	of	projects	1	and	4	together	with	 those	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 study,	 it	 seems	 that	 an	 enhancement	 of	prediction	 error-related	 activity	 might	 be	 a	 general	 effect	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	across	 regulation	 types.	 However,	 further	 studies,	 employing	 a	 wider	 range	 of	emotion	regulation	types	and	a	larger	sample	could	help	confirm	this	hypothesis.		Secondly,	 both	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 and	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 affected	prediction	 error-related	 activity	 in	 the	 anterior	 insula.	 The	 anterior	 insula	 has	previously	 been	 associated	 with	 prediction	 errors,	 including	 aversive	 prediction	errors	 (Garrison	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Kim,	 Shimojo,	 &	 O’Doherty,	 2006;	 Pessiglione,	
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Seymour,	Flandin,	Dolan,	&	Frith,	2006;	Seymour	et	al.,	2004),	making	it	possible	for	emotion	 regulation	 to	 target	 this	 specific	 type	 of	 activity	 in	 the	 region.	 In	 a	more	general	sense,	anterior	insula	is	thought	to	support	emotional	awareness,	is	known	to	be	involved	in	complex	human	emotions,	including	social	emotions,	and	contains	von	Economo	neurons,	which	only	occur	in	a	few	species	that	have	highly	developed	social	skills	(Allman	et	al.,	2010;	Craig,	2009;	Gu	et	al.,	2013;	Hogeveen,	Bird,	Chau,	Krueger,	 &	 Grafman,	 2016;	 Kelly	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kurth	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Lamm	&	 Singer,	2010;	 Seth,	 2013;	 Singer,	 Critchley,	 &	 Preuschoff,	 2009).	 Therefore,	 targeting	prediction	error-related	activity	in	the	anterior	insula	might	represent	the	means	by	which	you	could	have	a	profound	effect	on	the	person’s	general	emotional	state	and	awareness	–	in	other	words,	by	which	you	could	regulate	the	person’s	emotions	in	a	more	general	sense,	without	disregarding	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions.		Last	 but	 not	 least,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 and	 social	emotion	modulation	 influenced	prediction	error-related	activity	 in	an	overlapping	subregion	 of	 the	 anterior	 insula:	 the	 utmost	 anterior	 part	 of	 the	 right	 anterior	insula.	This	 is	noteworthy	 considering	 the	processing	hierarchy	within	 the	 insula,	which	highlights	increasing	complexity	towards	anterior	insula	parts	(Craig,	2009;	2011;	2010).	In	other	words,	since	the	very	anterior	insula	integrates	various	types	of	information	and	represents	complex	emotional	and	motivational	states,	targeting	this	 insula	 subregion	 maximally	 enhances	 the	 potential	 impact	 on	 emotions	 and	general	emotional	awareness.	
 
6.3	Methodological	Considerations	Considering	that	the	four	projects	included	in	this	thesis	employed	novel	paradigms	or	 paradigm	 combinations	 to	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 various	 emotion	 regulation	types	 on	 different	 kinds	 of	 emotional	 brain	 activity	 (i.e.,	 aversive	 stimulus-	 and	aversive	 prediction	 error-related	 activity),	 some	methodological	 issues	 should	 be	noted.	 The	 current	 section	 outlines	 the	 most	 relevant	 methodological	considerations	and	provides	 further	clarification,	as	well	as	suggestions	 for	 future	improvement	 of	 paradigms	 and	 analyses.	 It	 addresses:	 1)	 the	 choice	 of	 a	standardized	 picture	 set	 for	 emotion-evoking	 stimuli;	 2)	 the	 employment	 of	Pavlovian	 conditioning	 and	 the	 Rescorla	 Wanger	 model	 to	 investigate	 the	
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motivational	aspect	of	emotions;	and	3)	the	use	of	a	psychotherapist	for	the	study	of	social	emotion	regulation.		
6.3.1	Standardised	Aversive	Emotional	Stimuli	All	four	projects	of	the	current	thesis	investigated	the	impact	of	emotion	regulation	on	 aversive	 emotions	 and	 related	 neural	 processes,	which	 required	 that	 negative	emotions	be	evoked	in	all	participants	in	a	reliable	way.	To	that	end,	a	standardised	set	of	pictures	–	the	International	Affective	Picture	System	(IAPS)	(Lang,	Bradley,	&	Cuthbert,	2008)	–	was	used	in	all	projects,	out	of	which	those	pictures	with	both	the	highest	 arousal	 and	 most	 negative	 valence	 scores	 were	 selected.	 	 Such	 a	standardised	set	of	pictures,	whose	arousal	and	valence	scores	have	been	tested	on	a	 large	 group	 of	 subjects	 and	were	 found	 stable	with	 regard	 to	 both	within-	 and	between-subject	reliability	(Lang	et	al.,	2008),	provide	a	dependable	set	of	stimuli	for	 evoking	 aversive	 emotions.	 They	 were	 indeed	 the	 stimuli	 of	 choice	 for	many	existing	emotion	regulation	experiments,	as	evident	from	a	recent	meta-analysis	of	neuroimaging	reappraisal	studies	(Buhle	et	al.,	2014).		Nevertheless,	 using	 participant-specific	 arousal	 and	 valence	 scores	 to	 select	appropriate	pictures	within	the	set	would	provide	an	even	surer	means	of	evoking	strong	 emotional	 responses	 in	 the	 participant	 group,	 compared	 with	 relying	 on	standardised	ratings.	Moreover,	such	participant-specific	picture	evaluations	would	allow	 for	 additional	 analyses	 related	 to	 inter-individual	 differences	 in	 emotional	responses	 and	 emotion	 regulation.	 It	 is	 also	worth	 noting	 that	 aversive	 emotions	can	 be	 better	 evoked	 by	 ecologically	 more	 valid	 stimuli,	 such	 as	 videos	 or	participant-specific	 memories;	 these	 are,	 however,	 more	 difficult	 to	 control	 and	standardise,	potentially	weakening	group	analyses	of	brain	imaging	data.		Another	alternative	to	complex	emotional	materials	are	painful	stimuli,	such	as	mild	electric	 shocks,	 typically	 used	 in	 Pavlovian	 learning	 studies	 (Gläscher	 &	 Büchel,	2005;	M.	Menon	et	al.,	2007;	Seymour	et	al.,	2004;	Spoormaker	et	al.,	2011).	These	reside	at	the	other	end	of	the	‘controllability’	spectrum:	they	represent	simple	and	highly	 dependable	 aversive	 stimuli,	 which	 do	 not	 have	 to	 vary	 in	 content	 to	consistently	 evoke	 an	 aversive	 reaction.	 They	 may	 be,	 however,	 classified	 as	
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‘painful’	rather	than	 ‘emotional’	stimuli,	 thus	potentially	activating	brain	networks	for	both	emotion	and	pain.	In	addition,	reinterpreting	the	same	stimulus	again	and	again	by	way	of	 reappraisal	might	prove	 taxing	 to	 the	participants,	 thus	 lowering	emotion	 regulation	 effectiveness.	 All-in-all,	 choosing	 emotional	 stimuli	 for	 an	emotion	 regulation	 experiment	 is	 not	 trivial;	 the	 chosen	 stimuli	 should	 satisfy	specific	 research	 questions	 in	 the	 best	 possible	way,	without	 compromising	 their	reliability	to	consistently	elicit	emotional	responses	in	all	participants.		
6.3.2	Pavlovian	Learning	and	the	Rescorla	Wagner	Model	To	 extend	 the	 emotion	 part	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 such	 as	 to	 also	 include	 the	motivational	 aspect	 of	 emotions,	 a	 typical	 emotion	 regulation	 paradigm	 was	combined	with	a	Pavlovian	learning	paradigm	in	projects	1,	2	and	4	of	the	current	thesis.	 Pavlovian	 learning	 was	 chosen	 as	 it	 represents	 the	 simplest	 form	 of	associative	 learning,	 thus	 providing	 the	 possibility	 to	 combine	 the	 paradigm	with	emotion	regulation	without	making	the	experiment	too	difficult	for	participants,	as	well	as	 for	 interpreting	potential	 results.	Correspondingly,	 the	most	parsimonious	model	 to	 account	 for	 Pavlovian	 learning	 is	 the	 Rescorla	Wagner	model,	 involving	three	parameters,	prediction,	prediction	error,	and	learning	rate	(Pearce	&	Bouton,	2001;	 Rescorla	&	Wagner,	 1972;	 Schultz	&	Dickinson,	 2000).	 Given	 its	 simplicity,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Rescorla	 Wagner	 model	 accounts	 for	 prediction	 error,	 the	parameter	that	drives	learning	and	might	thus	represent	the	motivational	aspect	of	emotions,	 the	 chosen	model	 provides	 an	 excellent	 basis	 for	 the	 study	 of	 emotion	regulation	in	a	wider	context,	as	in	projects	1,	2	and	4	of	the	current	thesis.			It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	the	Rescorla	Wagner	model	can	only	account	for	classical	 conditioning,	 and	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 explain	 other	 forms	 of	 associative	learning,	which	humans	commonly	use,	such	as	higher	order	associative	learning	or	reinforcement	 learning	 (Ouden,	 2009).	 Furthermore,	 associative	 learning	 can	 also	be	modelled	by	an	alternative	approach	–	the	Bayesian	learning	models,	which	not	only	 account	 for	 point	 estimates	 of	 learning-related	 associations,	 but	 also	 employ	full	 posterior	 distributions,	 taking	 into	 account	 both	 the	 probabilities	 of	associations	 and	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 these	 probabilities	 (Ouden,	 2009).	 Bayesian	learning	models	are	more	difficult	to	interpret,	but	have	recently	gained	significance	
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and	 have	 also	 successfully	 been	 applied	 to	 Pavlovian	 and	 reinforcement	 learning	(Behrens,	Woolrich,	Walton,	 &	 Rushworth,	 2007;	 Chater,	 Oaksford,	 Hahn,	 &	 Heit,	2010;	 Courville,	 Daw,	 &	 Touretzky,	 2006;	 Yoshida,	 Dolan,	 &	 Friston,	 2008).	 In	summary,	 while	 the	 Rescorla	 Wagner	 model	 is	 a	 sensible	 choice	 for	 modelling	prediction	 errors	 in	 a	 classical	 conditioning	 study,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 carefully	consider	 which	 models	 are	 best	 fitted	 for	 certain	 experimental	 paradigms	 and	research	questions.	Future	studies	could	address	the	question	of	whether	emotion	regulation	 influences	 prediction	 error-related	 brain	 processes	 in	 other	 forms	 of	associative	learning,	such	as	reinforcement	learning.		
6.3.3	Psychotherapist	as	the	Social	Regulator	To	extend	the	regulation	part	of	emotion	regulation,	projects	3	and	4	of	the	current	thesis	 used	 a	 psychotherapist	 to	 study	 effects	 of	 social	 reappraisal	 and	 social	emotion	 modulation,	 respectively.	 When	 another	 person	 is	 regulating	 your	emotions,	 your	 relationship	 and	 the	 person’s	 significance	 in	 your	 life	 play	 an	important	 role	 in	 how	 successful	 they	might	 be	 at	 influencing	 your	 feelings.	 It	 is	reasonable	to	assume	that	an	established	close	relationship	might	lead	to	stronger	and	 more	 successful	 social	 emotion	 regulation	 and	 modulation.	 However,	 it	 is	equally	important	that	the	target	of	regulation	interprets	the	regulator’s	intentions	as	 positive.	 If	 the	 target	 believes	 that	 the	 regulator	 is	 helping	 them	 because	 they	think	them	incapable	of	controlling	their	own	emotions	well,	this	could	undermine	the	regulation	success	(Reeck	et	al.,	2015).			A	way	 to	 standardise	 the	 relationship	with	 the	 regulator	 across	 participants	 is	 to	use	a	newly	acquainted	individual,	with	whom	all	participants	form	a	similar	social	connection	 within	 a	 predetermined	 time.	 It	 is	 naturally	 very	 difficult	 to	 form	 a	meaningful	 bond	 with	 a	 stranger	 in	 a	 short	 time,	 but	 most	 people	 have	 positive	preconceptions	about	psychotherapists	(e.g.,	that	they	have	experience	with	helping	people	 feel	 better,	 that	 they	 can	 be	 trusted),	 and	 compared	 to	 an	 unfamiliar	stranger,	 a	 psychotherapist	 is	more	 likely	 to	be	perceived	 as	both	 competent	 and	warm	 –	 two	 main	 traits	 that	 determine	 the	 perception	 of	 another	 person	 on	 an	initial	encounter	(Fiske,	Cuddy,	&	Glick,	2007).	Using	a	psychotherapist	 in	a	social	emotion	 regulation	 experiment	 thus	 represents	 a	 good	 balance	 between	 social	
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connection	strength	and	comparability	across	participants.	However,	 it	represents	but	 one	 way	 to	 realise	 successful	 social	 emotion	 regulation.	 Future	 experiments	could	 investigate	 the	 influence	of	 social	 relationships	on	social	 regulation	success,	as	 well	 as	 possible	 differences	 in	 brain	 mechanisms	 supporting	 social	 emotion	regulation	when	implemented	by	different	regulators.			
6.4	Future	Directions	Projects	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	 offer	 a	 foundation	 for	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 future	studies	 that	 could	 offer	 additional	 support	 for	 the	 extended	 account	 of	 emotion	regulation	 and	 further	 expand	 the	 concept.	 The	 current	 section	 outlines	 three	projects	 that	 build	 on	 studies	 from	 the	 current	 thesis	 by	 either	 employing	alternative	analysis	methods	or	using	novel	paradigms	to	address	specific	research	questions.	 The	 first	 proposed	 project	 expands	 the	 view	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	using	 graph	 analysis	 to	 examine	 global	whole-brain	 changes	during	 intrapersonal	and	 social	 cognitive	 emotion	 regulation.	 The	 second	 project	 addresses	 a	fundamental	 aspect	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation:	 can	 the	 presence	 of	 another	affect	your	brain	state	even	 in	 the	absence	of	emotional	stimuli?	Finally,	 the	 third	study	 explores	 whether	 joint	 attention,	 an	 essential	 building	 block	 of	 social	interaction,	 is	 crucial	 for	 successful	 social	emotion	modulation,	 such	 that	 it	drives	the	success	of	modulation.		
6.4.1	Global	Brain	Interaction	Effects	of	Emotion	Regulation	Existing	neuroimaging	studies	on	emotion	regulation	effects,	including	those	of	the	current	 thesis,	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 effects	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 on	 local	 changes	 in	brain	activity	and/or	connectivity.	However,	some	neurobiological	theories	suggest	that	 emotion	 regulation	 is	 in	 fact	 realised	by	 increased	 interactions	 among	global	functional	brain	networks	spanning	the	entire	brain	(Barrett,	Wilson-Mendenhall,	&	Barsalou,	2014;	Gross	&	Barrett,	2011;	Lindquist	&	Barrett,	2012).	In	contrast	to	the	conventional	local	activation	and	connectivity	analyses	based	on	the	general	linear	model,	 graph	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 structural	 and	 functional	 data	 allows	 one	 to	examine	 the	 global	 structure	 of	 interactions	 among	 regions	 of	 the	 entire	 brain	(Bullmore	&	 Sporns,	 2009).	 The	proposed	project	would	 re-analyse	 intrapersonal	
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reappraisal	 and	 social	 reappraisal	 effects	by	employing	graph	analysis,	 to	 test	 the	assumptions	of	global	neurobiological	theories.		The	entire	brain	would	be	parcellated	into	functionally	and	structurally	meaningful	regions	of	interest,	after	which	two	graphs	with	nodes	(i.e.,	brain	regions)	and	edges	(i.e.,	emotion-related	functional	connections	between	them)	would	be	created,	one	for	 the	 regulation,	 and	 one	 for	 the	 no	 regulation	 condition.	 In	 line	 with	 global	theories,	two	main	hypotheses	would	be	tested.	First,	modularity,	a	global	measure	of	 graph’s	 decomposability	 into	 functional	 modules	 (Bullmore	 &	 Sporns,	 2009),	should	remain	stable	across	no	regulation	and	regulation	conditions,	following	the	idea	that	similar	functional	brain	networks	support	both	types	of	emotional	states	(Barrett	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Lindquist	 &	 Barrett,	 2012).	 Second,	 global	 participation,	 a	measure	 of	 connection	 strength	 between	 each	 node	 and	 nodes	 of	 other	modules	(Guimerà	&	Amaral,	2005),	should	increase	during	emotion	regulation,	reflecting	an	increased	 interaction	 between	 functional	 brain	 networks	 due	 to	 reappraisal	(Barrett	et	al.,	2014;	Lindquist	&	Barrett,	2012).	Using	a	different	analysis	method,	the	 study	would	 expand	 the	 view	of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	 highlighting	 currently	unknown	 global	 brain	 interaction	 effects	 of	 intrapersonal	 reappraisal	 and	 social	reappraisal.		
6.4.2	Social	Emotion	Modulation	Effects	on	Intrinsic	Brain	States	Several	studies	have	shown	that	when	a	person	is	exposed	to	threatening	stimuli	or	find	themselves	in	a	threatening	situation,	the	presence	of	a	supportive	person	can	attenuate	aversive	emotions	and	reduce	stress	(Conner	et	al.,	2012;	Eisenberger	et	al.,	 2011;	Onoda	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Younger	 et	 al.,	 2010).	However,	 not	much	 is	 known	about	the	effects	of	social	emotion	modulation	in	the	absence	of	threatening	stimuli	or	 any	 stimuli	 at	 all.	 It	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 supportive	conspecifics,	 in	contrast	 to	being	alone,	 is	potentially	reflected	by	a	 fundamentally	different	 brain	 state,	 potentially	 reflecting	 a	 reduction	 of	 general	 threat	 vigilance	(Beckes	&	Coan,	2011;	Coan,	2011;	Coan	&	Sbarra,	2015).	In	line	with	this	proposal,	a	 recent	 study	 confirmed	 that	 activity	 in	 threat-sensitive	 regions	was	 reduced	 by	social	 emotion	modulation	 during	 inter-trial	 intervals	 of	 an	 emotion	 experiment,	i.e.,	in	the	absence	of	direct	emotional	stimulation	(Zhang,	Li,	Beckes,	&	Coan,	2013).	
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However,	 effects	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 on	 intrinsic	 brain	 networks,	reflecting	 functional	 brain	 organisation	 during	 rest,	 i.e.,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	external	stimulation,	remain	unclear.		The	 proposed	 study	 would	 use	 independent	 component	 analysis	 to	 analyse	 data	acquired	during	resting	state	(i.e.,	while	participants	 lied	in	the	scanner	with	their	eyes	 closed	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 input)	 in	 two	 conditions:	 a	 social	 presence	condition,	 in	 which	 participants	 would	 have	 the	 feeling	 of	 being	 connected	 to	 a	person	 outside	 the	 scanner,	 and	 an	 alone	 condition,	 in	 which	 they	 would	 be	completely	 on	 their	 own.	 The	 analysis	 of	 differences	 between	 social	 and	 alone	conditions	would	focus	on	the	default	mode	network,	due	to	its	strong	involvement	in	social-emotional	processes	(Amft	et	al.,	2015;	Mars	et	al.,	2012;	Schilbach	et	al.,	2012).	 More	 specifically,	 changes	 during	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 might	 be	focused	 on	 the	 dorsomedial	 PFC,	 a	 social	 safety-signalling	 region	 (Eisenberger,	2013),	 or	 on	 the	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex,	which	 is	 known	 to	 reflect	 associations	between	supportive	social	and	threatening	stimuli	(Eisenberger,	2013;	Zhang	et	al.,	2013).	 Altogether,	 the	 proposed	 project	 would	 expand	 the	 view	 of	 emotion	regulation	 by	 examining	 the	 effects	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 on	 intrinsic	functional	brain	states	in	the	absence	of	any	external	stimulation.		
6.4.3	Joint	Attention	as	the	Driving	Force	of	Social	Emotion	Modulation	Despite	 many	 reports	 of	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 effectiveness	 (Conner	 et	 al.,	2012;	Eisenberger	et	al.,	2011;	Onoda	et	al.,	2009;	Younger	et	al.,	2010),	it	remains	unexplored	 exactly	 what	 part	 or	 parts	 of	 the	 social	 interaction	 are	 driving	 the	modulation	 and	 what	 neural	 mechanisms	 support	 this	 process.	 One	 of	 the	 basic	building	blocks	of	a	successful	social	interaction	is	the	ability	to	share	attention,	also	called	 joint	 attention	 (Moore	 &	 Dunham,	 1995).	 Based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 joint	attention	 is	especially	 important	 for	 trustful	 interactions	 in	threatening	situations,	the	proposed	project	would	explore	whether	joint	attention	is	the	essential	part	of	social	emotion	modulation,	driving	its	effectiveness.		A	 combined	 eye	 tracking	 –	 fMRI	 experiment	 would	 be	 carried	 out,	 during	 which	participants	would	interact	with	an	avatar	on	the	computer	screen,	convinced	that	
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the	avatar	is	being	controlled	by	another	participant	they	had	just	met.	The	set-up	was	 recently	 developed	 to	 recreate	 a	 natural	 joint	 attention	 setting	 in	 an	experimental	MRI	environment	(Pfeiffer	et	al.,	2014;	Schilbach	et	al.,	2010).	 In	the	proposed	project,	 the	 set-up	would	be	modified	 to	 additionally	 include	 a	 classical	conditioning	paradigm	with	electric	shocks	as	unconditioned	stimuli,	to	evoke	fear.	We	 would	 first	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 joint	 attention	 is	 both	 relevant	 and	necessary	for	successful	social	fear	regulation.	With	the	help	of	a	Rescorla	Wagner	model,	 the	 project	 would	 additionally	 examine	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 by	which	 joint	attention	 is	 influencing	 fear	processing:	does	 joint	attention	attenuate	fear	 by	 targeting	 prediction	 (i.e.,	 fear-related)	 and/or	 prediction	 error	 (i.e.,	unexpected	electric	shock-related)	processing?	The	effects	might	be	centred	on	the	ventral	striatum	and	the	anterior	insula,	realised	via	prefrontal	and	parietal	control	mechanisms	 (Mulej	 Bratec	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 The	 proposed	 project	would	 expand	 our	view	 of	 emotion	 regulation	 by	 way	 of	 determining	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 social	emotion	 modulation	 and	 exploring	 the	 underlying	 neural	 mechanisms	 by	 which	joint	attention	is	affecting	human	fear	processing.	
	
6.5	Conclusion	To	navigate	the	ups	and	downs	of	everyday	life	without	too	much	turbulence,	 it	 is	critical	 that	 we	 can	 effectively	 regulate	 our	 emotions.	 Emotion	 dysregulation,	ranging	from	the	inability	to	recognise	the	need	for	emotion	regulation	to	choosing	an	 inappropriate	 regulation	 strategy	 or	wrongly	 implementing	 such	 strategy,	 can	have	 dire	 consequences:	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 affective	 disorders,	 such	 as	 major	depression	 or	 anxiety,	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 problems	 in	 intrapersonal	emotion	 regulation	 (Eftekhari	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Gross	 &	 Jazaieri,	 2014;	 Sheppes	 et	 al.,	2015).	Lacking	the	means	for	social	emotion	regulation	and	modulation	can	be	even	more	 devastating:	 inadequate	 social	 relationships	 are	 associated	with	 a	mortality	risk	that	is	as	high	as	that	of	smoking	(Holt-Lunstad	et	al.,	2010).	It	is	thus	essential	that	we	continue	 to	expand	our	knowledge	of	emotion	regulation,	both	 in	healthy	individuals,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 relation	 to	 affective	 disorders	 and	 disorder-specific	emotional	and	social	impairments.		
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The	 current	 thesis	 complements	 and	 enhances	 our	 current	 understanding	 of	emotion	 regulation.	 It	 offers	 original	 findings	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 intrapersonal	reappraisal,	 social	 emotion	 modulation	 and	 social	 reappraisal	 on	 both	 basic	emotional	response-related	and	motivational	prediction	error-related	brain	activity	and	 connectivity.	 Furthermore,	 by	 adding	 to	 both	 the	 emotion	 and	 the	 regulation	part	 of	 the	 conventional	 view	 of	 emotion	 regulation,	 the	 thesis	 offers	 a	 new	perspective	of	emotion	regulation	that	can	serve	as	a	foundation	for	future	studies.	All	 in	 all,	 the	 thesis	 provides	 a	 small	 but	 relevant	 piece	 to	 the	 puzzle	 of	 emotion	regulation,	 which	 could	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 successful	 treatment	 of	 disorders	hallmarked	 by	 problems	with	 emotion	 regulation	 (such	 as	major	 depression	 and	anxiety	 disorders)	 and/or	 difficulties	 with	 social	 interactions	 (such	 as	 autism	spectrum	disorders).		 	
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